1.    Rowan v. Walker F/K/A Rowan, No. 87590-COA, Order of Reversal and Remand (Unpublished Disposition, September 11, 2025)

Christopher Rowan and Heather Walker married in 2004. They divorced in June 2021 under a stipulated decree requiring Rowan to pay child support and alimony.  In June 2023, Rowan moved to modify child support and alimony, claiming that his gross monthly income had decreased by more than 20%.  The District Court (Bridget Robb) denied the motion without a hearing, reasoning that Rowan’s earning capacity remained unchanged, his income decrease was voluntary (resignation), and modification was not in the children’s best interest.

Rowan appealed, arguing he was entitled to a hearing under Nevada law and that the District Court abused its discretion by denying his motion without an evidentiary hearing.

In Nevada, a  20% or more change in gross monthly income constitutes changed circumstances requiring review. NRS 125B.145(4); NRS 125.150(12).

The Court of Appeals REVERSED and REMANDED.  The District Court was ordered to conduct an evidentiary hearing on both issues.

 

2.    Sheets v. Sheets, No. 89934-COA, Order of Affirmance (Unpublished Disposition, October 29, 2025)

Timothy Sheets and Samantha Sheets (never married) share one child, P.S., born September 2022. Their relationship ended in 2023. Samantha continued living with P.S. in Timothy’s rented home. After a May 2024 altercation, Timothy filed for custody alleging Samantha “abducted” P.S.  Samantha countered, seeking primary physical custody and relocation to Billings, Montana. Samantha argued relocation was in good faith: near family, free childcare, better job offer, cleaner environment, rural lifestyle. Timothy opposed, citing harm to his relationship with P.S. and her half-siblings, and alleged Samantha’s motives were pretextual.

The District Court (Gregory Gordon) held an evidentiary hearing and granted Samantha primary physical custody and relocation. Timothy was awarded one week per month of parenting time.

Timothy appealed, arguing that substantial evidence does not support relocation findings, and that the parenting time schedule does not ensure sufficient contact with P.S.

In Nevada, the Best Interest Factors enumerated in NRS 125C.0035(4) must be considered in custody matters. A court must consider relocation when making an initial custody determination. Druckman v. Ruscitti (2014). There are five relocation factors a court must consider: quality of life, motives, compliance with visitation, noncustodial motives, realistic visitation. Schwartz v. Schwartz (1991).

The Court of Appeals AFFIRMED.

 

3.    Smith v. Smith, No. 89755-COA, Order of Affirmance (Unpublished Disposition, October 24, 2025)

Ronald and Rachel Smith married in 2015. They share one child, O.S. (born 2013). In April 2024, Rachel filed for divorce and custody, alleging irrational and hostile behavior by Ronald, and obtained a temporary protection order (TPO). Rachel requested exclusive possession of the marital residence in order to sell it (Airbnb was their only income source and the was home at risk of foreclosure). Ronald initially failed to respond, but later filed pro se motions opposing the sale of the residence, and requesting joint custody. Evidence showed that Ronald interfered with the sale of marital home, causing the loss of a $444,000 offer. The next best offer was $300,000. He also incurred $6,000 in community waste and violated the TPO. The District Court (Robert Lane) awarded Rachel sole legal and primary physical custody (Ronald was granted supervised parenting time) and an unequal distribution of property (Rachel received most of the personal property and a vacant lot). Ronald got 50% of the home sale proceeds, plus a $5,000 equalization payment).

Ronald appealed, arguing that the District Court deprived him of procedural due process by failing to enforce the mandatory disclosure rules under NRCP 16.2, allowed the evidentiary hearing to proceed without financial disclosure from Rachel, and allowed undisclosed witnesses to testify. He claimed that due to these errors, Rachel was awarded an unequal distribution of community property.

In Nevada, due process requires notice and opportunity to be heard (Mesi v. Mesi, 2020). Disclosure Requirements under NRCP 16.2 requires financial disclosures. Service is complete upon mailing. (NRCP 5(b)(2)(C)).  Community property is equally divided unless there are compelling reasons for unequal distribution. NRS 125.150(1)(b).

The Court of Appeals AFFIRMED.

 

4.    Spiranskaya v. The Eight Judicial District Court, State of Nevada, County of Clark, the HON. T. Arthur Ritchie, Judge, and Vadim Kira, Real Party in Interest, No. 91374-COA, Order Denying Petition (Unpublished Disposition, October 13, 2025)

Irina Spiranskaya filed an emergency petition for a writ of mandamus or prohibition challenging the district court’s jurisdiction in a family law matter. She relied on NRS 125A.305, which governs jurisdiction for initial child custody determinations. However, the petition did not involve an initial custody decision, but rather, a subsequent matter.

Spiranskaya sought extraordinary relief, arguing that the district court lacked jurisdiction. She requested that the Appellate Court arrest proceedings, or compel action under writ authority.

In Nevada, a Writ of Mandamus compels the performance of a duty required by law, or controls arbitrary discretion. (NRS 34.160; Int’l Game Tech. v. Second Jud. Dist. Ct., 124 Nev. 193 (2008). Prohibition prevents a tribunal from acting in excess of jurisdiction. (NRS 34.320).

Extraordinary Writ Relief is discretionary, and a petitioner must show entitlement. (Pan v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 120 Nev. 222 (2004). NRS 125A.305 applies only to initial custody jurisdiction, not post-decree issues.

The Court of Appeals DENIED the petition, finding Spiranskaya failed to demonstrate entitlement to extraordinary relief, and that NRS 125A.305 was inapplicable because the case did not involve an initial custody determination. All other requested relief was also denied.

 

5.    Larson v. Trautman, Evelyn Madrid and Paul Madrid, No. 89636-COA, Order of Affirmance (Unpublished Disposition, September 25, 2025)

Andrew Larson and Paulene Trautman entered a domestic partnership in 2016.  In 2022, Trautman filed to terminate the partnership.  Larson counterclaimed, seeking division of community assets, including a property (Bagnoli Court) partially owned by Trautman’s parents.  After one day of trial, the parties reached a settlement agreement during a judicial settlement conference. The settlement agreement states that: each party keeps their own personal property, accounts, and debts, Trautman and her parents keep the Bagnoli property, Trautman keeps the pets and pays Larson $17,000 via QDRO within 30 days, and waiver and release language were included in the decree

The decree was entered. Larson later filed motions under NRCP 60(b) to set aside the decree, alleging: the terms were unfair and inconsistent with the agreement, that there was newly discovered evidence that Trautman’s parents didn’t contribute financially to the Bagnoli property, and fraud and misrepresentation regarding property and pets.The District Court (Bill Henderson) denied the motions, finding that Larson agreed to the terms, was fully canvassed, accepted the $17,000 QDRO payment, evidence about Trautman’s parents was available before the settlement, and his claims amounted to “buyer’s remorse.”

Larson appealed, arguing: the decree was inequitable; was the product of undue influence; was based on fraud; the judge exhibited bias; and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel.

In Nevada, NRCP 60(b) allows relief for a mistake, newly discovered evidence, and for fraud.  Settlement agreements are contracts. (May v. Anderson, 121 Nev. 668).  Judicial bias requires extrajudicial source or deep-seated favoritism (Canarelli v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 138 Nev. 104).  There is no right to effective assistance of counsel in civil cases (Garcia v. Scolari’s, 125 Nev. 48).

The Court of Appeals AFFIRMED, finding that Larson’s arguments amounted to dissatisfaction with the agreement, not legal grounds for relief.

Marshal S. Willick