Olson v. Olson, No. 86237-COA, Order of Affirmance (Unpublished Disposition, Feb. 22, 2024)
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Tiffany Olson and Christian Olson divorced in 2014. They agreed to joint legal custody and for Tiffany to have primary physical custody of their two minor children. Both parties remarried. In June 2021, Christian filed a motion seeking primary physical custody of A.O. and L.O. The district court granted Christian’s motion finding that substantial changes had occurred.
Following a physical altercation and events thereafter involving A.O. and Christian, Tiffany filed a motion to modify child custody. Following the evidentiary hearing, the district court (Stockard) denied Tiffany’s motion. Tiffany appealed.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s denial. The COA found that the district court, as the trier of fact, considered all of the evidence, weighed each witness’s credibility, and properly exercised its discretion to deny custody modification.
Furthermore, the district court wrote a lengthy order which thoroughly detailed its findings and considerations based on evidence presented during the hearing. The district court concluded that the physical altercation between A.O. and Christian did not constitute clear and convincing evidence of domestic violence.
Slader v. Colley, No. 87160-COA, Order Affirming in Part and Dismissing in Part (Unpublished Disposition, Feb. 26, 2024)
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Cheryl Slader and Cory Colley are divorced and have one minor child together. Following a trial on issues related to child custody in 2022, the district court (Mastin) granted joint legal custody and awarded primary physical custody to Cory, subject to Cheryl’s parenting time and set child support.
After reassignment, the district court (McConnell) entered an order that resolved the remaining child custody issues regarding holidays and parenting time. Cheryl appealed.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the portion of Cheryl’s appeal that related to alimony and child support as the COA lacks jurisdiction to consider those issues because the district court still had not entered a final judgment on those matters.
However, on the issues of child custody, the COA affirmed the district court. In its divorce decree, the district court made findings of fact relevant to the best interest of the child factors. Furthermore, the district court properly concluded that the domestic violence presumption did not apply because Cheryl did not present clear and convincing evidence that domestic violence occurred.
The COA concluded that the limited record before them demonstrated that the district court’s findings on the domestic violence and child custody issues were supported by substantial evidence.
B.Y. and A.F. v. Dist. Ct. (Burdiss), No. 88027, Order Granting in Part Petition for Writ of Mandamus (Unpublished Disposition, Mar. 8, 2024)
The children (B.Y. and A.F.) of Sherice Inez Foster filed a petition for writ of mandamus challenging the order of a district court (Rocheleau) denying a petition for temporary guardianship over the children that had been filed by appointed counsel seeking appointment of their grandparents as temporary guardians.
The Supreme Court concluded that petitioner children had been out of the custody, care, and control of their parents since March 2023, well over the 6-month period after which the presumption applies. Thus, good cause for the temporary guardianship must be presumed. And the presumption applies to ex parte requests and to any temporary guardianship application.
The SC found that it appeared that the district court’s conclusions incorporated a misunderstanding as to who was seeking the temporary guardianship. Furthermore, the SC concluded that the district court manifestly abused its discretion in failing to give the petition for temporary guardianship proper consideration under NRS Chapter 159A.
Tahican, LLC v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 139 Nev. ___, ___ P.3d ___ (Adv. Opn. No. 2, Feb. 2, 2023)
The Supreme Court considered whether a creditor’s claim seeking avoidance of a fraudulent transfer of real property under Nevada’s Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act may support the recording of a lis pendens even though the creditor does not claim an interest in the property itself but instead seeks to transfer title back to the debtor.
The SC denied Tachican’s petition for a writ of mandamus which challenged a district court order denying the motion to expunge a lis pendens.
In doing so, the SC clarified the statement in Levinson v. Eighth Judicial District Court 109 Nev. 747, 752, 857 P.2d 18, 21 (1993) and held that the plain language of NRS 14.010(1) does not limit a lis pendens to actions in which the plaintiff claims an ownership or possessory interest in the property.
The SC concluded that a fraudulent transfer claim seeking avoidance of the transfer of real property is one “affecting the title or possession of real property” under NRS 14.010(1) and thus supports a lis pendens.
Lopez v. Lopez, 139 Nev. ___, ___ (Nev. App. Adv. Opn. No. 54, Nov. 30, 2023)
Maria Lopez and Pedro Lopez were married in Mexico in 1995, and moved to the United States and created the P & D Family Trust, a revocable inter vivos trust over which they, as co-settlors and co-trustees, retained the right to revoke, alter, or amend at any point during their lifetimes.
Many issues involving the P & D Family Trust arose during Maria and Pedro’s divorce proceedings. After the divorce trial, the district court (Throne) deemed all family trust properties to be community property and order them distributed equally between the parties. Maria appealed.
An issue of first impression arose in their divorce action over the district court’s authority to resolve community property disputes over property held in a revocable inter vivos trust. The Court of Appeals analyzed whether a revocable inter vivos trust holding community property must be named as a necessary party in a divorce action where the divorcing spouses are co-trustees, co-settlors, and beneficiaries.
The COA concluded that both Maria and Pedro are the materially interested parties, and that divorce revokes every devise given by a settlor to their former spouse in a revocable inter vivos trust.
Therefore, the COA held that the parties are not required to name such a revocable inter vivos trust as a necessary party in a divorce action where the spouses are co-settlors, co-trustees, and beneficiaries.
As such, the COA upheld the district court’s distribution decisions and affirmed its decree of divorce.
- New Cases added to MLAW: Two SCT Published: L.R.S. and Falconi; Four COA Unpublished: Elmore, Xavier, Wilson, and Maldonado - October 8, 2024
- New Cases added to MLAW: Two SCT Unpublished: Parental Rights as to D.E. & Randall; Three COA Unpublished: Anderson, Carlson, & Teshome - September 26, 2024
- New Cases added to MLAW: Two SCT Published: Parental Rights as to G.R.S. & Burdiss; Two COA Unpublished: Cunning & Yu - September 5, 2024