New Cases Added to MLAW: 4 COA Published: Backman, Johnson, Soldo-Alessio, and In the Matter of Guardianship A.L.R.-Q., A.R.W. and A.M.W. (Minors)

by | May 3, 2026 | Nevada Family Law Appeals | 0 comments

1.    Backman v. Gelbman, 141 Nev ___, ___ P.3d ___ (Adv. Op. 8, February 13, 2025)

Backman and Gelbman have litigated child support since the birth of their child in 2013. In 2020, Gelbman retired and successfully moved to modify child support to $0 based on a 20% decrease in income. The court imputed equal income to both parties. Backman filed several motions to modify child support between 2020 and 2023, citing changes in her income and Gelbman’s alleged additional income. In February 2023, Backman filed another motion, providing financial documentation and testimony showing a significant decrease in her income. The family court master denied the motion without conducting a substantive review, and the District Court (Aimee Banales) affirmed.

Backman appealed, arguing that the District Court abused its discretion by affirming the master’s denial of Backman’s motion to modify child support without conducting a substantive review under NRS 125B.145(4).

In Nevada, a child support order may be modified only upon a finding of: (1) A change in circumstances since the entry of the order; and (2) That modification is in the best interest of the child. Rivero v. Rivero, 125 Nev. 410, 431 (2009). A 20% change in gross monthly income constitutes a change in circumstances requiring a review of the child support order. NRS 125B.145(4). The controlling order for determining a 20% change is the most recent substantive order setting child support and making income findings—not subsequent denials of modification. A party seeking modification must present prima facie evidence of changed circumstances to trigger a substantive review. Rooney v. Rooney, 109 Nev. 540 (1993); Myers v. Haskins, 138 Nev. 553 (2022).

The Court of Appeals held that the District Court abused its discretion by failing to conduct a substantive review of the child support order after Backman presented prima facie evidence of a 20% decrease in income.

 

2.    Johnson v. Bennett, 141 Nev ___, ___ P.3d ___ (Adv. Op. 35, June 26, 2025)

Cierah Johnson and William Bennett divorced in March 2022 under a decree awarding joint legal and joint physical custody on a week on/week off basis. Shortly after Johnson relocated to Colorado following her father’s death, the parties entered a May 2022 stipulation granting Bennett primary physical custody in Nevada, with the parties to “reevaluate” custody in one year, though the stipulation did not characterize the arrangement as temporary. When Johnson returned to Nevada in May 2023, the parents informally resumed a joint custodial schedule, but Johnson did not seek to modify the 2022 stipulated order. Bennett, an Air Force mechanic, received orders requiring him to relocate to Georgia by November 30, 2023, and he petitioned to relocate with the children under NRS 125C.006. Johnson opposed, arguing that the 2022 arrangement was intended as a temporary accommodation, and that the parties were exercising de facto joint custody. She also filed a countermotion seeking primary physical custody. After issuing an October 2023 temporary order placing the children with Johnson, the District Court (Bill Henderson) conducted a three day evidentiary hearing. It found that: Bennett already held primary physical custody under the 2022 stipulation; Evaluated Johnson’s countermotion first and required her to “significantly tip the scales;” Applied a standard requiring Bennett to show that circumstances in Georgia would “equal or slightly exceed” those in Nevada; Found the best interest factors “pretty even;” and ultimately granted Bennett’s relocation request. The court denied Johnson’s motion for reconsideration.

Johnson appealed, arguing that the District Court was required to determine the parties’ de facto custody arrangement before applying the relocation statutes; that the court misallocated the burden of proof by deciding the non-relocating parent’s countermotion first; that it applied an incorrect, heightened burden rather than the proper preponderance standard; and that it ultimately failed to follow the statutory requirements set forth in NRS 125C.006 and NRS 125C.007.

In Nevada, post-2015 relocation statutes require courts to apply NRS 125C.006 when a parent has primary physical custody, and NRS 125C.0065 when the order provides for joint physical custody, with the applicable statute determined strictly by the existing custody order rather than any de facto arrangement. See NRS 125C.006(1); NRS 125C.0065(1). The relocating parent bears the burden of proof at all stages of the analysis under NRS 125C.007(3), and the proper standard of proof for both the threshold relocation test and the best interest inquiry is a preponderance of the evidence, as held in Monahan v. Hogan, 138 Nev. 58 (Ct. App. 2022). Courts must resolve the relocation petition before considering any contingent countermotion to avoid impermissible burden shifting. Additionally, stipulated custody orders are interpreted according to traditional contract principles and remain controlling unless formally modified. Mizrachi v. Mizrachi, 132 Nev. 666 (Ct. App. 2016).

The Court of Appeals held that the District Court correctly applied NRS 125C.006, determining that Bennett had primary physical custody based on the 2022 stipulated order. The Court of Appeals also found that the District Court abused its discretion by deciding the countermotion before the relocation petition, which imposed an improper heightened burden on Johnson, and failed to hold Bennett to his statutory burden, and that these error were not harmless.

REVERSED and REMANDED for a new relocation hearing applying proper burden and sequencing.

The court did NOT reach the denial of reconsideration due to the reversal of the main order.

 

3.    Soldo-Alessio v. Ferguson, 141 Nev ___, ___ P.3d ___ (Adv. Op. 9, February 13, 2025)

Cheyenne Soldo-Allesio and Kevin Ferguson share one minor child, E.F., and although never married, their relationship was marked by volatility and repeated domestic violence allegations. After their final separation, Soldo-Allesio obtained a February 2022 temporary protective order, later extended for six months upon a finding that domestic violence had occurred or there was a credible threat, and she relocated with E.F. to Florida. Ferguson filed for custody in Nevada seeking primary physical custody, while Soldo-Allesio countered for primary custody in Florida and disclosed extensive evidence—including police reports, photographs of injuries and bruising, and the TPO—all submitted before the discovery deadline. Before trial, she served an exhibit list containing 21 items, seven previously disclosed, but at trial Ferguson objected on timeliness and authenticity grounds, and the District Court (Regina McConnell) excluded all exhibits, incorrectly stating that “police records are hearsay.” With no exhibits admitted, trial proceeded solely on testimony. The court ultimately awarded joint physical custody until 2026, at which point primary physical custody would shift to Ferguson in Nevada. It found the domestic violence factor under NRS 125C.0035(4)(k) inapplicable, reasoning there was no clear and convincing evidence of domestic violence, and emphasized the absence of criminal charges or convictions. Soldo-Allesio moved for relief under NRCP 52 and 59, arguing that the court misapplied the standard and wrongly excluded critical evidence, but the court denied the motion.

Soldo-Allesio appealed, arguing that the District Court applied the wrong evidentiary standard for assessing domestic violence under NRS 125C.0035(4)(k); that it erred by excluding all of her trial exhibits, including those directly addressing domestic violence; and that it improperly treated the absence of a criminal conviction as dispositive of whether domestic violence occurred.

In Nevada, domestic violence is evaluated as a best interest factor under NRS 125C.0035(4)(k) using a preponderance of the evidence standard, not clear and convincing evidence, unless the court is applying the distinct rebuttable presumption against custody for perpetrators of domestic violence under NRS 125C.0035(5), which does require clear and convincing evidence. Preponderance remains the default evidentiary standard in family law matters absent explicit legislative direction, Monahan v. Hogan, 138 Nev. 58 (Ct. App. 2022). Consistent with Castle v. Simmons, 120 Nev. 98 (2004), courts must consider and resolve evidence relating to domestic violence before determining legal or physical custody.

The Court of Appeals held that the District Court applied the wrong standard when considering domestic violence as a best interest factor; that the court abused its discretion by excluding all trial exhibits without proper sanctions analysis; and that the court improperly relied on lack of criminal prosecution as evidence domestic violence did not occur.

REVERSED and REMANDED.

 

4.    In the Matter of Guardianship A.L.R.-Q., A.R.W. and A.M.W. (Minors), 141 Nev ___, ___ P.3d ___ 141 Nev., (Adv. Op. 66, Dec. 23, 2025)

Kelly and Edward Ruckle (maternal grandmother and step grandfather) were appointed guardians over three minor grandchildren in January 2022 after the District Court found that the children had lived in unfit conditions with their mother, Sara. Later, a reunification therapist (Dr. Holland) submitted confidential NSRG 5 reports alleging that the Ruckles failed to comply with court orders, and raised concerns about educational neglect and interference with reunification. At a brief NSRG 5 hearing where removal/termination was not to be considered, the District Court (Stacy Rocheleau) removed the Ruckles as guardians and terminated the guardianship, placing the children with Sara.

The Ruckles appealed, asserting that the District Court violated their procedural due process rights by failing to give adequate notice that removal and termination would be considered at the NSRG 5 hearing, and by denying them any meaningful opportunity to be heard (no briefing, no evidence, and a seven-minute hearing at which the court announced its decision without allowing response).

In Nevada, both the U.S. and Nevada Constitutions protect against deprivation of a liberty interest without due process; custodial relatives serving as guardians possess a liberty interest in the care, custody, and management of the child and are entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard before removal or termination (drawing on In re Guardianship of D.M.F.). Statutory and rule guidance includes NRS 159A.185 (grounds for removal), NRS 159A.191 (termination), and NSRG 5 (court handling of communications), with required best interest findings under NRS 159A.186(2) and termination findings under NSRG 10(A) when such actions are considered.

The Court of Appeals held that the District Court violated the Ruckles’ procedural due process rights because the NSRG 5 notice did not apprise the parties that removal/termination would be considered, no citations were issued on Sara’s last minute petition, and the court afforded no meaningful opportunity to be heard. The Court VACATED the termination order and REMANDED for briefing, an evidentiary hearing, and the required statutory/rule-based findings, while maintaining the current custodial placement with Sara pending the District Court’s final decision on remand.

VACATED and REMANDED.

Marshal S. Willick
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