1.    Hurd v. Opipari, No. 89932-COA, Order Affirming in Part, Reversing in Part and Remanding (Unpublished Disposition, January 30, 2026)

Kymberlie Hurd and Mario Opipari, parents of a minor child with Down syndrome, engaged in custody litigation beginning in 2021. After a prior appeal resulted in a remand for proper best interest analysis, the parties reached a settlement during an evidentiary hearing in April 2024. They placed on the record an agreement for joint legal custody, primary physical custody to Mario, and child support based on their financial disclosures—though no specific support amount was stated. Mario later drafted a written stipulated decree including a $398 monthly support obligation derived from Kymberlie’s business revenue rather than her net income. Four days after the decree was filed, Kymberlie moved under NRCP 60(b) to set it aside, alleging she never signed it, did not approve it, and that subsequent events involving Mario’s wife caused her to withdraw consent.  The District Court (Bill Henderson) denied the motion.

Kymberlie appealed the denial of her NRCP 60(b) motion, arguing (1) the district court coerced her into agreeing, (2) the stipulated decree was invalid because she never signed it, (3) the court failed to make required best interest findings, and (4) the child support amount was erroneous because it was calculated using gross revenue instead of income after legitimate business expenses, and should have applied the low income schedule.

In Nevada, NRCP 60(b) allows a court to set aside a final judgment only for limited reasons such as mistake, fraud, or misconduct. Stipulated custody agreements are governed by contract principles and become binding when placed on the record under EDCR 5.601(d), even if a party later refuses to sign the written order. A court approved stipulation is construed as including findings that it is in the child’s best interest unless specific findings are expressly required. Child support determinations require specific factual findings, including proper calculation of gross monthly income under NAC 425.025(1)(n), which for self-employment income must account for legitimate business expenses. NRCP 60(b)(1) permits relief for “mistake,” including mistakes in child support computation.

The Court of Appeals held that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to set aside the custody portion of the stipulated decree. The record showed that Kymberlie voluntarily entered the agreement in court, acknowledged under oath that she understood and agreed to the terms, and waived further best interest findings. There was no evidence of judicial coercion. However, the court held that the District Court abused its discretion by failing to consider whether the child support amount was based on a mistake because the decree used Kymberlie’s business revenue rather than her net income after business expenses. The Court therefore AFFIRMED the decree as to custody, but REVERSED and REMANDED for re-calculation of child support, directing the District Court to determine allowable expenses, actual gross income, and whether the low income schedule applies.

 

2.    Rappa v. District Court (Lorico), No. 89820-COA, Order Dismissing Petition for a Writ of Mandamus and/or Prohibition (Unpublished Disposition, March 5, 2025)

Parties can stipulate to dismiss this original writ petition for a writ of mandamus and/or prohibition, with each party to bear their own attorney fees and costs, under NRAP 42.

 

3.    Rowland v. Yzaguirre, No. 88386-COA, 2024 WL 7411295 (Nev. Ct. App. Oct. 7, 2024)

Rowland and Yzaguirre share one minor child. The child was born in Alabama, but Rowland later took the child to New Zealand and then to Nevada. Rowland was convicted in Nevada of child abuse and neglect involving the child. CPS temporarily removed the child, but later returned her to Rowland. Rowland filed for custody in Nevada, and Yzaguirre, residing in Illinois, requested remote parenting time. The District Court (Sandra Unsworth) awarded Rowland sole custody temporarily, with supervised remote parenting time for Yzaguirre. After an evidentiary hearing, the court found that Rowland had committed domestic violence and abducted the child. The court awarded Yzaguirre sole legal and primary physical custody, and allowed the child to relocate to Illinois. Rowland was granted limited supervised remote parenting time. Rowland later filed motions to modify custody and hold Yzaguirre in contempt for denying a holiday call. The District Court denied both motions.

Rowland appealed, arguing that the appeal of the original custody decree was timely; that the District Court abused its discretion in denying Rowland’s motions to modify legal and physical custody; that the court violated his due process rights; and that the court was biased against him.

In Nevada, custody modifications require a substantial change in circumstances and must serve the child’s best interest. Due process requires notice and an opportunity to be heard. Judicial bias must stem from an extrajudicial source or reflect deep-seated favoritism.

The Court of Appeals held that the appeal of the original custody decree was untimely and correctly dismissed; that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motions to modify custody; that Rowland received proper notice and a full hearing; and that there was no evidence of judicial bias.

 

4.    Miller v. Miller, No. 87625-COA, 2024 WL 7411300 (Nev. Ct. App. Oct. 17, 2024)

Melinda and Paul divorced in 2016, sharing joint legal and physical custody of their child. Due to Paul’s variable work schedule as a pilot, the custody schedule was inconsistent, leading to repeated litigation.  Melinda moved to establish a permanent schedule, and the District Court temporarily ordered a week-on/week-off arrangement.  Paul later filed a motion for contempt, alleging that Melinda violated the holiday schedule by taking the child during his designated President’s Day weekend.  Melinda argued that Paul failed to communicate his intent to exercise custody and had not consistently used his parenting time. At the evidentiary hearing, Melinda requested primary physical custody for the first time in her pretrial memorandum. The court (Dawn Throne) declined to consider Melinda’s request due to lack of notice to Paul.  The court found Melinda in contempt, sanctioned her $500, and awarded Paul $1,800 in attorney fees. Melinda’s motion for reconsideration was partially granted (removing “floating days” from the schedule), but the contempt finding and fees were upheld.

Melinda appealed, arguing that the District Court abused its discretion in finding her in contempt; that the court erred in awarding attorney fees and sanctions; and that the court violated due process by refusing to consider her late request for primary custody.

In Nevada, Disobedience of a lawful court order constitutes contempt under NRS 22.010(3). The order must be clear and unambiguous, and the contemnor must have had notice and the ability to comply. See Cunningham v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 102 Nev. 551 (1986).  Under NRS 22.100(3) and EDCR 5.219(f), a court may impose sanctions and award attorney fees for contempt. A court may not modify custody without prior specific notice to the parties. See Dagher v. Dagher, 103 Nev. 26 (1987); Micone v. Micone, 132 Nev. 156 (2016).

The Court of Appeals held that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in finding Melinda in contempt because she knowingly violated a clear custody order; that there was no error in awarding attorney fees and sanctions; that the court acted within its statutory authority; that there was no due process violation; and that the court properly declined to consider a custody modification raised without proper notice.

 

5.    Schaefer v. White, No. 87866-COA, 2024 WL 7411310 (Nev. Ct. App. Sept. 19, 2024)

Schaefer and White, who were never married, share a minor child, M.S. For most of M.S.’s life, the parents co-parented informally, with M.S. primarily residing with White due to Schaefer’s work in North Dakota and substance abuse issues. In 2023, Schaefer filed for sole custody amid tensions with White’s new partner. White counterclaimed for sole custody. A temporary order granted joint custody and placed M.S. in Schaefer’s school zone. After an evidentiary hearing, the District Court (Gregory Gordon) awarded joint legal and physical custody, designated White’s school zone for M.S.’s education, and ordered Schaefer to pay $1,118/month in child support.

Schaefer appealed, arguing that the District Court abused its discretion by awarding joint physical custody despite Schaefer having less than 40% parenting time; that the court erred in selecting Aggie Roberts Elementary School based primarily on logistical concerns; and that the court erred in declining to impute income to White for child support purposes.

In Nevada, the best interest of the child is the sole consideration (NRS 125C.0035(1)). A 40% timeshare is a guideline, not a rule (Rivero v. Rivero, 125 Nev. 410; Bluestein v. Bluestein, 131 Nev. 106). Courts must consider multiple factors under Arcella v. Arcella, 133 Nev. 868, including logistics, curriculum, and the child’s needs. Courts may impute income only if a parent is unemployed or underemployed without good cause (NAC 425.125; Rosenbaum v. Rosenbaum, 86 Nev. 550).

The Court of Appeals held that there was no abuse of discretion in awarding joint custody despite Schaefer’s less than 40% timeshare; that there was no error in selecting the school in White’s zone, as the court considered all relevant Arcella factors; and that there was no abuse of discretion in declining to impute income to White due to her pregnancy and good faith unemployment.

Marshal S. Willick