1. Sachetti v. Sachetti, No. 89619-COA, Order of Affirmance (Unpublished Disposition, April 29, 2026)
Edward Sachetti and Kelley Sachetti were divorced pursuant to a decree entered in April 2024. The decree incorporated terms reached during a settlement conference, including provisions requiring Edward to appraise his home and make monthly pension payments to Kelley. In July 2024, Kelley filed a motion to enforce the decree, asserting that Edward failed to obtain the required home appraisal and improperly deducted amounts from his pension payments. Kelley also sought attorney fees incurred in enforcing the decree. Edward opposed the motion, arguing that the decree inaccurately reflected the parties’ settlement agreement and contained terms to which he did not consent. The District Court (Michele Mercer) enforced the decree, finding that Edward failed to show any discrepancy between the decree and the settlement terms. The court later awarded Kelley $11,108.34 in attorney fees and $85.09 in costs after briefing.
Edward appealed, arguing that the District Court abused its discretion by enforcing a divorce decree that allegedly misstated the parties’ settlement agreement; improperly included provisions such as property valuation adjustments and pension/social security equalization, to which the parties did not agree; and erred in awarding attorney fees, arguing lack of notice, insufficient findings, and unreasonable fees.
In Nevada, district courts have inherent authority to interpret and enforce their divorce decrees, and final judgments may be enforced as necessary (NRS 125.240). Courts may not rewrite agreement-based decrees to insert terms the parties did not agree to (Harrison v. Harrison). Appellate review of enforcement and reconsideration orders is for abuse of discretion, while interpretation of an agreement-based decree is reviewed de novo. Arguments not raised in the district court are forfeited on appeal (Old Aztec Mine, Inc. v. Brown). If an appellant fails to provide required transcripts, appellate courts presume the missing record supports the district court’s findings (Cuzze v. University & Community College System of Nevada). Attorney fee awards are reviewed for abuse of discretion, and must consider the Brunzell factors and income disparity (Brunzell; Wright v. Osburn). Fees may be awarded where a party’s position is frivolous or unsupported (NRS 18.010(2); EDCR 5.219).
The Court of Appeals held that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in enforcing the divorce decree, and properly awarded attorney fees to Kelley.
AFFIRMED.
2. Dawson v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct. (Gibson), and DFS and M.D., Real Parties in Interest, No. 92113-COA, Order Denying Petition for a Writ of Mandamus (Unpublished Disposition, April 29, 2026)
Samantha Dawson was involved in a dependency proceeding under NRS Chapter 432B after her child attempted suicide while in her care. The child was hospitalized, and the Clark County District Attorney’s Office filed a petition alleging that the child was in need of protection due to neglect and threat of harm. At an evidentiary hearing, the District Court (David Gibson, Jr.) heard testimony that Dawson was responsible for the child’s welfare and that she failed to act appropriately when faced with clear risks, including allowing the child access to a firearm and failing to respond adequately to warning signs such as a suicide note and prior mental health concerns. The District Court found that the neglect allegation was substantiated, though it found insufficient evidence on the threat of harm allegation, and ordered that the child be placed in the custody of the Department of Family Services.
Dawson petitioned for a writ of mandamus, arguing that the District Court abused its discretion by substantiating the neglect allegation and removing the child from her custody. She contended that the District Court’s findings were inconsistent because it rejected the threat of harm allegation, but still found neglect and ordered removal.
In Nevada, a writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy used to compel the performance of a legal duty, or to control an arbitrary or capricious exercise of discretion (NRS 34.160). The decision to grant such relief lies within the appellate court’s discretion, and the petitioner bears a heavy burden to show a clear legal right to relief (Pan v. Eighth Judicial District Court). In dependency proceedings, the district court has broad discretion in placement decisions, and the best interest of the child is the primary consideration (Clark County District Attorney v. Eighth Judicial District Court). Appellate courts will not issue mandamus relief unless the district court has manifestly abused its discretion or acted arbitrarily. Moreover, appellate courts do not reweigh evidence or reassess credibility determinations.
The Court of Appeals held that Dawson failed to demonstrate entitlement to extraordinary writ relief, and that the District Court did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in distinguishing between the neglect allegation (substantiated) and the threat of harm allegation (not substantiated).
DENIED.
3. Glickman v. Glickman, No. 90343-COA, Order of Affirmance (Unpublished Disposition, May 7, 2026)
Scott Gary Glickman and Nicole Christy Glickman married in 2019 and share one minor child, A.M., born in 2021. Scott filed for divorce in 2022, and both parties sought primary physical custody, though they agreed to joint legal custody. Nicole initially obtained temporary primary custody, with Scott receiving supervised parenting time due to allegations of domestic violence. At trial, the District Court (Mari Parlade) heard extensive, conflicting testimony regarding multiple incidents of alleged domestic violence by both parties. The court found Nicole’s testimony credible—crediting evidence that Scott placed another child in a headlock, pushed Nicole into objects causing bruising, and later, grabbed her arm during a custody exchange. The court rejected Scott’s allegations against Nicole. After trial, the District Court awarded joint legal custody, but primary physical custody to Nicole; imposed a two-stage parenting plan for Scott (including limited in-person parenting time and conditions for expanded visitation); and found by clear and convincing evidence that Scott committed domestic violence.
Scott appealed, arguing that the District Court’s parenting time restrictions effectively amounted to an award of sole physical custody without a required finding that he was an unfit parent; that the court violated his constitutional rights by restricting his parenting time to Nevada; and that the court improperly delegated decision-making authority by conditioning increased parenting time on completion of a psychological evaluation.
In Nevada, child custody determinations are reviewed for abuse of discretion, and courts must make findings under the best interest of the child factors in NRS 125C.0035(4) and tie those findings to the custody determination. When a court finds by clear and convincing evidence that a parent committed domestic violence, a rebuttable presumption arises against awarding joint or sole physical custody to that parent, and the court must craft a parenting arrangement that adequately protects the child and the other parent (NRS 125C.0035(5)). “Sole physical custody” exists when the noncustodial parent has no significant in person parenting time, and courts must avoid improperly characterizing highly restrictive arrangements as something less (Roe v. Roe). However, appellate courts defer to credibility determinations and factual findings supported by substantial evidence and do not reweigh evidence on appeal.
The Court of Appeals held that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in awarding Nicole primary physical custody, that substantial evidence supported the District Court’s finding that Scott committed multiple acts of domestic violence, triggering the statutory presumption against awarding him joint or sole physical custody, and rejected Scott’s constitutional arguments.
AFFIRMED.
4. Teamer v. Summers, No. 89296-COA, Order of Affirmance (Unpublished Disposition, May 7, 2026)
Ariel Teamer and Quinten Summers share one minor child. In 2018, the parties agreed to joint legal custody, with Ariel having primary physical custody and Quinten receiving visitation. The court later allowed Ariel to relocate within Nevada. However, beginning in 2021, Ariel cut off Quinten’s parenting time and communication, and in 2022, secretly relocated with the child to Arizona without court approval. After Ariel failed to attend an evidentiary hearing, the District Court (Mari Parlade) awarded Quinten sole custody based on Ariel’s interference with parenting time and unauthorized relocation. Ariel subsequently moved to modify custody and requested relocation, alleging deficiencies in Quinten’s care. During this litigation, Ariel served requests for admissions on Quinten, which he did not timely answer due to attorney withdrawal issues. At the evidentiary hearing, the District Court ultimately allowed Quinten to withdraw the deemed admissions, conducted a best interest analysis, found that Ariel committed parental abduction, and awarded Quinten primary physical custody while denying Ariel’s relocation request.
Ariel appealed, arguing that the District Court abused its discretion by allowing Quinten to withdraw admissions under NRCP 36 after the evidentiary hearing, which she claimed prejudiced her case; violated her due process rights through the timing of that ruling; and improperly weighed the best interest factors, particularly failing to give sufficient weight to the child’s health issues in Quinten’s care.
In Nevada, requests for admission are governed by NRCP 36, and a district court may permit withdrawal of admissions if doing so promotes resolution on the merits and does not prejudice the opposing party (NRCP 36(b)). Discovery rulings are reviewed for abuse of discretion. Child custody determinations are governed by the best interest of the child standard under NRS 125C.0035(4), and courts must consider all relevant factors, but retain discretion regarding the weight given to each. Importantly, if a parent commits parental abduction, a rebuttable presumption arises against awarding that parent custody or unsupervised parenting time (NRS 125C.0035(7)). Appellate courts do not reweigh evidence or credibility determinations, and will affirm if findings are supported by substantial evidence.
The Court of Appeals held that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in permitting withdrawal of the admissions; that even if the withdrawal ruling were erroneous, any error was harmless; and that the District Court properly applied and weighed the best interest factors.
AFFIRMED.
5. Rowland vs. Yzaguirre, No. 91568-COA, Order of Affirmance (Unpublished Disposition, May 13, 2026)
Wendy Rowland and Barry Yzaguirre share one child, born in 2010. In a 2023 custody decree, the District Court (Unsworth) found that Rowland had committed acts of domestic violence against the child and had abducted the child. The court awarded Yzaguirre primary physical custody, allowed the child to relocate to Illinois, and limited Rowland to supervised contact. After earlier modification requests were denied and affirmed, the arrangement was eased slightly in 2025 to permit Rowland supervised parenting time in Illinois.
Rowland filed a new motion to modify custody, arguing that a recently enacted statute, SB 275, required the court to reconsider the domestic violence allegations, and prohibited removing a child from a capable parent merely to improve that child’s relationship with the other parent. The District Court denied the motion without a hearing. Rowland appealed, claiming that the judge was biased against her.
In Nevada, a parent seeking to modify custody must show both a substantial change in circumstances affecting the child’s welfare, and that modification serves the child’s best interest. Without that showing, no evidentiary hearing is required. This rule prevents parties from repeatedly relitigating facts that the court has already decided. SB 275 bars removing or restricting a parent’s contact solely to improve the child’s relationship with the other parent, and requires courts to consider all relevant evidence of past abuse. A claim of judicial bias requires proof of an outside influence or deep-seated antagonism, making fair judgment impossible.
The Court of Appeals held that Rowland was not entitled to relief and AFFIRMED. Rowland failed to show a substantial change in circumstances because her motion rested on allegations that the court had already weighed in the original decree. SB 275 did not change the result, since the court had already considered both parents’ conduct and had based custody on multiple factors—including Rowland’s abuse and abduction of the child—not solely on improving the child’s relationship with Yzaguirre. The court also rejected the bias claim, finding no improper influence or antagonism.
- New Cases Added to MLAW: 5 COA Unpublished: Sachetti, Dawson, Glickman, Teamer, and Rowland - July 8, 2026
- New Cases Added to MLAW: 5 COA Unpublished: Stumbo, Savard, Hamdan, Summit, and Belen - May 11, 2026
- New Cases Added to MLAW: Five COA Unpublished: Davis, Khalifah, In the Matter of J.J.M.R.; J.M.J.R. and J.M.J.R., Minors, Follett, and Pelz - May 6, 2026