1. Martinelli v. Lucero Del Real, No. 88908-COA, Order of Affirmance (Unpublished Disposition, December 9, 2025)
Michael Thomas Martinelli and Michelle Lucero Del Real were in a romantic relationship beginning in 2013, shortly after Del Real’s son was born. Martinelli is not the child’s biological father. The relationship ended in 2022 after Martinelli committed an act of domestic violence against Del Real in the child’s presence. Later that year, Martinelli filed a petition to establish nonparent visitation, claiming he had lived with the child, acted as a de facto father, and had a meaningful relationship. Del Real opposed, citing Martinelli’s domestic violence, substance abuse, and harassment. After an evidentiary hearing, the district court (Stephanie Charter) denied Martinelli’s petition, declared him a vexatious litigant, and awarded attorney fees to Del Real.
Martinelli appealed, arguing that the district court abused its discretion by: (1) denying his motion to reopen discovery; (2) denying his motion in limine to exclude evidence of his arrests and domestic violence; (3) denying his petition for nonparent visitation; (4) awarding attorney fees after declaring him a vexatious litigant; and (5) exhibiting judicial bias.
In Nevada, discovery rulings and evidentiary decisions are reviewed for abuse of discretion (Club Vista Fin. Servs. v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 128 Nev. 224, 276 P.3d 246 (2012); In re T.M.R., 137 Nev. 262, 487 P.3d 783 (2021)). Relevant evidence is generally admissible unless its probative value is substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice (NRS 48.015, NRS 48.035). Nonparent visitation petitions are governed by NRS 125C.050, which creates a rebuttable presumption that visitation is not in the child’s best interest if a parent denies visitation; the petitioner must rebut this presumption by clear and convincing evidence. Courts consider factors under NRS 125C.050(6), including emotional ties, ability to provide guidance, cooperation with the parent, history of abuse, and the child’s preferences. Attorney fees may be awarded under NRS 18.010(2)(b) when claims are brought without reasonable grounds or to harass, and courts apply the Brunzell factors to assess reasonableness. Judicial bias claims require proof of deep-seated favoritism or antagonism originating outside judicial proceedings (Canarelli v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 138 Nev. 104, 506 P.3d 334 (2022)).
The Court of Appeals held that the District Court did not abuse its discretion. Martinelli had ample time for discovery and failed to show that reopening was warranted. Evidence of domestic violence and substance abuse was relevant to the child’s best interests and properly admitted. The District Court correctly applied NRS 125C.050, finding that Martinelli failed to rebut the presumption against visitation, and determined that visitation was not in the child’s best interests based on factors such as Martinelli’s abusive behavior, substance abuse, inability to cooperate, and the child’s stated preference. The attorney fee award was proper under NRS 18.010(2)(b) because Martinelli pursued the petition to harass Del Real, and the court considered the Brunzell factors. Martinelli’s judicial bias claim lacked merit. The judgment was AFFIRMED.
2. Vasquez, Jr., v. Vasquez, No. 89329-COA, Order of Affirmance (Unpublished Disposition, December 23, 2025)
Samuel and Jeannette married in 1996, and after more than twenty five years together, Jeannette filed for divorce in 2022. Their children were already adults, thus the case focused on property division and alimony. Jeannette had spent most of the marriage as a homemaker and had worked as a teacher only during the last decade, earning $4,333.33 per month in addition to receiving $524.31 in VA disability benefits. She sought $2,000 per month in alimony for fifteen years and alleged that Samuel had dissipated $210,000 in community funds after a Chase account dropped from $230,000 to $20,000 within seven months. Samuel, who worked as a healthcare director earning $8,333.33 per month, also received $4,250 in rental income that he failed to disclose. He claimed that the $330,000 deposited into the Chase account was his separate property from a gift or inheritance. He also acknowledged traveling with his girlfriend and making related expenditures that appeared on community credit and bank statements.
After reviewing the evidence, the District Court (Mari Parlade) found that the $230,000 in the account was presumptively community property and that Samuel had not rebutted this presumption. The court concluded that Samuel had wasted $210,000 in community assets through unexplained withdrawals and travel, awarding Jeannette $105,000 as her half of the dissipated funds. It further ordered Samuel to pay Jeannette $2,000 per month in alimony for ten years based on the statutory factors under NRS 125.150(9).
Samuel appealed, arguing that the District Court erred in finding that he committed marital waste warranting an unequal division of community property, and that the District Court abused its discretion by awarding Jeannette $2,000/month in alimony for 10 years.
In Nevada, property acquired during a marriage is community property unless proven otherwise. NRS 123.220. A District Court must divide community assets equally unless a compelling reason exists. NRS 125.150(1)(b). Misuse of community property for a selfish, inequitable purpose—often during marital breakdown—constitutes waste. Lofgren v. Lofgren, 112 Nev. 1282 (1996). Alimony is awarded when “just and equitable,” considering 11 statutory factors under NRS 125.150.
The Court of Appeals held that substantial evidence supported the finding that Samuel dissipated $210,000 in community funds, and that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in awarding Jeannette $2,000 per month for 10 years.
AFFIRMED.
3. Yang v. Yanghu, No. 90514-COA, Order of Affirmance (Unpublished Disposition, January 20, 2026)
Sean and Wenna married in 2015 and share a daughter, V.Y., born in 2016. The family had been living with both sets of parents, but on October 7, 2023, a confrontation occurred in which Sean’s mother threatened Wenna with a knife, leading Wenna to leave with the child and move in with her parents.
After relocating, Wenna transferred V.Y. from Alamo Elementary to Dearing Elementary, and later to Lowman Elementary due to housing needs. Wenna filed for divorce on October 17, 2023, seeking primary physical custody, and temporary orders granted the parties joint legal custody, with Wenna receiving temporary primary physical custody and Sean limited parenting time on Thursdays and Fridays from 4–8 p.m. Although Sean later attempted to re-enroll V.Y. in Alamo, the court declined to allow the school change mid-semester.
Following trial, the District Court (Charles Hoskin) found that Wenna had been the de facto primary custodian since separation, that Sean neither requested additional parenting time nor consistently exercised the time available to him, and that testimony raised concerns regarding his living situation, including spoiled food served by his grandparents, poor home cleanliness, and reliance on his grandparents for childcare. The court further found that Sean’s mother’s knife threat constituted domestic violence relevant to best interest considerations. The Court awarded Wenna primary physical custody, maintained joint legal custody, and denied Sean’s request to switch V.Y. back to Alamo Elementary.
Sean appealed, arguing that the District Court abused its discretion by awarding Wenna primary physical custody, erred in determining parenting time, allegedly failing to maximize Sean’s time with V.Y., and abused its discretion in denying Sean’s school choice request to re-enroll V.Y. at Alamo Elementary.
In Nevada, custody standard centers solely on the child’s best interests under NRS 125C.0035. Appellate courts defer to the District Court’s factual findings so long as they are supported by substantial evidence, consistent with Ellis v. Carucci (Nev. 2007). Although courts must first consider joint custody, they may award primary physical custody when joint custody is not in the child’s best interest, as clarified in Roe v. Roe (Nev. Ct. App. 2023). Acts such as assault or threats—including those involving weapons—can constitute domestic violence under NRS 33.018(1), which weighs heavily against the offending party in the custody analysis. When determining school placement, courts apply the Arcella v. Arcella factors, examining academic environment, continuity, the child’s needs, parental motives, and the practicality of the commute. These decisions are reviewed on appeal for abuse of discretion.
The Court of Appeals held that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in granting Wenna primary physical custody. The parenting time schedule was supported by substantial evidence and tailored to best-interest and safety concerns. Denial of Sean’s request to move V.Y. back to Alamo Elementary was supported by substantial evidence and proper application of Arcella factors.
AFFIRMED.
4. Ruvalcaba v. Clark County Department of Family Services, No. 89719-COA, Order of Affirmance (Unpublished Disposition, January 22, 2026)
In June 2019, law enforcement responded to a 911 call from the home of Ruvalcaba and her husband, Sanchez, after a dispute over their daughter V.S.’s shower escalated. During the incident, Ruvalcaba slapped V.S.’s arm, prompting Sanchez to intervene, and the parents exchanged slaps as their son J.S. attempted to separate them. When J.S. restrained her, Ruvalcaba bit him on the shoulder and threw a glass object that shattered. Officers observed scratches on Sanchez, a visible bite mark on J.S., and no injuries on Ruvalcaba, leading to her arrest as the primary aggressor. The Clark County Department of Family Services (CCDFS) investigated and substantiated physical abuse based on the bite to J.S. and neglect of all three children for exposing them to domestic violence. At an administrative hearing, evidence—including the bite mark still visible days later, multiple witness statements, and reports of a long history of domestic violence—supported CCDFS’s findings, which the hearing officer upheld. Ruvalcaba sought judicial review, but the District Court (Erika Mendoza) denied her petition.
Ruvalcaba appealed, arguing that substantial evidence did not support the substantiated finding that she physically abused J.S. by biting him, and that substantial evidence did not support the finding that she neglected her children by exposing them to domestic violence.
In Nevada, child abuse is defined as a nonaccidental physical or mental injury that harms or threatens a child’s welfare under NRS 432B.020(1)(a), and “physical injury” expressly includes bites and temporary disfigurement such as marks or bruises pursuant to NRS 432B.090(6), (7) and NAC 432B.024(1). Child neglect is separately defined as negligent treatment or maltreatment that subjects a child to conduct that is terrorizing, degrading, painful, or emotionally traumatic under NRS 432B.140.
The Court of Appeals held that substantial evidence supported CCDFS’s substantiation of (1) physical abuse of J.S., and (2) neglect of all three children due to domestic violence exposure.
AFFIRMED.
5. Hudspeth v. Hudspeth, No. 90145-COA, Order Affirming in Part and Dismissing Appeal in Part (Unpublished Disposition, January 22, 2026)
Timothy and Lisa married in 2010 and share two minor children, with Timothy working as a marine engineer on a 70 days at sea, 70 days at home rotation. After Lisa filed for divorce in April 2023, the court entered a temporary custody order granting her full time custody while Timothy was at sea, and giving Timothy primary physical custody during his home periods, with Lisa receiving alternating weekends.
In April 2024, the parties signed two Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs) resolving issues related to custody, child support, alimony, and major assets—including the home, vehicles, and bank accounts—leaving only the division of personal property unresolved. Their custody agreement maintained the temporary structure: Lisa has custody while Timothy is at sea, Timothy has primary custody when home, with parenting time for Lisa, and if his home time exceeds his sea time, the schedule shifts to a week on/week off rotation.
Conflict arose in June 2024 when Timothy forced entry into the home with a hammer and removed guns and a safe in violation of the possession order, prompting Lisa to file a contempt motion. The court entered a divorce decree incorporating the MOUs and set an evidentiary hearing on remaining property and contempt issues, while denying Timothy’s repeated motions to dismiss, reconsider, or continue the proceedings—many of which cited his being at sea.
Timothy appealed, arguing that the Nevada District Court (Mari Parlade) lacked jurisdiction to issue a child custody order because Timothy is a seaman under 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (maritime jurisdiction), and that the child custody order was improper because it did not give Timothy joint physical custody and interfered with his religious freedom.
Maritime jurisdiction vests exclusively in Federal Courts under 28 U.S.C. § 1333, but it applies only when the dispute’s primary objective concerns maritime commerce, as outlined in Norfolk Southern Railway Co. v. Kirby. Federal Courts do not have authority over domestic relations matters such as divorce or child custody under Ankenbrandt v. Richards. Issues not raised in the District Court are generally forfeited on appeal unless they implicate subject matter jurisdiction, pursuant to Old Aztec Mine, Inc. v. Brown. In Nevada, stipulated child custody agreements are enforceable unless unconscionable, illegal, or contrary to public policy under Rivero v. Rivero, and Nevada Courts presume that parents act in their children’s best interests, consistent with St. Mary v. Damon. For appellate jurisdiction, a divorce decree is not final or appealable if significant issues—such as property division—remain unresolved, as held in Lee v. GNLV Corp., though custody orders are independently appealable under NRAP 3A(b)(7).
The Court of Appeals held that the District Court had jurisdiction, and that maritime law does not apply. Timothy forfeited his challenges to the custody agreement. The custody portion of the decree was AFFIRMED. The remainder of the appeal was DISMISSED as non-appealable.
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