Five SCT Published: In the Matter of the Parental Rights as to R.A.S., In the Matter of H.B., III., CCSD v. Dist. Court (Sharp), In the Matter of Children N.D., G.D., and M.D., and Gill

by | Apr 12, 2026 | Nevada Family Law Appeals | 0 comments

1.    In the Matter of the Parental Rights as to R.A.S.,  141 Nev ___, ___ P.3d ___ (Adv. Op. No. 20, April 24, 2025)

Shianna G. and Logan S. had a child, R.A.S., in 2018. In late 2019, while struggling with substance abuse, Shianna temporarily left the child with Logan to attend treatment. After completing rehab in January 2020, she attempted multiple times to locate or contact Logan, but he had moved, changed his phone number, and blocked her on Facebook. Logan made no effort to provide updated contact information. Shianna later relapsed, was incarcerated, and upon release attempted to stabilize her life by working and caring for another child. In June 2023, Logan filed a privately initiated petition to terminate her parental rights, and the District Court (Kriston Hill) granted the petition based on findings of abandonment, neglect, unfitness, and token efforts.

Shianna appealed, arguing that the District Court’s findings of parental fault were not supported by substantial evidence. She maintained that she did not intend to abandon her child, that any lack of contact resulted from Logan’s blocking and concealment, that leaving the child in Logan’s care was not neglect, that she was currently fit as a parent, and that she made more than “token efforts” under the circumstances. She also challenged aspects of the evidentiary rulings, but emphasized that the parental fault findings could not stand.

In Nevada, termination of parental rights requires clear and convincing evidence of both (1) at least one statutory ground of parental fault under NRS 128.105, and (2) that termination is in the child’s best interest. Substantial evidence must support the findings. “Abandonment” requires a settled purpose to relinquish parental rights; the presumption of abandonment may be rebutted by showing efforts at contact. “Neglect” requires proof that the parent failed to provide proper care while the child was in the parent’s custody. “Unfitness” requires a current, severe inability to care for the child, and prior unfitness matters only if it reflects present incapacity. “Token efforts” must be evaluated with caution, particularly in private termination petitions, where the motivations and circumstances differ from state-initiated cases. Courts must consider whether the petitioning parent obstructed contact, and must apply heightened scrutiny to ensure no improper severance occurs.

The Nevada Supreme Court held that none of the District Court’s parental fault findings were supported by substantial evidence. Shianna rebutted the abandonment presumption because Logan effectively prevented all contact; neglect could not be found because the child was properly cared for while with Logan; unfitness was unsupported because the District Court failed to identify any present conduct showing inability to parent; and token efforts could not be established when Logan’s actions made contact impossible. Because no ground of parental fault was proven by clear and convincing evidence, the Court reversed the termination order and emphasized that private termination actions require particular caution due to their unique motivations and contexts.

 

2.    In the Matter of H.B., III.,  141 Nev ___, ___ P.3d ___ (Adv. Op. No. 15, April 03, 2025)

H.B., a minor, lost his primary caregiver—his father—and subsequently lived briefly with his mother on the streets before moving in with his uncle, Marques. Marques petitioned for guardianship and disclosed that he had a 2008 felony conviction for attempted murder. A background check confirmed this conviction. Both the child’s paternal grandmother and the mother (via communication with Marques) supported the guardianship. The District Court (Linda Marquis) denied the petition, concluding that a felony conviction automatically disqualified Marques from serving as guardian, and further found that he failed to properly serve all required relatives and parties. The petition was denied with prejudice.

H.B. and Marques appealed, arguing that the District Court misinterpreted NRS 159A.061(3) by treating a felony conviction as an automatic disqualification from guardianship. They contended that the statute requires courts to consider a felony conviction as one factor among many and does not create a categorical bar. They also argued that service of notice should have been excused for good cause because Marques had active communication with the child’s mother, even if he did not serve her in the statutorily required form.

In Nevada, NRS 159A.061(3) requires courts to consider multiple enumerated factors when determining whether a proposed guardian is qualified and suitable, including whether the potential guardian has a felony conviction. The statute is unambiguous and contains no automatic disqualification provision. Courts must interpret statutes by their plain meaning, avoid reading in terms the Legislature omitted, and harmonize all statutory provisions. Under NRS 159A.047 and NRS 159A.0475, strict service requirements apply in guardianship cases: the petitioner must serve the minor’s relatives within two degrees of consanguinity and the parents using certified mail, personal service, or—if those attempts fail—publication. Exceptions to service are discretionary and apply only if statutory criteria are met.

The Nevada Supreme Court held that the District Court erred in concluding that a felony conviction automatically disqualifies a proposed guardian. A felony conviction must be considered, but it is not dispositive, and suitability must be evaluated holistically under NRS 159A.061. However, the Court affirmed the denial of the petition because Marques failed to properly effectuate service on required relatives and did not meet the statutory criteria for a notice exception. The Court instructed the District Court to amend its order to remove the words “with prejudice,” because dismissal for defective service is not a decision on the merits.

 

3.    CCSD v. Dist. Court (Sharp), 141 Nev ___, ___ P.3d ___ (Adv. Op. 10, March 6, 2025)

The State charged Nikos Sharp with multiple child abuse related offenses after the alleged victim, E.S., disclosed past sexual abuse. During discovery, Sharp sought access to several other unrelated child abuse and neglect reports made to the Department of Family Services (DFS) involving E.S.—including reports of physical abuse by her mother and of E.S. uploading her own nude images online. After an in-camera review, the District Court (Kathleen Delaney) ordered DFS to disclose redacted versions, then later ordered disclosure of unredacted versions including the identities of the individuals who made the reports. DFS objected and filed an original writ petition seeking to prevent disclosure.

DFS petitioned for writ relief, arguing that NRS 432B.290(4) creates an absolute privilege protecting reporter identities, and that the District Court exceeded its authority by compelling disclosure. DFS maintained that releasing reporter identities would chill reporting of suspected child abuse and contravene the statutory confidentiality scheme. Sharp argued that the statute does not provide absolute protection, that the District Court had properly conducted an in-camera review, and that the information was necessary for his defense—including impeachment and potential exculpatory use.

In Nevada, NRS 432B.290 establishes confidentiality protections for DFS child welfare records, but NRS 432B.290(4) provides only a limited privilege for reporter identities. The statute requires DFS to take precautions to protect reporter identities only if the agency reasonably believes disclosure would cause specific and material harm to (1) an investigation, or (2) the life or safety of any person. DFS may disclose confidential information to courts for in-camera review under NRS 432B.290(2)(e), and the court may order release when necessary to determine an issue before it. The Nevada Supreme Court interprets the statute in harmony with constitutional due process obligations in criminal prosecutions, emphasizing that statutory confidentiality cannot categorically override a defendant’s right to obtain potentially exculpatory evidence.

The Nevada Supreme Court held that NRS 432B.290(4) provides a limited—NOT absolute—privilege for reporter identities. Reporter names are protected only when DFS has actually determined that disclosure would harm an investigation or risk the safety of any person. Because DFS never conducted such a harm assessment in this case, the statutory protection did not apply. Therefore, the District Court did not exceed its jurisdiction in ordering DFS to disclose the reporter identities, and the writ petition was denied. The Court emphasized that its interpretation balances public policy encouraging reporting with constitutional protections for criminal defendants, and that district courts may compel disclosure when statutorily and constitutionally justified.

 

4.    In the Matter of Children N.D., G.D., and M.D., 141 Nev ___, ___ P.3d ___ P.3d ___ (Adv. Op. 2, January. 8, 2026)

The Clark County Department of Family Services (CCDFS) filed a petition under NRS Chapter 432B alleging that minor children N.D., G.D., and M.D. required protection from their father, Kevin D., and their stepmother. After allegations against the stepmother were withdrawn, the juvenile court (Robert Teuton) held a multi-day evidentiary hearing and concluded CCDFS failed to prove the allegations against Kevin by a preponderance of the evidence. The juvenile court dismissed the petition entirely, closing the 432B case.

CCDFS appealed, arguing that the dismissal order should be treated as a final judgment appealable under NRAP 3A(b)(1). They contended that In re A.B.—which previously held that child custody orders arising from juvenile proceedings were not appealable—was wrongly decided and should be overruled. Kevin argued the opposite: that under In re A.B. and NRAP 3A(b)(7), juvenile court child custody orders are never appealable and the dismissal order could not be reviewed.

In Nevada, appeals are permitted only when authorized by statute or court rule, and NRAP 3A(b)(1) allows appeals from final judgments entered by a district court. A final judgment is one that disposes of all issues in the case and leaves nothing for future consideration. The Supreme Court analyzed NRS Chapter 432B, the structure of NRAP 3A(b), and the flawed reasoning of In re A.B., concluding that juvenile court orders dismissing 432B petitions fully resolve the action, and therefore meet the definition of a final judgment under NRAP 3A(b)(1). The Court clarified that NRAP 3A(b)(7) (child custody orders not arising from juvenile court) does not eliminate appellate jurisdiction under NRAP 3A(b)(1). Stare decisis does not require retaining precedent when its reasoning is unsound.

The Nevada Supreme Court held that an order dismissing a child protection petition under NRS Chapter 432B is appealable as a final judgment under NRAP 3A(b)(1), even though it arises from juvenile court and concerns custody. The Court expressly overruled In re A.B. to the extent it held such orders unappealable. Because the dismissal here completely resolved all issues in the 432B proceeding, the appeal was permitted to proceed, and briefing was ordered to continue.

 

5.    Gill v. Gill, 142 Nev. ___, ___ P.3d ___ (Adv. Op. 19, March 5, 2026)

Vikramjit (“Vick”) Gill and Anjena Gill married in 2020 and had a son, K.G., in Las Vegas in April 2023. One month later, Anjena traveled with the baby to Canada for what was intended to be a temporary funeral trip, but unexpected circumstances prolonged the stay. During that time, Vick visited and frequently communicated with them, and both parents discussed long term family planning. In November 2023, after the relationship deteriorated, Anjena filed a custody action in Canada. Vick responded by initiating a Hague Convention proceeding, also in Canada, seeking the child’s return to Nevada. The Canadian courts determined that K.G. was not returnable, finding Canada to be his habitual residence. Vick’s appeal of that decision was unsuccessful. He then filed for divorce and custody in Nevada in May 2024. The Nevada District Court (Heidi Almase) denied his custody and child support requests, concluding that Nevada lacked home state jurisdiction under the UCCJEA, and noting substantial prior litigation in Canada.

Vick appealed, arguing that the District Court incorrectly concluded that Nevada lacked subject matter jurisdiction over custody and support; that K.G.’s stay in Canada was a temporary absence, leaving Nevada as the child’s home state; and that the court improperly refused to exercise jurisdiction.

In Nevada, the UCCJEA (NRS Chapter 125A) governs jurisdiction over child custody. Under NRS 125A.305(1)(a), a state has home state jurisdiction if the child lived there for six consecutive months, including periods of temporary absence. “Home state” is defined by NRS 125A.085. The court must determine home state jurisdiction before addressing potential limitations on exercising that jurisdiction. While the Hague Convention concerns habitual residence—not UCCJEA jurisdiction—the U.S. Supreme Court instructs that treaty signatory court decisions carry special weight (Monasky v. Taglieri). Under NRS 125A.365, once a court has jurisdiction, it may still decline to exercise it if another forum is more appropriate, after giving parties the opportunity to brief the issue and attempting communication between courts as contemplated by NRS 125A.355. Finally, Nevada treats child custody and child support as interdependent, and courts generally hear them together. Bluestein v. Bluestein.

The Nevada Supreme Court held that the District Court erred, and that Nevada does have home state jurisdiction over custody and support.

Remanded.

Marshal S. Willick
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