New Cases Added to MLAW: Five SCT Published: Martinez, In Re: Matter of N.R.R. and N.I.R., Walker, Nester, and In Re: Matter of A.T.

by | Apr 4, 2026 | Nevada Family Law Appeals | 0 comments

1.    Martinez v. Martinez, 140 Nev _____, _____ P.3d _____ (Adv. Op., No. 73, November 27, 2024)

Jennifer and Paul Martinez divorced in California in 2015. Jennifer was awarded primary physical custody, and Paul—who had previously suffered seizures and memory loss—received unsupervised visitation after his condition improved. Jennifer later relocated with the child (L.M.) to Nevada. After ongoing visitation problems and a Nevada custody evaluation, the case was transferred from California to Nevada. In Nevada, Paul moved for primary custody and for Jennifer to pay all transportation costs for visitation. Jennifer opposed and sought supervised visitation until Paul underwent neurological testing. The District Court (Rhonda Forsberg) denied both parties’ competing custody modification requests, increased Paul’s visitation, and ordered Jennifer to pay all transportation costs for L.M.’s travel.

Jennifer, the appellant, challenged (1) the order requiring her to pay all transportation costs, arguing the District Court failed to apply Nevada’s child support regulatory scheme and improperly based the decision solely on her past relocation; and (2) the modification of visitation, arguing the court exceeded the scope of the parties’ requests and violated her due process rights.

In Nevada, child support determinations are governed by statutes (e.g., NRS 125B.080) and detailed regulations adopted by the Division of Welfare and Supportive Services. When a court deviates from the base child support formula, it must apply the eight enumerated factors in NAC 425.150, which expressly include “the cost of transportation of the child to and from visitation” (NAC 425.150(1)(e)). Transportation costs must therefore be considered within the child support deviation analysis—not imposed separately. Courts may only modify custody or visitation consistent with the best interest factors in NRS 125C.0035(4), and due process requires notice and an opportunity to be heard on issues under consideration. Custody and visitation determinations are reviewed for abuse of discretion, but legal questions—such as interpretation of statutes and regulations—are reviewed de novo.

The Nevada Supreme Court held that the District Court erred by ordering Jennifer to pay all transportation costs outside the child support framework, reversed the transportation cost ruling and remanded for specific findings under NAC 425.150.

 

2.    In Re: Matter of N.R.R. and N.I.R., 140 Nev ____, ____ P.3d ____ (Adv. Op. No. 77, December 5, 2024)

DFS removed minor real parties in interest N.I.R. and N.R.R. (collectively, the children) from their parents’ care based on substantiated findings of physical risk relating to ongoing domestic violence between their parents. The children were placed with their paternal aunt, who lived with their paternal grandmother. DFS assisted the aunt with rental payments for two months until she became a licensed foster parent, at which point the aunt began receiving foster care subsidies.

The children’s attorney asked DFS for additional rental assistance for the aunt. DFS declined. The aunt requested DFS’s financial assistance during a hearing on a motion to terminate parental rights. After learning that DFS paid the aunt’s rent for two months, the District Court (Margaret Pickard) ordered DFS to pay an additional $1,000 toward the aunt’s rent. DFS sought reconsideration, which the District Court denied after an evidentiary hearing.

DFS sought a writ of mandamus or prohibition and requested that the Supreme Court direct the District Court to vacate its order directing DFS to pay $1,000 for the foster parent’s rent, arguing that the District Court lacked statutory authorization to order it to pay rental assistance. While the District Court’s original order directing payment did not identify any statutes so empowering the court, the court relied on NRS 432B.550(1) in its order denying reconsideration. The children argue that this reliance was not misplaced and that District Courts have broad authority to review and direct DFS action, specifically highlighting NRS 432B.550 and NRS 432B.590(7).

In Nevada, neither NRS 432B.550(1) or NRS 432B.590(7) empower the District Court to order DFS to pay rental assistance to a foster parent. By its plain language, NRS 432B.550(1) permits a court to regulate custodial arrangements as an ongoing matter if the court retains jurisdiction, and subject to conditions, if the court imposes any.

The Supreme Court held that the District Court acted arbitrarily and capriciously when it purported to exercise an authority it did not possess, interfered with DFS’s discretion to administer its budget, and directed the clerk of the court to issue a writ of mandamus directing the District Court to vacate its order.

 

3.     Walker v. Walker, 141 Nev. ___, ___ P.3d ___ (Adv. Opn. No 2, January 9, 2025)

Egan and Laura divorced in 2002. Egan later remarried. In 2011, Egan was appointed to the Second Judicial District Court. As part of his appointment, he had the irrevocable choice to remain with PERS or withdraw from PERS and transfer those service credits to JRS (a.k.a. JPERS). He chose JRS and named his current wife as his beneficiary. When planning for retirement, Egan discovered that PERS and JRS “only allow for a single Option 2 beneficiary.” Egan filed a petition for judicial confirmation and resolution of retirement benefits, asking the court to direct PERS/JRS to designate both Laura and his current wife as Option 2 beneficiaries, with Laura receiving the benefits outlined in the MSA, and his current wife receiving all remaining benefits. Alternatively, Egan asked the court to enter an amended QDRO designating Laura as an alternative payee, and his current wife as his Option 2 beneficiary.

The District Court (William Maddox, Sr.) found that there was no rational basis preventing Egan from designating two different Option 2 beneficiaries for his PERS and JRS accounts, and that he “should be allowed to pick his current spouse as Option 2 for JRS.” The District Court ordered that; (1) Laura was entitled to 4.25 years of PERS credits at the “highest three years of pay into PERS of Egan’s PERS account,” (2) Laura was not entitled to any of Egan’s JRS account, and (3) the parties shall “work out details of the agreement and decide if an amended QDRO is needed.” Following the district court’s order, Laura drafted an amended QDRO that designated herself as an alternative payee “entitled to a portion of Egan’s retirement benefit based on Option 2.” Laura filed a motion for a new trial, and attached a letter from PERS indicating that two Option 2 beneficiaries cannot be designated. The District Court denied the motion, finding in part, that Egan had no reason to believe that PERS or JRS would only recognize one Option 2 beneficiary.

Laura appealed, arguing that the District Court did not have authority to modify the divorce decree or the QDRO, or to designate two Option 2 beneficiaries.

In Nevada, NRS 1A.450(1)(a) permits JRS members to designate more than one Option 2 beneficiary. When a divorce decree provides a former spouse an interest in a PERS member’s retirement account, the member’s transfer to JRS does not extinguish that interest.

The Supreme Court held that the District Court correctly determined that Egan’s former wife and current wife may both be designated as Option 2 beneficiaries. However, the court Reversed and Remanded the District Court’s order with respect to its finding that Laura is not entitled to service credits from Egan’s JRS account.

 

4.     Nester v. Dist. Court (Gamble), ___ Nev. __, __ P.3d __ (141 Nev. Adv. Op. 4, Jan. 30, 2025)

Leanne Nester and Cody Gamble are divorced parents engaged in post decree custody litigation. During consideration of Gamble’s motion to modify custody, a media organization (Our Nevada Judges) requested camera access, which the District Court (Bryce Duckworth) granted. Nester moved to reconsider and sought closure of the custody hearing, arguing that open proceedings would risk disclosure of sensitive information about the children, including medical and Child Protective Services records. The District Court denied her request, reasoning that it lacked discretion to close family law proceedings.

Nester petitioned the Nevada Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus, arguing that the District Court misinterpreted Falconi and wrongly concluded that it had no authority to close custody hearings. She asserted that the court failed to apply the required constitutional balancing test, and that opening the hearing risked significant harm to her children due to the sensitive nature of the information involved.

In Nevada, courts recognize a presumptive First Amendment right of public access to judicial proceedings, including family law matters. However, under Falconi, a hearing may be closed if a party demonstrates that: (1) closure serves a compelling interest; (2) there is a substantial probability that the interest would be harmed without closure; and (3) no reasonable alternatives to closure would adequately protect that interest. Courts retain inherent authority to restrict access when required for the fair administration of justice, and must apply this three-factor test on a case-by-case basis rather than treat openness as mandatory.

The Nevada Supreme Court held that the District Court failed to apply the required Falconi test, wrongly concluding that it lacked authority to close the custody hearing. This failure constituted a manifest abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court of Nevada therefore granted the writ of mandamus, directing the District Court to vacate its order denying closure, and to reconsider the request using the proper constitutional analysis.

 

5.    In Re: Matter of A.T., a Minor., 141 Nev ____, ____ P.3d ____ (Adv. Op. No. 32, June 12, 2025)

Tautiana Bellamy was the mother of four-year-old A.T., whose sibling died from severe injuries inflicted by Bellamy’s boyfriend. Bellamy admitted witnessing prior abuse and failing to protect the children, leading the Department of Family Services (DFS) to take protective custody of A.T. DFS and the District Attorney filed a dependency petition alleging abuse or neglect based on Bellamy’s failure to protect. Bellamy entered a no contest plea, and the District Court (David Gibson, Jr.) accepted it over the prosecution’s objection, treating it as equivalent to an admission for purposes of the NRS Chapter 432B case.

DFS, the District Attorney, and A.T. (through counsel) petitioned for writ relief, arguing that NRS 432B.530 does not permit no contest pleas unless negotiated with and approved by the District Attorney. They asserted that the statute gives only two allowable responses—admit or deny—and that the District Court exceeded its authority by accepting a no contest plea without prosecutorial agreement. They also argued that allowing no contest pleas undermines reunification planning and violates separation of powers principles.

In Nevada, statutory interpretation begins with the statute’s plain meaning, but courts may look to legislative purpose when language is susceptible to multiple reasonable interpretations. Under NRS 432B.530(2), a District Court must inform parties of the allegations and give them an “opportunity to admit or deny” them. The Supreme Court held that this language does not expressly prohibit no contest pleas. The purpose of NRS Chapter 432B—swift resolution of child protection proceedings to minimize harm and instability—supports allowing no contest pleas because they allow cases to proceed as though allegations are true without requiring admissions that may expose a parent to criminal liability. A no contest plea does not infringe on prosecutorial charging authority so long as the court does not negotiate or alter charges.

The Nevada Supreme Court held that a District Court may accept a no contest plea in NRS Chapter 432B dependency proceedings even without agreement from the District Attorney. The court concluded that the statute’s text is not limited to admission or denial, that no contest pleas align with the Legislature’s intent for fast and efficient resolution, and that accepting such pleas does not violate separation of powers principles when the court merely treats the allegations as true and does not negotiate charges. Because the District Court acted within its authority, the petition for writ relief was denied.

Marshal S. Willick
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