New Cases Added to MLAW: Five COA Unpublished: Reyna, Montemayer, Gonzalez, Fondren, and Tavares

by | Apr 19, 2026 | Nevada Family Law Appeals | 0 comments

1.    Reyna v. Reyna, No. 90923-COA, Order of Affirmance (Unpublished Disposition, February 19, 2026)

Paul and Helena Reyna married in 2012 and share one child, C.R., born the same year. In January 2024, Paul filed for divorce and sought joint legal and physical custody. Helena counterclaimed for sole custody, alleging that Paul abused alcohol, was dependent on marijuana, and that his mental health was unstable. The District Court (Amy Mastin) initially ordered supervised visitation, but later allowed unsupervised visits. At trial in January 2025, both parties testified about Paul’s PTSD, substance use, and the child’s sleeping arrangements, including Helena’s past practice of co-sleeping with C.R. Following testimony and evidence, the District Court found that Paul continued to self-medicate with marijuana, had not adequately addressed addiction needs, and lacked psychiatric support for his PTSD. The court granted Helena temporary primary physical custody, and conditioned Paul’s path to joint custody on addressing his addiction and mental health issues, requiring him to provide verification from a psychiatrist. After Paul failed to comply, the District Court maintained Helena’s primary custody, and restricted Paul’s marijuana use during parenting time.

Paul appealed, arguing that the District Court abused its discretion by failing to make sufficient findings connecting his addiction and mental health issues to the child’s best interest;  by improperly assuming marijuana use was harmful without articulating its impact on C.R.; by minimizing Helena’s inappropriate co-sleeping arrangement; and by failing to foster the father-child relationship.

In Nevada, courts must determine custody based solely on the child’s best interest as codified in NRS 125C.0035(1), and supported by Davis v. Ewalefo. Under NRS 125C.0035(4), courts must consider non-exhaustive best interest factors, including the mental and physical health of parents, the child’s emotional needs, the nature of the parent child relationship, stability, and parental cooperation. District courts need not restate every factor, but must “tie” their findings to the best interest analysis. Nevada law also recognizes a preference that courts first consider joint physical custody, but may award primary physical custody where joint custody is not in the child’s best interest. Roe v. Roe (Nev. Ct. App. 2023). Appellate courts will not reweigh credibility or evidence. Grosjean v. Imperial Palace.

The Court of Appeals held that the District Court did not abuse its discretion.

Affirmed.

 

2.    Montemayer v. Barnes, No. 90265-COA, Order Dismissing Appeal (Unpublished Disposition, February 20, 2026)

The District Court (Charles Hoskin) issued a custody decree awarding Justin Ryan Oresko primary physical custody, but with two significant conditions: (1) he must complete three consecutive weeks of substance abuse testing with no positive results, and (2) he must obtain suitable housing for himself and the child. Until he satisfied these conditions, the decree provided that Carmen Barnes would remain the de facto custodian. Because these requirements had not yet been met, the District Court had not finalized the child custody determination.

Carmen nonetheless filed an appeal challenging the decree, arguing that the District Court’s decree should be reviewed, even though Oresko’s custody rights were contingent on future compliance.

In Nevada, an appellate court may only review final orders unless a statute or rule expressly provides otherwise. Under NRAP 3A(b)(7), a child custody order is appealable only when it is a final order, meaning one that resolves all outstanding custody issues, and leaves nothing for future consideration.

The Court of Appeals held that the decree was not a final, appealable order.

Dismissed.

 

3.    Gonzalez v. Velaquez-Gonzalez, No. 90570-COA, Order Affirming in Part and Reversing in Part (Unpublished Disposition, February 27, 2026)+

Luba Gonzalez and Enrique Velazquez Gonzalez married in 2013 and divorced in 2021. Their stipulated divorce decree granted them joint legal and joint physical custody of their daughter, I.G., with weekly exchanges and annual vacation allotments. The decree required both parents to confer about all health care matters, including dental care, and required detailed travel itineraries for out of state vacations. In March 2023, two disputes arose. First, Luba unilaterally rescheduled I.G.’s dental appointment into her custodial time. Second, two days before Enrique’s planned vacation to Mexico with I.G., Luba filed a motion to block the trip.  Luba refused to exchange the child, causing I.G. to miss the Mexico trip. Enrique filed (1) a motion for order to show cause seeking to hold Luba in contempt and refer her for criminal parental kidnapping, and (2) a motion to modify custody alleging abduction and interference. After multi-day evidentiary hearings, the District Court (Heidi Almase) found that Luba had willfully detained the child under NRS 200.359, triggering the NRS 125C.0035(7) rebuttable presumption against awarding custody to a parent who commits abduction. The district court later ruled that although Luba rebutted the abduction presumption, her actions nonetheless constituted a substantial change in circumstances warranting a shift to primary physical custody in Enrique’s favor. The court found Luba in contempt for (1) withholding the child and (2) changing the dental appointment, and imposed sanctions and attorney fees.

Luba appealed, arguing that the District Court abused its discretion by modifying custody to grant Enrique primary physical custody; by finding that she abducted I.G. and using that finding as the basis for substantial change and best interest determinations; by holding her in contempt for both the withholding incident and the dental appointment rescheduling; and by awarding attorney fees to Enrique.

In Nevada, under NRS 125C.0035(7), if a parent commits an “abduction”—defined as an act under NRS 200.310–.340 or NRS 200.359—there is a rebuttable presumption against awarding that parent physical custody or unsupervised parenting time. NRS 200.359(1) prohibits willfully detaining, concealing, or removing a child in violation of a court order. Willfulness under subsection (1) does not require specific intent, unlike subsection (2), which does require specific intent to frustrate the other parent’s relationship. To modify joint custody, Nevada requires a substantial change in circumstances, and that modification is in the child’s best interest. Romano v. Romano. Courts must evaluate the best interest factors under NRS 125C.0035(4), including parental cooperation, conflict, emotional and developmental needs, and willingness to foster the child’s relationship with the other parent. Contempt findings require that the violated order be clear and unambiguous. Division of Child & Family Services v. Eighth Judicial District Court. Attorney fees may be awarded under NRS 18.010(2)(b) or EDCR 5.219 when a party unreasonably or vexatiously multiplies proceedings.

The Court of Appeals held that substantial evidence supported the District Court’s findings; that the decree’s provisions were inconsistent and ambiguous regarding whether dental care decisions required advance consultation and when so that count of contempt and monetary sanction should be reversed; that the District Court’s credibility findings were entitled to deference; and that Luba’s reconsideration motion unreasonably and vexatiously multiplied the litigation, and therefore affirmed all other aspects of the decision.

 

4.    Fondren v. Lopez (& Washoe Co. D.A., Family Support Div.), No. 90575-COA, Order of Affirmance (Unpublished Disposition, March 4, 2026)

Logan Fondren and Vanessa Lopez married in 2008 and share one child born in 2009. In 2010, they obtained a summary divorce decree that incorporated a settlement agreement awarding joint legal custody, primary physical custody to Vanessa, and ordering Logan to pay $747 per month in child support plus half of the child’s health care costs, based on a monthly income of $3,750. In January 2025, the Washoe County District Attorney’s Office, Family Support Division, assisted Vanessa in seeking a three-year statutory review and modification of child support under NRS 125B.145(1). The DA’s office submitted financial audits and the parties’ financial disclosure forms. Logan’s updated disclosure listed a gross monthly income of $9,550.06, with substantial household expenses and support obligations for children from another relationship. After an evidentiary hearing, the District Court (Chuck Weller) determined that Logan’s gross income had risen to $11,032 per month, applied the NAC 425.140 formula, credited $97 for child’s health insurance costs, and reduced the award by $150 for supporting another minor child. The resulting child support obligation was set at $1,268 per month.

Logan appealed, arguing that the District Court abused its discretion by failing to consider the higher cost of living in California, where he resides, compared to Nevada; by failing to adequately account for his financial obligations to other children; by violating his right to a fair hearing by not properly weighing evidence; and by demonstrating judicial bias.

In Nevada, under NRS 125B.145(4), a 20% change in gross income constitutes a change in circumstances warranting modification. Child support must be based on the obligor’s earnings and ability to pay, and the NAC 425 guidelines carry a rebuttable presumption that they meet the child’s needs. NAC 425.100(1)–(3). A court may deviate downward, but must make specific findings. NAC 425.150 authorizes consideration of support obligations for other children; relative household income; other necessary child related expenses; and the obligor’s ability to pay.

The Court of Appeals held that the District Court did not abuse its discretion, and Affirmed the modified child support order.

 

5.    Tavares v. Tavares, No. 88218-COA, Order of Affirmance (Unpublished Disposition, March 4, 2026)

Edgar and Jenny Tavares married in 2016 and jointly petitioned for a summary divorce in March 2021. Their stipulated divorce decree, entered in April 2021, divided their assets: Jenny received three real estate properties and her full 401(k), while Edgar kept his 401(k). Approximately 18 months later, Edgar filed a motion under NRCP 60(b) seeking to set aside the divorce decree, alleging that it was inequitable, and that Jenny had fraudulently induced him into signing due to his compromised mental state. He argued that he never received notice of entry of the decree, and alternatively claimed that NRCP 60(b)(6) permitted relief beyond the six-month deadline. Jenny opposed, arguing that the motion was time barred, that Edgar had waived notice of entry under the summary divorce statute, and that no assets had been omitted. The District Court (Mari Parlade) denied the motion as untimely.

Edgar appealed, arguing that the District Court (1) wrongly concluded that it lacked jurisdiction because his NRCP 60(b) motion was untimely, (2) improperly rejected his claim that he never received notice of entry of the decree, (3) failed to consider relief under NRCP 60(b)(6), and (4) erred by failing to treat certain assets—specifically the parties’ 401(k)s—as “omitted property” subject to correction under NRS 125.150(3).

In Nevada, summary divorce decrees are final judgments under NRS 125.184(1), and NRCP 60(b)’s time limits apply to efforts to set aside such decrees. Byrd v. Byrd; Mizrachi v. Mizrachi. NRCP 60(c)(1) requires that motions based on mistake, newly discovered evidence, or fraud—NRCP 60(b)(1)–(3)—must be brought within 6 months of entry or notice of entry of judgment, and the deadline cannot be extended. Under NRCP 5(b)(2)(C), service by mail is complete upon mailing, and parties to a summary divorce waive the right to written notice of entry under NRS 125.184(1). A challenge not supported with cogent argument or relevant authority is forfeited on appeal. Edwards v. Emperor’s Garden. NRCP 60(b)(6), which allows relief for “any other reason,” is available only when the grounds are not encompassed by subsections (1)–(5), requires “extraordinary circumstances” and that the movant be faultless in the delay. Pioneer Investment Services Co. v. Brunswick Associates; Vargas v. J Morales Inc. Under NRS 125.150(3), a party may move within three years to adjudicate omitted community property due to fraud or mistake, but only when such property was actually omitted from the decree.

The Court of Appeals held that the District Court correctly denied Edgar’s motion because it was untimely, legally unsupported, and factually contradicted by the record.

Affirmed.

Marshal S. Willick
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