1. Lee v. Perry, No. 90830-COA, Order Affirming in Part, Reversing in Part and Remanding (Unpublished Disposition, May 20, 2026)
Nae-Ryung Lee and Joshua Lee Perry married and lived in San Diego with their child, born in 2019. During a 2021 trip to South Korea (Lee’s home country), Joshua and the child returned to the U.S. in 2022 and settled in Las Vegas, while Lee remained abroad before rejoining them. Lee then alleged Joshua had “kidnapped” the child, claiming the parties had agreed to return to South Korea, and filed for divorce in Nevada in October 2022, seeking primary custody and permission to relocate. Lee took the child back to South Korea, where the child remained, and Joshua began a Hague Convention return proceeding there. Through a series of Nevada hearings—several Lee did not attend—the district court (Mari Parlade) first declined custody jurisdiction, was reversed on appeal, then took temporary emergency jurisdiction, and ultimately, on Joshua’s motion for reconsideration, found Nevada had exclusive continuing jurisdiction. In June 2025, it entered an amended decree granting Joshua sole legal and primary physical custody, limiting Lee to weekly supervised parenting time.
Lee appealed. She argued the district court improperly amended its decree on its own initiative more than a year later and violated her due process rights by entering a final custody order without notice that custody would be decided. She also argued the court improperly relied on NRCP 60(a), abused its discretion in awarding sole legal custody on unsupported findings, and awarded sole physical custody without the findings Nevada law requires.
In Nevada, a statutory presumption favors joint legal custody, rebutted when the court finds the parents cannot cooperate, communicate, and compromise in the child’s best interest. Factual findings are upheld if supported by substantial evidence, but no deference is owed to legal error or to conclusory findings that may mask it. Where a parenting-time arrangement so restricts the noncustodial parent that it functions as sole physical custody, the court must make specific written findings—beyond the best-interest factors—that the parent is unfit or that primary custody to one parent is not in the child’s best interest, and must then adopt the least restrictive arrangement consistent with the child’s best interest.
The Court of Appeals affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. On due process, it found Lee had ample notice—through Joshua’s pretrial memorandum, the scheduling hearing, and his reconsideration motion, which she opposed—that custody and jurisdiction were live issues, so the decree was not an improper sua sponte amendment, and any reliance on NRCP 60(a) was harmless. On legal custody, the court found substantial evidence—Lee’s years-long withholding of the child, repeated violations of court orders, and obtaining a foreign passport without Joshua’s consent—supported the conclusion that the parties could not cooperate. On physical custody, however, it held that limiting Lee to weekly supervised parenting time functionally amounted to sole physical custody, which the district court mischaracterized as primary custody and failed to support with the required findings and least-restrictive-alternative analysis. It therefore reversed the physical custody and parenting-time decisions and remanded for either a genuine primary-custody arrangement or adequate findings supporting sole physical custody.
2. Seidlinger v. Hsiung, No. 91401-COA, Order of Affirmance (Unpublished Disposition, May 27, 2026)
Julie Rae Seidlinger and Roger Weibar Hsiung married in 2008 and share three minor children. Julie filed for divorce in 2018. During the proceedings she alleged that Roger physically, verbally, and emotionally abused the children—allegations Roger denied. The family underwent a child custody evaluation in which those allegations were discussed, after which the parties stipulated to joint legal and physical custody, and the court entered a divorce decree adopting that stipulation. About three years later, Julie moved to modify custody to obtain primary physical custody, asserting the children reported that Roger continued the same behavior and attaching journal excerpts, writings, and drawings, while acknowledging she had no independent proof of domestic violence; she also asked that the children be interviewed at the Family Mediation Center. Roger opposed the motion as merely cumulative of her earlier allegations and filed a countermotion alleging parental alienation and seeking primary physical custody. In her reply, Julie added that Roger had recently slapped one child’s hands to force the child to complete a drawing. The district court (Gregory Gordon) denied both the motion and countermotion without an evidentiary hearing, finding the allegations too vague to establish a prima facie case, and denied the request to interview the children. After Julie sought amendment or NRCP 54(b) certification, the court reaffirmed its denial, certified the decision as final, and this appeal followed.
Julie argued first that the district court abused its discretion by denying her modification motion without an evidentiary hearing, contending she had stated a prima facie case, that the court improperly made credibility determinations, and that it wrongly required her to submit admissible evidence. She argued second that the court abused its discretion by denying her request for post-judgment discovery under NRCP 16.21, including her request to have the children interviewed.
In Nevada, a district court’s denial of a motion to modify custody without an evidentiary hearing is reviewed for abuse of discretion, which occurs only where no reasonable judge could reach a similar conclusion. A movant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing only on a showing of “adequate cause”—a prima facie case requiring both a substantial change in circumstances affecting the child’s welfare since the last custody determination and that modification serves the child’s best interest—and demonstrating that prima facie case is a heavy burden grounded in res judicata principles that prevent serial re-litigation. In assessing a prima facie case, the court accepts the movant’s specific allegations as true and looks to the verified pleadings, but need not consider allegations that are general, vague, conclusory, cumulative, impeaching, or that would only support inferences rather than establish grounds for a change. Discovery matters lie within the court’s sound discretion, and post-judgment discovery in family law cases is generally not permitted in custody matters without first setting an evidentiary hearing.
The Court of Appeals held that Julie was not entitled to relief and affirmed. On the modification ruling, the court concluded Julie failed to show that no reasonable judge could have found her allegations too lacking in specificity to make out a prima facie case; her claims about Roger’s conduct were general and nebulous, the record did not show the court made credibility determinations or required admissible evidence (the court expressly viewed her submissions in the light most favorable to her), and even accepting the single hand-slapping incident as true, it did not amount to a substantial change in circumstances affecting the child’s welfare. On discovery, the court held that because the matter was not set for an evidentiary hearing and Julie did not show good cause for post-judgment discovery, the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to order discovery or to have the children interviewed.
3. Fisher v. Wing, No. 91269-COA, Order of Affirmance (Unpublished Disposition, May 28, 2026)
Steven Aaron Fisher and Beatriz M. Wing married in 2011 and divorced in 2023. After Wing sought reconsideration, the district court (Jim Shirley) entered an amended decree dividing community property unequally based on findings that Fisher committed marital waste, and awarded Wing alimony and attorney fees. In a prior appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the alimony award and certain property characterizations but reversed the marital-waste finding and the characterization of a New York Life IRA, and vacated the fee award. On remand, the district court again found the IRA was community property, clarified the alimony award, and awarded Wing roughly $37,419 in attorney fees. This second appeal followed.
Fisher appealed, arguing the district court wrongly denied his motion to change venue from Lander County, again erred in treating the IRA as community property, erred in several other property rulings, erred in awarding alimony, and imposed an unjust and punitive fee award despite his claimed indigency. He also argued the court was biased against him.
In Nevada, an action is generally tried where the defendant resides, and venue may be changed only on a specific showing that an impartial proceeding cannot be had or that witness convenience and the ends of justice require it. Property acquired during marriage is presumed community, and a spouse claiming it is separate must prove that by clear and convincing evidence, including adequate tracing of funds. Issues that could have been raised in a prior appeal are forfeited and fall outside a remand’s scope, and a principle decided on appeal becomes the law of the case. Attorney fee awards rest in the court’s discretion, and judicial bias requires an extrajudicial source or deep-seated antagonism making fair judgment impossible.
The Court of Appeals held that Fisher was not entitled to relief and affirmed. Lander County was proper venue, and Fisher offered no affidavits showing inconvenience or exceptional circumstances. The IRA was presumed community because it was opened during the marriage, and Fisher failed to rebut that presumption because he did not trace the funds. His remaining property arguments fell outside the remand and were forfeited, and the alimony award was the law of the case. The fee award was proper, his indigency claim failed because he had paid the filing fee, and the bias claim lacked any extrajudicial source or deep-seated antagonism.
4. Khalifah v. Hollings, No. 89482-COA, Order of Affirmance (Unpublished Disposition, May 29, 2026)
Hakeem Khalifah and Monique Hollings were never married but have one child, born in 2018. They had a stipulated decree giving them joint legal and physical custody, with Hollings ordered to pay Khalifah child support. Disputes later arose over the child’s schooling, physical custody, and child support. After a four-day evidentiary hearing, the district court (T. Arthur Ritchie, Jr.) ruled in September 2024 that the child should continue at DLA, that neither party had shown a substantial change in circumstances warranting a custody change (though it adjusted the timeshare to week-on-week-off), and that income should be imputed to Khalifah because he had not established he could not work. Khalifah twice moved for reconsideration, citing alternative schools and a disability preventing him from working; the court denied both motions, and he appealed. While that appeal was pending, the parties filed competing motions to modify custody, the matter was remanded, and after another hearing the district court entered an August 2025 order denying both motions for lack of a substantial change in circumstances. Khalifah appealed that order too, and both appeals were consolidated.
On the September 2024 order, Khalifah argued the court abused its discretion in denying his motion to modify physical custody, in keeping the child at DLA, and in imputing income to him despite his asserted disability. On the August 2025 order, he raised substantive challenges (the court ignored allegedly false statements by Hollings, made unsupported findings about his mental health, and overlooked evidence the child was exposed to drug use and volatile conduct in Hollings’ home) and a procedural challenge (the hearing was held too soon after remand and given too little time).
In Nevada, custody, school-choice, and child-support decisions are all reviewed for abuse of discretion, and factual findings are upheld if supported by substantial evidence, with the appellate court declining to reweigh evidence or credibility. Modifying physical custody requires both a substantial change in circumstances affecting the child’s welfare since the last order and that modification serves the child’s best interest. School-choice disputes turn on a non-exhaustive list of best-interest factors weighed at the court’s discretion. A court may impute income to a parent who is unemployed or underemployed without good cause, the key question being the parent’s good faith. Reconsideration is appropriate only in rare cases raising new issues of fact or law, and evidence already available is not “newly discovered.” Issues not raised on appeal are forfeited, harmless errors do not warrant reversal, and where a decision rests on independent alternative grounds, the appellant must defeat all of them.
The Court of Appeals held that Khalifah was not entitled to relief and affirmed both orders. On physical custody, substantial evidence—including the high conflict between the parties, the lack of abuse or sufficient domestic violence, and the court’s credibility findings—supported preserving joint custody. On school choice, the court properly weighed the Arcella factors between the only two options presented and acknowledged Khalifah’s sincere concerns, so its choice of DLA was supported by substantial evidence. On child support, the court permissibly found Khalifah failed to establish he could not work, and his later doctor’s note was not newly discovered evidence. As to the August 2025 order, any failure to address Hollings’ alleged falsehoods was harmless because her motion was denied; the mental-health findings, even if erroneous, went only to best interest and did not undermine the independent finding of no substantial change; his concerns about Hollings’ home had already been raised before the September 2024 order and were not shown to be a new change; and the scheduling of the hearing fell within the court’s broad discretion, with no showing he was prevented from presenting evidence.
5. Nbeken v. Nbeken, No. 89259-COA, Order Affirming in Part, Reversing in Part and Remanding (Unpublished Disposition, May 29, 2026)
Uche and Frank Ngbeken married in 2017 and share two children. In 2023 they filed competing divorce complaints. They settled custody, leaving only the division of assets and debt—principally the marital home—for trial. Frank testified that he bought the home in 2019, was the sole name on the mortgage and deed, paid the mortgage from his wages, and that Uche had signed a quitclaim deed conveying any interest she had to him because she preferred to build a home in her native Nigeria. Uche admitted signing the quitclaim deed but denied intending to gift her interest, claiming she signed only to protect her credit in case Frank defaulted; she conceded she made no mortgage payments but said she paid childcare costs instead. The district court (Heidi Almase) found that the quitclaim deed created a rebuttable presumption that Uche intended to gift her interest to Frank, credited Frank’s testimony that the parties intended the home to be his separate property, and concluded Uche failed to rebut that presumption by clear and convincing evidence. It awarded Frank the home as his sole and separate property.
Uche appealed. She first urged the court to overrule the Nevada precedent recognizing “transmutation-by-deed.” She next argued the district court abused its discretion in finding she failed to overcome the gift presumption, and that the court erred by not conducting a Malmquist analysis, because even if the gift presumption stood, Frank admitted he paid the mortgage with his wages, giving the community an interest in the home.
In Nevada, a property characterization is upheld if based on substantial evidence, but the application of a legal presumption is reviewed de novo. A spouse-to-spouse conveyance of real property creates a presumption of gift that can be overcome only by clear and convincing evidence. The Court of Appeals cannot overrule Nevada Supreme Court precedent. Where community funds—including either spouse’s earnings during the marriage—are used to pay down property owned by one spouse, the community acquires a pro tanto interest, and a Malmquist analysis is required to value the separate and community interests in the asset.
The Court of Appeals affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. It declined to overrule the gift-presumption precedent, holding it has no authority to overrule the Supreme Court. It upheld the finding that Uche failed to rebut the gift presumption, since Frank’s credited testimony was substantial evidence and the court does not reweigh credibility on appeal—so Frank initially acquired the home as separate property. However, the court held that the quitclaim deed gifted only the interest Uche held at signing (attributable to the down payment), not any future community interest, and that when Frank paid the mortgage with his wages—a community asset—the community gained a pro tanto interest in the home. The district court was therefore required to conduct a Malmquist analysis, and its failure to do so required reversal of the ruling that the home was entirely Frank’s separate property and remand for that analysis.
- New Cases Added to MLAW: 5 COA Unpublished: Lee, Seidlinger, Fisher, Khalifah, and Nbeken - August 18, 2026
- New Cases Added to MLAW: 5 COA Unpublished: Sachetti, Dawson, Glickman, Teamer, and Rowland - July 8, 2026
- New Cases Added to MLAW: 5 COA Unpublished: Stumbo, Savard, Hamdan, Summit, and Belen - May 11, 2026