New Cases Added to MLAW: Five COA Unpublished: Benton, Proenza-Chavez, Jones, Vartanpour, and Jeffery

by | May 2, 2026 | Nevada Family Law Appeals | 0 comments

1.    Benton v. Cloutier, No. 89224-COA, Order of Reversal and Remand (Unpublished Disposition, March 5, 2026)

Robert Benton and Jacqueline Cloutier were unmarried partners who shared two children and lived together in a home Cloutier originally purchased in her name in 2016. In 2021, during the COVID 19 pandemic, Cloutier refinanced the home, transferring title to herself and Benton as joint tenants. She withdrew nearly $99,000 in cash from the refinance, giving Benton approximately $49,415, and the parties later transferred the property into a jointly held trust. In 2023, when their relationship ended, Cloutier filed a complaint seeking determination of their respective interests in the home. At a 2024 evidentiary hearing, Benton argued that joint tenancy status created a presumption of equal ownership, and that Cloutier had the burden to provide clear and convincing evidence rebutting this presumption. Cloutier argued that she included Benton’s name on the new title only because she needed his name to qualify for refinancing, that she had paid nearly all mortgage payments before and after the refinance, and that Benton contributed minimally. The District Court (Stephanie Charter) found Cloutier contributed vastly more and awarded her 95.83% of the equity, granting Benton only the remainder.

Benton appealed, arguing that the District Court applied the wrong legal standard; improperly placed the burden on him to prove donative intent instead of requiring Cloutier to rebut the presumption of equal ownership; and failed to apply the established burden-shifting framework for joint tenant property division under Nevada law.

In Nevada, joint tenancy creates an initial presumption of equal ownership, which can be rebutted by showing lack of relatedness or lack of donative intent. Sack v. Tomlin and Langevin v. York hold that unequal contributions may rebut equal share presumptions when parties are not related and no donative intent exists. In Howard v. Hughes, the Nevada Supreme Court extended this framework to unmarried joint tenants and clarified the burden shifting analysis. Rebutting either presumption requires clear and convincing evidence, not merely a preponderance.

The Court of Appeals held that the District Court failed to apply the required legal framework and used the wrong standard of proof.

Reversed and Remanded.

 

2.    Proenza-Chavez v. Ramos-Ventura, No. 90697-COA, Order of Reversal and Remand (Unpublished Disposition, March 5, 2026)

Adynes Proenza-Chavez and Jose Ramos-Ventura divorced in February 2025, sharing joint legal and joint physical custody of their son, L.R.P., born in December 2021. Shortly after the decree, in March 2025, Adynes filed a motion to modify custody, seeking sole legal and sole physical custody, alleging that Jose sexually abused her 12 year old daughter from another relationship. She asserted the abuse occurred multiple times in 2024 and in the presence of L.R.P. Adynes documented that CPS and LVMPD had active investigations into the allegations, and attached a temporary protection order (TPO) issued March 14, 2025, granting her temporary sole custody with no visitation for Jose. Jose filed an opposing motion seeking to maintain the existing custody schedule, but did not substantively refute the abuse allegations.

Without holding a hearing, the District Court denied Adynes’ motion, finding that—even assuming the allegations were true—they did not constitute a substantial change in circumstances affecting L.R.P.’s welfare. The court also ruled that Chavez failed to show “adequate cause” for an evidentiary hearing.

Chavez appealed, arguing that the District Court abused its discretion by refusing to hold an evidentiary hearing before denying her motion to modify custody.

In Nevada, a District Court must hold an evidentiary hearing on a motion to modify physical custody where the movant demonstrates adequate cause, meaning that the movant sets forth a prima facie case for modification. Rooney v. Rooney. A prima facie case requires showing of a substantial change in circumstances affecting the child’s welfare, and that modification is in the child’s best interest. Romano v. Romano. When determining whether a movant has made a prima facie case, the District Court must accept the movant’s allegations as true. Myers v. Haskins. Changes must generally have occurred after the prior custody order. Ellis v. Carucci. Serious post decree allegations—such as new evidence of abuse or domestic violence—can constitute changed circumstances. Castle v. Simmons.

The Court of Appeals held that the District Court abused its discretion by denying Chavez’s motion without holding an evidentiary hearing.

Reversed and Remanded.

 

3.    Jones v. Beale, No. 90243-COA, Order Dismissing in Part, Affirming in Part, Vacating in Part and Remanding (Unpublished Disposition, March 12, 2026)

Jeremiah Jones and Larae Beale married in 2009 and have two minor children, Z.J. (born 2008) and H.J. (born 2013). In 2023, Beale filed for divorce seeking joint legal and primary physical custody. Jones counterclaimed seeking the same. A temporary custody order awarded Beale temporary primary physical custody with Jones exercising alternating weekend parenting time, and the children were referred for interviews at the Family Mediation Center.

At a January 2024 hearing, the District Court (Mari Parlade) reviewed the child interview reports and ordered temporary joint physical custody of H.J., while Beale retained temporary primary physical custody of Z.J. subject to Z.J.’s reasonable teenage discretion regarding time with Jones. The court also found Z.J. had made a good faith effort at reunification therapy with Jones. The matter was set for a comprehensive evidentiary hearing on custody and other divorce issues. In June 2024, Jones sought an order to show cause alleging that Beale withheld the children by taking them to New York for four weeks. The contempt issue was deferred to the evidentiary hearing. At the August 2024 evidentiary hearing, the parties agreed to joint legal custody and joint physical custody of H.J. (with a disputed schedule), and agreed Beale would have primary physical custody of Z.J. subject to teenage discretion. Beale later requested sole legal custody of Z.J. Testimony included Beale’s concerns about Jones’s angry outbursts and alcohol related fear, and Jones’s acknowledgment of a past drinking problem, but now claimed sobriety. In February 2025, the District Court entered the divorce decree, awarding Beale modified legal custody (decision making authority with notice to Jones) and sole physical custody of both children, restricting Jones’s parenting time to reunification therapy and limited public place contact if the children desired. The court declined to hold Beale in contempt and addressed support and other issues, reserving jurisdiction on child support arrears.

Jones appealed, arguing that the court disregarded the parties’ stipulations, failed to make adequate findings, and imposed overly restrictive parenting time limits. He also sought review of other aspects of the decree, though some issues were not final or properly before the court.

In Nevada, the best interest of the child governs custody, and courts must make written findings tied to the factors in NRS 125C.0035(4). Orders granting sole physical custody—which substantially restrict the noncustodial parent’s in-person time—require additional, specific findings beyond the statutory factors, and must consider the least restrictive parenting time arrangement consistent with the child’s best interests. Roe v. Roe. Courts may review contempt determinations within an otherwise appealable custody order.

The Court of Appeals held that it lacked jurisdiction to review nonfinal portions of the decree; that the District Court made extensive best interest findings supported by substantial evidence; that the District Court did no abuse its discretion; that there was substantial evidence that the parents could not communicate and cooperate, and that Beale met the children’s needs while Jones injected conflict; and deferred to the District Court’s credibility determinations that Beale reasonably believed Jones consented to the New York trip and attempted to resolve the issue.

DISMISSED the appeal in part, AFFIRMED in part, VACATED in part, and REMANDED.

 

4.    Vartanpour v. Lloyd, No. 90732-COA, Order of Affirmance (Unpublished Disposition, March 12, 2026)

Rafik Vartanpour and Christiana Lloyd share one minor child, born in December 2008. In January 2012, Vartanpour filed a complaint to establish custody, parenting time, and child support, seeking joint legal custody and primary physical custody. Lloyd counterclaimed, seeking sole legal and primary physical custody, and presented evidence that Vartanpour was incarcerated at the Clark County Detention Center on charges including two counts of lewdness with a minor under 14.

In October 2012, after producing Vartanpour for a hearing, the District Court (Regina McConnell) entered a custody decree awarding Lloyd sole legal and primary physical custody, and suspending Vartanpour’s parenting time due to his incarceration, expressly providing that upon his release he could return to court to address parenting time. Vartanpour did not appeal that decree. In February 2025, while still incarcerated, Vartanpour moved to modify custody/parenting time, requesting limited contact with the child via letters or telephone calls. He alleged changed circumstances based on his completion of college coursework and mental health education programs (including domestic violence and anger management classes), asserting personal growth and improvement. The District Court denied the motion without holding an evidentiary hearing, finding no substantial change in circumstances, and noted that Vartanpour did not request an order for his appearance at the hearing.

Vartanpour appealed, arguing that the District Court abused its discretion by denying his motion to modify custody/parenting time without holding an evidentiary hearing; by concluding that he failed to show a substantial change in circumstances despite his educational and rehabilitative efforts; and by failing to arrange his telephonic or video appearance, allegedly denying him access to the courts.

In Nevada, a District Court may deny a motion to modify custody without an evidentiary hearing unless the movant demonstrates adequate cause, i.e., a prima facie case showing (1) a substantial change in circumstances affecting the child’s welfare, and (2) that modification would serve the child’s best interest. Rooney v. Rooney; Romano v. Romano. This is a heavy burden designed to prevent serial relitigation of custody. Ellis v. Carucci. In assessing whether adequate cause exists, the court accepts specific allegations as true, but may consider the factual underpinnings of prior custody orders. An incarcerated party’s appearance must be requested by motion supported by affidavit under NRS 50.215(1); the court is not required to arrange an appearance sua sponte.

The Court of Appeals held that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Vartanpour’s motion without an evidentiary hearing, and did not err by failing to arrange Vartanpour’s appearance at the hearing because he did not move for such relief under NRS 50.215(1).

AFFIRMED.

 

5.    Jeffery v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct. (Mercer), and Merlaina Beckwith, Real Party in Interest, No. 92064-COA, Order Denying Petition (Unpublished Disposition, March 13, 2026)

Michael Jeffery was involved in an ongoing divorce and child custody proceeding in the Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County. Dissatisfied with several actions taken by the District Court (Michele Mercer) and the presiding judge during those proceedings, Jeffery did not pursue a direct appeal. Instead, he filed a pro se petition for a writ of mandamus with the Nevada Court of Appeals, seeking extraordinary relief to correct or compel actions by the District Court.

In Nevada, a writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy available only to: Compel the performance of an act that the law requires as a duty of office (NRS 34.160), or control an arbitrary or capricious exercise of discretion by a lower court. Whether to entertain a writ petition lies entirely within the discretion of the Appellate Court, and the petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating that extraordinary relief is warranted. Mandamus is not a substitute for a direct appeal.

The Court of Appeals held that Jeffery failed to meet his burden of demonstrating that extraordinary writ relief was warranted.

Marshal S. Willick
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