New Cases Added to MLAW: Five COA Unpublished: Arevalo, English, D’Antonio III, Frehner, and Morris

by | Apr 21, 2026 | Nevada Family Law Appeals | 0 comments

1.    Jesus Arevalo v. District Court (Hoskin), and Catherine Delao, No. 90266-COA, Order Denying Petition for Writ of Mandamus and/or Prohibition (Unpublished Disposition, June 5, 2025)

Arevalo filed a petition for a writ of mandamus and/or prohibition. He challenged a District Court order that denied his motion to disqualify Judge Charles Hoskin. Arevalo also sought to compel the District Court to comply with a prior writ of mandamus issued by the Court of Appeals in Docket No. 86607-COA.

A writ of mandamus is available to compel the performance of a legal duty or to control an arbitrary or capricious exercise of discretion. NRS 34.160; Int’l Game Tech., Inc. v. Second Jud. Dist. Ct., 124 Nev. 193 (2008). A writ of prohibition may be issued to prevent a District Court from acting in excess of its jurisdiction. NRS 34.320; Smith v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 107 Nev. 674 (1991). Mandamus and prohibition are extraordinary remedies and are granted only when there is no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at law. Pan v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 120 Nev. 222 (2004).

The Court of Appeals denied the petition, finding that Arevalo failed to demonstrate that extraordinary relief was warranted.

 

2.    English v. The Eighth Judicial District Court (Bailey), and CCDFS, Real Party in Interest, No. 91983-COA, Order Denying Petition (Unpublished Disposition, February 2, 2026)

Kori Morgan English, acting pro se, filed an emergency petition for a writ of mandamus or prohibition arising from proceedings under NRS Chapter 432B, Nevada’s child protection statutory framework. The petition challenged actions taken in the juvenile dependency case involving the Clark County Department of Family Services (DFS). The opinion does not detail the underlying factual allegations. Instead, it focuses on whether the extraordinary writs English sought were legally justified.

English petitioned the Court of Appeals seeking mandamus—to compel the District Court (Soonhee Bailey) to perform a legally required duty—or prohibition, to prevent the District Court from acting without jurisdiction. She argued that the District Court had erred in handling her NRS 432B matter, and that extraordinary intervention was required. She bore the burden of demonstrating that writ relief was appropriate. DFS opposed the petition as the real party in interest.

In Nevada, a writ of mandamus is available only to: (1) compel the performance of a duty required by law; or (2) control a court’s arbitrary or capricious exercise of discretion. A writ of prohibition arrests proceedings of a tribunal acting without, or in excess of its jurisdiction. Both writs are extraordinary remedies, and the decision whether to entertain such a petition lies within the sole discretion of the appellate court. The petitioner must show there is no plain, speedy, and adequate legal remedy, and must affirmatively demonstrate entitlement to extraordinary relief.

The Court of Appeals held that English failed to demonstrate that extraordinary writ relief was warranted. The court emphasized that she had not met the burden necessary to justify either mandamus or prohibition. Consequently, the court denied the petition. The court added that the denial should not be construed as a ruling on the merits of the underlying issues, leaving those questions for later proceedings if properly brought.

 

3.    D’Antonio III v. D’Antonio, No. 90516-COA, Order of Affirmance (Unpublished Disposition, February 2, 2026)

Arthur and Lydia D’Antonio married in 2015 and share three minor children. In their 2024 divorce litigation, Arthur sought joint legal and physical custody; Lydia sought joint legal custody but primary physical custody, and permission to relocate with the children to Minnesota. Arthur alleged that Lydia abused alcohol and posed a safety risk to the children. Lydia denied the allegations, but agreed to alcohol monitoring. After trial, the District Court (Michelle Rocheleau) found Arthur’s allegations not credible, determined that Lydia was the primary caregiver and better able to meet the children’s needs, and awarded her primary physical custody with joint legal custody. The court further found that Lydia’s relocation request was made in good faith, supported by job opportunities, family assistance, lower living costs in Minnesota, and concluded that relocation was in the children’s best interest.

Arthur appealed, challenging both: (1) the award of primary physical custody to Lydia; and (2) the court’s decision to allow relocation. He argued that the District Court misapplied the NRS 125C.0035(4) best interest factors, improperly accepted Lydia’s testimony regarding alcohol use, wrongly found him to be the source of parental conflict, and erred in assessing his work schedule and availability. He further asserted that Lydia misrepresented the benefits of relocating, and that the court was biased against him.

In Nevada, child custody decisions are reviewed for abuse of discretion, and factual findings supported by substantial evidence will not be disturbed. The best interest of the child under NRS 125C.0035(4) controls, and courts may consider any relevant factor. Credibility determinations belong to the district court and are given great deference. When a parent seeks out of state relocation and no prior custodial order exists, the court uses the Druckman v. Ruscitti framework, requiring a good faith reason for the move and evaluation of relocation factors such as quality-of-life improvement, motives of both parties, likelihood of compliance with visitation orders, and the feasibility of meaningful parent child relationships post move.

The Court of Appeals held that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in awarding Lydia primary physical custody. Substantial evidence supported findings that Arthur’s alcohol-related allegations were disingenuous; that Lydia was more likely to foster Arthur’s relationship with the children; and that Lydia, as primary caregiver, better met the children’s needs. The court also held the District Court properly applied Druckman’s relocation factors, crediting Lydia’s testimony regarding job prospects, family support, lower costs, and good faith motives. The District Court reasonably found Arthur’s opposition was not honorable. Because substantial evidence supported the relocation decision, and no judicial bias was shown, the Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court in full.

 

4.    Frehner v. Frehner, No. 89894-COA, Order Reversing in Part, Vacating in Part, Dismissing in Part, and Remanding (Unpublished Disposition, February 3, 2026)

Ann and Michael Frehner married in 2010 and share two minor children. During divorce litigation, Ann alleged multiple acts of domestic violence by Michael—two incidents involving her (2021 and 2023) and one incident involving their child, S.F. (being punched in the ribs). She presented photographs, a criminal docket showing Michael’s 2023 domestic battery arrest and no contest plea, and testimony describing the children’s emotional suffering. The District Court appointed psychologist Dr. Holland, who interviewed S.F. and reported emotional distress, suicidal ideations, and “physical altercations” between Michael and S.F., including pushing or punching. Despite this evidence, the District Court (Regina McConnell) awarded joint physical custody, found no domestic violence because it didn’t find “clear and convincing evidence,” denied Ann’s request for child testimony, and awarded child support, periodic alimony, and rehabilitative alimony.

Ann appealed, arguing: (1) the District Court applied the wrong evidentiary standard to the domestic violence best interest factor; (2) it improperly denied child testimony; (3) it misapplied the best interest factors and should have awarded primary physical custody; (4) its child support order was erroneous; (5) its alimony awards were insufficient and legally flawed; and (6) it erred in failing to award attorney fees. Michael argued that the District Court acted within its discretion, and that the evidence supported joint custody and the financial awards.

In Nevada, child custody determinations must be based on the child’s best interests under NRS 125C.0035(4), and the court must consider all allegations of domestic violence. When evaluating domestic violence as a best interest factor, the evidentiary standard is preponderance of the evidence. Only when applying the statutory rebuttable presumption against joint or sole custody does the standard rise to clear and convincing evidence. The District Court must use the correct standard or its decision is reversible error. Courts must also follow NRCP 16.215, which governs child testimony, especially where allegations of abuse exist. For alimony, NRS 125.150(9) forbids courts from treating child support as income when assessing a party’s financial condition. Final attorney fee awards must be appealed through a separate appeal once a written order is issued.

The Court of Appeals held that the District Court abused its discretion by applying the clear and convincing standard to the domestic violence best interest factor, rather than the required preponderance standard, and by failing to address significant evidence of domestic violence toward both Ann and S.F. Because the outcome might have differed under the correct standard, the joint physical custody award was reversed and remanded. The court also held that the District Court must reconsider child testimony on remand because the allegations of abuse made the testimony relevant and necessary. The court vacated child support (dependent on the joint custody status), and vacated both alimony awards: periodic alimony because the district court illegally counted child support as Ann’s income; and rehabilitative alimony because it lacked sufficient explanation. Finally, the court dismissed the attorney fee issue for lack of jurisdiction because no final written fee order had been issued.

 

5.    Morris v. Morris, No. 89528-COA, Order Affirming in Part, Reversing in Part and Remanding (Unpublished Disposition, February 3, 2026)

David and Ashley Morris married in 2018 and have one minor child. David filed for divorce in October 2023, seeking joint legal and primary physical custody, and an equitable division of property. Ashley counterclaimed, agreeing that David could have primary physical custody if she relocated to Florida, and she requested alimony and equal division of community property. Shortly before the evidentiary hearing, David won a sweepstakes after paying a $70 entry fee in February 2024—receiving a 2024 Jeep (≈$60,000) and $50,000 cash (purportedly for taxes). The District Court’s (Robert Lane) decree (June 2024) awarded joint legal and physical custody (with David to have primary physical custody if Ashley relocates); and later (October 2024) ruled that the Jeep and $50,000 were community property to be split evenly; and ordered alimony of $1,500/month for three years to Ashley.

David appealed, arguing; (1) the sweepstakes Jeep and $50,000 were his separate property because he entered the sweepstakes after separation and paid the entry fee from post-separation earnings, and (2) the alimony award lacked the required statutory findings and was unsupported by the record. He requested either vacatur or remand for proper analysis. Ashley did not file an answering brief.

In Nevada, property acquired during marriage is presumed community property, and the presumption is overcome only by clear and convincing evidence. The community ends upon entry of the written divorce decree. Appellate courts review property characterization and distribution for abuse of discretion, and will not reweigh evidence when substantial evidence supports the findings. Alimony must be “just and equitable,” and the District Court must consider and make findings on the eleven factors listed in NRS 125.150(9); failure to demonstrate consideration of those factors requires remand for proper findings.

The Court of Appeals held that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the sweepstakes Jeep and $50,000 to be community property. The court reversed the alimony award and remanded. The judgment was therefore Affirmed in part, Reversed in part, and Remanded.

Marshal S. Willick
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