New Cases Added to MLAW: Five SCT Published: Destin, In the Matter of the Parental Rights as to S.A.T., Oshiro, CCSD v. Dist. Court (Angalia B.)(AO 11); and CCSD v. Dist. Court (Angalia B.) (AO 48)

by | Mar 28, 2026 | Nevada Family Law Appeals | 0 comments

1.    Destin v. Dist. Court (Handwerker-Lamaster), 141 Nev ___, ___ P.3d ___ (Adv. Op. 42, August. 28, 2025)

A.R., a newborn, was removed from her parents in 2022 due to neglect and abuse, and DFS initially placed her with her paternal aunt, Mary Handwerker-LaMaster, while also involving the maternal grandmother, Ericka Destin. Both relatives later sought to adopt A.R. After parental rights were terminated, the District Court (David Gibson, Jr.) held a post-termination placement hearing, during which DFS recommended placement with the aunt, citing A.R.’s strong, sibling-like bond with her cousin in that home. Although the court found both relatives equally capable and loving, it selected the aunt as the adoptive placement and incorporated a Post Adoptive Contact Agreement giving the grandmother ongoing visitation.

Grandmother Ericka Destin petitioned for a writ of mandamus, arguing that the District Court improperly relied on DFS’s placement preference, failed to take additional evidence, made insufficient best interest findings, and improperly favored a “nuclear family” structure over closer consanguinity. She also urged the court to overrule Philip R. to the extent that it requires the District Court to give weight to DFS’s preference.

In Nevada, post-termination placement decisions are governed by NRS 128.110, which grants DFS custody of the child and discretion to consider relative preferences, but leaves the ultimate placement decision to the District Court, whose sole consideration is the child’s best interest. Courts must give “due consideration” to DFS’s placement preference—as re-affirmed in Philip R. v. Eighth Judicial District Court—while making written findings and considering all relevant circumstances. Mandamus is available only where the district court manifestly abuses its discretion or misapplies the law.

The Nevada Supreme Court held that the District Court did not manifestly abuse its discretion. It properly considered DFS’s preference as required by law, made adequate findings, and reasonably concluded that placement with the aunt was in A.R.’s best interest—especially given the evidence of a strong sibling-like bond with the cousin and the suitability of both homes. The court rejected arguments that the district judge wrongly prioritized a nuclear family or failed to consider evidence, and therefore, denied the petition for writ relief.

 

2.    In the Matter of the Parental Rights as to S.A.T., a Minor.,  141 Nev ___, ___ P.3d ___ (Adv. Op. No. 46, October 02, 2025)

Molly L. and Bryan T. divorced in 2014 with joint legal custody, and Molly having primary physical custody. After a severe mental health episode in 2016, Bryan was hospitalized, and Molly obtained an extended TPO restricting contact unless Bryan completed significant psychological treatment. Bryan, indigent at the time, struggled for years to navigate the legal system and comply with requirements, while Molly took steps (including moving without notice and limiting family connections) that hindered Bryan’s ability to contact the children. When Bryan eventually obtained an inheritance in 2021, he hired counsel, completed the required treatment, and resumed supporting efforts—after which Molly filed a private petition to terminate his parental rights. The District Court (Heidi Almase) denied the petition.

Molly appealed, arguing primarily that Bryan’s years long lack of contact constituted abandonment, neglect, or at least token efforts, and that these parental fault grounds required termination. She further argued that Bryan’s failure to specifically deny allegations in her petition should be treated as an admission under NRCP 8(b)(6), and that the District Court erred in finding that Bryan met the TPO’s conditions.

In Nevada, termination of parental rights requires clear and convincing evidence of; (1) at least one statutory ground of parental fault under NRS 128.105, and (2) that termination is in the child’s best interest. Courts review factual findings for substantial evidence and legal conclusions de novo. A rebuttable presumption of abandonment arises after six months without support or communication, but abandonment requires a “settled purpose” to forgo all parental rights. Neglect must occur while the parent has custody and must be serious, persistent, and harmful. The statutory “token efforts” ground must be applied with great caution in private termination actions, as it is easily subject to misuse when the petitioning parent controls the child’s access. Additionally, because termination proceedings do not require a responsive pleading, NRCP 8(b)(6) does not permit deeming allegations admitted.

The Nevada Supreme Court held that the District Court correctly found no parental fault grounds. Bryan rebutted the presumption of abandonment by showing that he lacked intent to relinquish his rights, and made reasonable efforts despite indigency and Molly’s interference. No neglect occurred because the child was well cared for in Molly’s custody. And “token efforts” alone cannot support termination in a private action, especially where the child is safe and the custodial parent contributed to the lack of contact. The court further held that failure to deny allegations does not equal admission and that issues concerning TPO compliance were moot. The order denying termination was Affirmed.

 

3.    Oshiro v. Oshiro, 141 Nev ___, ___ P.3d ___ (Adv. Op. 59, November 26, 2025)

Cherlyn and Robert Oshiro married in 1999, spent their marriage relying primarily on Robert’s military disability benefits, and later, both spouses’ Social Security benefits. Cherlyn stopped working in 2007 due to an accident, and Robert retired in 2013. As Robert’s disability worsened, Cherlyn became his primary caretaker. When Cherlyn filed for divorce in 2023, all issues were resolved except alimony. Robert received about $6,017 per month in combined disability and Social Security benefits, while Cherlyn received $998. The District Court (Kimberly Wanker) awarded Cherlyn $2,000 per month in alimony after considering all sources of income—including Robert’s military disability benefits—though it did not order division of those benefits.

Robert appealed, arguing that NRS 125.165 prohibits not only dividing military disability benefits, but also considering them when calculating alimony. He claimed that the District Court’s reliance on his disability benefits effectively resulted in an unlawful equitable division of those benefits and created an extreme, inequitable burden. He also invoked federal cases (Mansell and Howell) in support of restricting state courts from considering disability compensation in divorce-related financial determinations.

In Nevada, alimony is governed by NRS 125.150(1)(a), which allows courts to award support “as appears just and equitable,” and requires courts to consider 11 statutory factors, including the “financial condition of each spouse.” Disability income and Social Security benefits are part of that financial condition. NRS 125.165, however, prohibits courts from attaching, levying, seizing, assigning, or otherwise dividing a veteran’s service-connected disability benefits. The statute does not prohibit considering the existence or value of such benefits. Legislative history confirms this—earlier versions of the bill would have barred courts from “considering” disability benefits, but the Legislature intentionally removed that restriction. Federal precedent (Howell) also permits courts to consider disability benefits for alimony purposes, and Nevada’s statute must be read in harmony with that authority.

The Nevada Supreme Court held that NRS 125.165 does not bar courts from considering military disability benefits when determining alimony, so long as the court does not divide or seize the benefits themselves. The Court affirmed the $2,000 monthly alimony award, finding that the District Court acted within its discretion by evaluating the parties’ financial circumstances, needs, and abilities. The court emphasized that although the award required Robert to rely heavily on his disability benefits for his own living expenses, the decree did not order those benefits to be divided or used directly for payment, and therefore, did not violate NRS 125.165. The amended divorce decree was Affirmed.

[Ed. Note:  This decision followed and relied upon the identical result in Conte v. Conte, No. 87945-COA, Order Reversing Judgment, Vacating Sanctions Award, and Remanding (Unpublished Disposition, June 25, 2025).]

 

4.    CCSD v. Dist. Court (Angalia B.) 141 Nev ___, ___ P.3d ___ (Adv. Op. 11, March 06, 2025)

Angalia B., the court appointed Educational Decision Maker (EDM) for J.B., requested J.B.’s education records from Clark County School District (CCSD). After receiving some documents, she suspected that emails concerning J.B. stored in CCSD’s Google Vault were missing, and moved to compel their production. CCSD argued that the emails were not “education records” because they were not placed in J.B.’s permanent file. The District Court  (Rhonda Kay Forsberg) rejected that contention, and ordered CCSD to produce all emails referencing J.B.

CCSD petitioned for writ relief, asserting that the District Court erred by ordering the production of emails without determining whether they were “education records” under FERPA. CCSD argued that emails in its Google Vault were not (1) “directly related” to J.B. and (2) not “maintained” as required by FERPA, because they were not intentionally placed into a designated student file. CCSD maintained that it was not required to search or produce any emails unless they were already part of J.B.’s official record.

In Nevada, FERPA defines “education records” as materials that (1) directly relate to a student, and (2) are maintained by an educational institution. Nevada statutes (NRS 392.029; NRS 432B.462) incorporate and apply FERPA’s definitions. Interpreting FERPA, the court noted that “directly related” does not include documents that merely mention a student incidentally; courts must evaluate content case by case. Regarding “maintained,” the court interpreted the term broadly: modern electronic databases—like Google Vault—qualify as “maintaining” records because digital systems now automatically and securely store emails, eliminating the need for intentional placement into a physical or electronic student file.

The Nevada Supreme Court held that although CCSD does “maintain” the emails stored in Google Vault, the District Court erred in concluding that the emails were “directly related” to J.B. without reviewing their content. The court granted CCSD’s writ petition, vacated the District Court’s production order, and directed the District Court to conduct an in camera review of all emails mentioning J.B. (by name, initials, or student ID) to determine which emails, if any, directly relate to the student, and therefore, qualify as education records under FERPA.

 

5.    CCSD v. Dist. Court (Angalia B.) 141 Nev ___, ___ P.3d ___ (Adv. Op. 48, November 26, 2025)

Decision on Petition for Rehearing En Banc.

J.B., a special needs student in the Clark County School District (CCSD), had an Educational Decision Maker (EDM)—his grandmother, Angalia B.—appointed by the District Court (Rhonda Forsberg). Believing CCSD’s initial production of J.B.’s education records was incomplete, Angalia requested all emails stored on CCSD’s Google Workspace that mentioned J.B. CCSD refused, asserting that such emails were not “education records” under FERPA or Nevada’s parallel statutes. The District Court disagreed and ordered CCSD to produce every email referencing J.B., prompting CCSD to seek extraordinary writ relief.

CCSD petitioned for a writ of mandamus (prohibition was not meaningfully argued), asserting that the District Court misinterpreted FERPA and Nevada law by concluding that any email mentioning a student automatically becomes an education record. CCSD argued that education records must be intentionally maintained as institutional records, and that the District Court’s ruling would impose an unworkable burden by treating millions of informal emails as education records.

In Nevada, FERPA and NRS 392.029 grant parents and legal guardians the right to inspect education records, defined as materials that both directly relate to a student and are maintained by the educational institution. Relying on Owasso Independent School District v. Falvo, the court explained that “maintained” requires a level of permanence and intentional storage, typically in a centralized, secure system overseen by a designated records custodian. Ordinary emails, which are informal, easily deleted, and not deliberately incorporated into a student’s institutional file, generally do not qualify as education records unless the district affirmatively designates and stores them as such.

The Nevada Supreme Court held that the District Court erred in ordering CCSD to produce all emails referencing J.B. The court concluded that emails are not education records merely by being stored on CCSD’s Google Workspace or by containing a student’s name. Only those emails intentionally treated as institutional records and maintained in a designated location qualify under FERPA and Nevada law. Because the District Court applied an overly broad standard, the Supreme Court granted CCSD’s petition and directed the District Court to vacate its production order.

The dissent consisted of all three Justices on the original panel hearing Advance Opinion 11.  They would have held that “a record” is maintained when it is stored on an educational institution’s secure database or storage system. Construing FERPA consistent with its legislative intent requires a broad reading of the word “maintained,” which construction further serves to accommodate any future unknowable storage format that would otherwise undermine the transparency inherent in the law.

Marshal S. Willick
Latest posts by Marshal S. Willick (see all)