New Cases Added to MLAW: 5 COA Unpublished: Stumbo, Savard, Hamdan, Summit, and Belen

by | May 11, 2026 | Nevada Family Law Appeals | 0 comments

1.    Stumbo v. Symmes Stumbo, No. 89614-COA, Order of Affirmance; Gibbons Dissenting (Unpublished Disposition, March 24, 2026)

Logan Stumbo and Margaret Symmes Stumbo married in 2015 and have two minor children, born in 2019 and 2022. Margaret filed for divorce in July 2023 and sought sole physical custody. Logan opposed and requested joint physical custody. During case management, the District Court (Bill Henderson) indicated that any relocation request could be presented by brief rather than by motion, and directed the parties to set their own discovery deadlines. The court set trial dates and designated a day to hear custody and relocation issues. In February 2024, Margaret filed a brief seeking permission to relocate the children to New Jersey, citing her job loss in Las Vegas, a substantially higher-paying job in New Jersey, rent-free housing with family, improved schools, and robust family support. Logan opposed the relocation, sought a continuance, and retained a psychologist to conduct a relocation assessment. Margaret declined to participate in Logan’s expert evaluation.

The District Court denied Logan’s request to continue the trial, denied his request to compel Margaret’s participation in the expert evaluation, and limited the expert’s testimony to general impacts of relocation rather than case-specific opinions. After trial, the court awarded Margaret primary physical custody and permitted relocation.

Logan appealed, arguing that the District Court violated his due process rights by denying a continuance, by refusing to compel Margaret’s participation in his retained expert’s relocation assessment, and by severely limiting expert testimony. He further contended that the court improperly weighed evidence and erred in granting primary custody and relocation to Margaret.

In Nevada, child custody and relocation determinations are reviewed for abuse of discretion, while constitutional due process claims are reviewed de novo. Courts must decide custody based on the best interest of the child under NRS 125C.0035, and relocation requires satisfaction of the threshold elements in NRS 125C.007(1) and consideration of the factors in NRS 125C.007(2). Due process requires a meaningful opportunity to present one’s case, but does not guarantee the right to present every witness or to compel participation in a party-retained expert evaluation absent compliance with applicable rules (e.g., NRCP 35 or appointment of a neutral expert). Trial continuances and expert testimony limits are within the court’s discretion, subject to fairness and absence of prejudice.

The Court of Appeals held that the District Court did not violate Logan’s due process rights, and that substantial evidence supported awarding Margaret primary physical custody and permitting relocation.

AFFIRMED.

 

2.    Savard v. Savard, No. 89248-COA, Order of Affirmance (Unpublished Disposition, April 14, 2026)

Marc Richard Savard and Joanna Lynn Savard married in 1998 and had four children. Marc filed for divorce in 2020 after the marriage deteriorated. The ensuing litigation was highly contentious and involved disputes over child custody, child support, relocation, community property distribution, alimony, and attorney fees. Following a lengthy trial, the District Court (Stacy Rocheleau) issued a decree of divorce containing detailed factual findings, including adverse credibility findings against Marc. After entry of the original decree, Marc moved to alter or amend the judgment. The District Court corrected a child-support calculation error and issued an amended decree nunc pro tunc. In that amended decree, the court awarded the parties joint physical custody, denied Marc’s request to relocate the children to Canada, ordered child support and permanent alimony in favor of Joanna, made an unequal community property distribution based on Marc’s financial misconduct, and awarded Joanna attorney fees.

Marc appealed, arguing that the District Court lacked jurisdiction to enter the amended decree after he filed a notice of appeal; abused its discretion in awarding joint physical custody and by denying his relocation request; erred in its determinations of child support, community property, alimony, and attorney fees; improperly denied most relief sought in his motion to alter or amend; and demonstrated judicial bias.

In Nevada, a premature notice of appeal does not divest the District Court of jurisdiction until entry of the final written order (NRAP 4(a)(2), (a)(6)). Child custody determinations must be based solely on the best interest of the child (NRS 125C.0035), with joint physical custody favored when supported by the evidence (NRS 125C.0025). Requests to relocate children out of state, when no final custody order exists, are evaluated under Druckman v. Ruscitti, using the statutory relocation framework as guidance. Community property must be divided equally unless a compelling reason, such as financial misconduct or dissipation, justifies an unequal division (NRS 125.150(1)(b)). Alimony awards are discretionary and must consider the statutory factors under NRS 125.150(9). Attorney fees may be awarded based on income disparity, unreasonable or harassing litigation conduct, and the Brunzell factors (NRS 125.150(4); NRS 18.010(2)(b)). Appellate courts do not reweigh evidence or reassess credibility.

The Court of Appeals held that the District Court retained jurisdiction to enter the amended decree, did not abuse its discretion in awarding joint physical custody and denying Marc’s request to relocate the children to Canada, that the district court’s determinations regarding child support, unequal distribution of community assets and debts, and permanent alimony were supported by substantial evidence, that the award of attorney fees to Joanna was proper under NRS 125.150(4), NRS 18.010(2)(b), and Sargeant, and that Marc failed to demonstrate judicial bias or entitlement to further relief on his post judgment motions.

AFFIRMED.

 

3.    Hamdan v. Hamdan, No. 90273-COA, Order of Affirmance (Unpublished Disposition, April 16, 2026)

Rabih Hamdan and Avir Hamdan divorced pursuant to a decree entered in April 2022, which ordered Rabih to pay monthly alimony of $2,648 to Avir. In April 2023, Avir filed a motion for an order to show cause, alleging that Rabih had failed to pay alimony as ordered. Rabih opposed the motion and filed a countermotion to modify his alimony obligation, asserting financial hardship. In December 2023, the District Court (Nadin Cutter) conducted an evidentiary hearing on both Avir’s contempt motion and Rabih’s countermotion. Following the hearing, the District Court found Rabih in civil contempt for failing to pay alimony, ordered him to pay $45,016 in arrears, and denied his request to modify alimony.

Rabih appealed, arguing that the District Court abused its discretion by holding him in contempt without making sufficient findings that his failure to pay alimony was willful or in bad faith. He contended that the court relied on improper assumptions about his financial ability to pay, and that its findings regarding his income, assets, and access to funds were unsupported by substantial evidence. He also argued that the contempt ruling was tainted by judicial bias.

In Nevada, disobedience to a clear and lawful court order constitutes contempt (NRS 22.010(3)). A contempt finding requires a showing that the order was clear and unambiguous and that the contemnor had the ability to comply (Cunningham v. Eighth Judicial District Court). Contempt orders are reviewed for abuse of discretion, and appellate courts defer to district court factual findings and credibility determinations if they are supported by substantial evidence (Lewis v. Lewis; Vaile v. Vaile). Judicial bias warrants relief only when the alleged bias arises from an extrajudicial source, or reflects deep-seated favoritism or antagonism making fair judgment impossible (Canarelli v. Eighth Judicial District Court).

The Court of Appeals held that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in finding Rabih in civil contempt, and that Rabih failed to demonstrate judicial bias.

AFFIRMED.

 

4.    Summit v. Summit, No. 90741-COA, Order Affirming in Part, Vacating in Part and Remanding (Unpublished Disposition, April 24, 2026)

Mark Edward Summit and Margaret Marie Summit divorced in December 2015 and have two minor children. Under the custody order in effect before this litigation, Margaret held primary physical custody, while Mark exercised limited parenting time and paid monthly child support. In June 2023, Mark took the children on vacation and refused to return them to Margaret. Margaret filed a motion for an order to show cause seeking contempt and other remedies. Mark opposed, and filed a countermotion to modify custody and child support, asserting that he had become the de facto primary custodian, and that violence in Margaret’s home constituted a substantial change in circumstances. The District Court (Mari Parlade) conducted evidentiary hearings, reviewed a Brief Focused Assessment, and later, reopened proceedings after Margaret obtained a temporary protection order against Mark based on evidence that he slashed her tire at the children’s school.

The District Court found a substantial change in circumstances, credited Margaret’s testimony, found that Mark committed domestic violence, denied Mark’s custody-modification request, and imposed highly restricted supervised parenting time.

Mark appealed, arguing that the District Court: abused its discretion by denying his motion to modify custody; improperly evaluated several best-interest factors, particularly evidence of alleged violence in Margaret’s home; displayed judicial bias in crediting evidence against him; erroneously rejected his claim of de facto primary custody; and effectively, awarded sole physical custody to Margaret by imposing extremely restrictive parenting time without making the findings required under Nevada law.

In Nevada, a court may modify physical custody only if the moving party demonstrates (1) a substantial change in circumstances affecting the child’s welfare, and (2) that modification serves the child’s best interest (Romano v. Romano; NRS 125C.0035). When determining custody, the sole consideration is the child’s best interest, evaluated under the non-exclusive factors in NRS 125C.0035(4). If a parent commits domestic violence, a rebuttable presumption arises that awarding that parent physical custody is not in the child’s best interest (NRS 125C.0035(5)). A court that functionally awards sole physical custody—by restricting one parent’s in-person time to minimal supervised contact—must make specific additional findings, including why less-restrictive alternatives would not serve the child’s best interest (Roe v. Roe).

The Court of Appeals held that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mark’s motion to modify custody, but erred in its imposition of the parenting time order.

AFFIRMED in part, VACATED in part, and REMANDED.

 

5.    Belen v. Chapman, No. 91144-COA, Order of Reversal and Remand (Unpublished Disposition, April 28, 2026)

Kiara Nativity Belen and Morgan Lennert Chapman were never married and share one child, M.C., born in 2017. In 2019, the parties entered into a partial parenting agreement, and the District Court (Adriana White) entered a custody decree awarding them joint legal and joint physical custody consistent with that agreement. In November 2024, Kiara moved to modify custody, seeking primary physical custody and permission to relocate with M.C. to Puerto Rico, where her fiancé lived. Morgan opposed. At the evidentiary hearing, Kiara attempted to introduce testimony regarding acts of domestic violence allegedly committed by Morgan before the 2019 custody decree. Morgan objected, and the District Court excluded the testimony as irrelevant under McMonigle. The District Court ultimately denied Kiara’s motions to modify custody and relocate, finding a substantial change in circumstances, but concluding that neither modification nor relocation was in the child’s best interest.

Kiara appealed, arguing that the District Court abused its discretion by excluding evidence of Morgan’s alleged pre-decree acts of domestic violence. She contended that the exclusion tainted the District Court’s best-interest analysis for both custody modification and relocation.

In Nevada, a party seeking to modify physical custody must show (1) a substantial change in circumstances affecting the child’s welfare, and (2) that modification is in the child’s best interest (Romano v. Romano). When a parent seeks to relocate with a child, the parent must satisfy NRS 125C.007(1), and (2), the child’s best interest is the paramount consideration (NRS 125C.0035). Domestic violence is a critical best-interest factor, and district courts must hear all information regarding domestic violence when determining custody (Castle v. Simmons). Although domestic-violence evidence known at the time of a prior custody order cannot be used to show a substantial change in circumstances, it may and must be considered when evaluating the child’s best interest (Nance v. Ferraro; Soldo-Allesio v. Ferguson).

The Court of Appeals held that the District Court abused its discretion by excluding Kiara’s testimony concerning alleged acts of domestic violence that predated the 2019 custody decree, and that the District Court’s failure to consider and make findings regarding the alleged 2018 chokehold and 2019 spitting incidents prevented meaningful appellate review, and therefore, undermined confidence that the same result would have been reached had all domestic violence evidence been considered.

REVERSED and REMANDED.

 

Marshal S. Willick
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