New Cases Added to MLAW: Five COA Unpublished: Sovey, Bell, Fisher, Probst, and Norman

by | Aug 21, 2025 | Nevada Family Law Appeals | 0 comments

1.    Sovey (F/K/A Herrick-Sovey) v. The Second Judicial District Court (Robb), and Samantha Herrick, No. 90747-COA, Order Denying Emergency Petition (Unpublished Disposition, June 16, 2025)

Sovey filed an emergency petition for a writ of mandamus seeking to disqualify the presiding district court judge (Bridget Robb), from his ongoing family law case for reasons unspecified in the order.

A writ of mandamus may be issued to compel the performance of an act that the law requires as a duty resulting from an office. NRS 34.160. A writ of mandamus may also be issued to control an arbitrary or capricious exercise of discretion. Int’l Game Tech., Inc. v. Second Jud. Dist. Ct., 124 Nev. 193, 197 (2008). The decision to entertain a writ petition is discretionary, and the burden is on the petitioner to demonstrate that extraordinary relief is warranted. Pan v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 120 Nev. 222, 228 (2004).

The Court of Appeals held that the petitioner failed to demonstrate that extraordinary relief was warranted and denied the petition.

 

2.    Bell v. Robinson, No. 89297-COA, Order of Affirmance (Unpublished Disposition, June 25, 2025)

Bell and Robinson share one minor child, R.R.B., born in 2013.  They have litigated custody issues since 2015.  In August 2022, the district court awarded joint physical custody.  In April 2023, Bell moved for primary physical custody, alleging Robinson’s substance abuse and parental neglect. Bell’s motion included a declaration from Robinson’s ex-boyfriend, Bradley Hunt, describing a January 2023 incident where Robinson allegedly bit him and stole his car.  Robinson admitted to driving away in Hunt’s car but claimed it was to escape domestic violence.  She admitted to possibly biting Hunt in self-defense. The district court (T. Arthur Ritchie) held an evidentiary hearing in August 2023.  Testimony revealed inconsistencies in Hunt’s statements and his continued contact with Robinson after the alleged incident.  Bell admitted to making unilateral decisions about the child’s schooling and activities without Robinson’s input.

Bell appealed arguing that the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion to modify physical custody.

A parent seeking to modify physical custody must demonstrate both a substantial change in circumstances and that the modification is in the child’s best interest.

The Court of Appeals held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to modify custody. The Court affirmed the district court’s denial of Bell’s motion to modify custody as it was supported by substantial evidence and did not constitute an abuse of discretion.

 

3.    Fisher v. Wing, No. 87698-COA, Order Affirming in Part, Vacating in Part, Reversing in Part, and Remanding (Unpublished Disposition, June 25,2025)

Fisher and Wing married in 2011 and divorced in 2023.  Wing moved for reconsideration, arguing the district court (Jim Shirley) failed to divide certain community assets and address marital waste.

The amended decree made an unequal distribution of property based on findings that Fisher committed marital waste by paying his criminal defense attorneys and awarded alimony and attorney fees to Wing.

Fisher appealed the district court claiming: error in classifying the New York Life Premier II IRA as community property; the findings of marital waste were not supported by substantial evidence; and the alimony award was improper.  Wing cross-appealed arguing the marital waste award should be increased and that the district court erred in reducing her award of attorney fees.

Community property must be equally divided unless a compelling reason exists (NRS 125.150).  Marital waste must be supported by substantial evidence and typically involves selfish use of marital assets.  Alimony must be just and equitable, considering statutory factors (NRS 125.150(9)). Attorney fee awards must be supported by findings under Brunzell and consider income disparity.

The Court of Appeals held that the classification of the IRA lacked sufficient findings as to the conflicting evidence of the source of payments for the account and whether commingling had occurred, and was remanded; the finding of waste for attorney fees and insurance withdrawal was reversed because those events occurred before the restraining order and it is questionable whether such a withdrawal can be “waste” in any event; the alimony award was affirmed as the district court adequately reviewed the applicable facts and statutory factors; and the reduction of attorney fees lacked a clear rationale, and the order was internally contradictory, and was vacated.

 

4.    Probst (F/K/A Carney) v. Carney, No. 89437-COA, Order of Affirmance (Unpublished Disposition, June 26, 2025)

Probst and Carney divorced in 2011. Initially, Probst had primary physical custody. In 2018, custody was modified to joint legal and physical custody. In 2020, custody was modified again, granting Carney primary physical custody. In 2022, Carney alleged that Probst’s stepson had inappropriate sexual contact with the younger child. The court (Sandra Unsworth) temporarily suspended Probst’s parenting time. The court appointed Dr. Herbert Coard (reunification therapist) and Dr. Lorraine Apodaca (parenting coordinator) to assist with child safety and reunification. In January 2023, Probst was granted unsupervised parenting time in the Reno/Sparks area. Later, concerns resurfaced regarding the younger child’s safety in Probst’s home. Probst filed a motion to remove Dr. Coard and Dr. Apodaca, alleging bias and improper withholding of parenting time. The district court held an evidentiary hearing and denied Probst’s motion.

Probst appealed, arguing that the district court improperly delegated custody decisions to third parties; that Dr. Coard and Dr. Apodaca were biased against her; that the district court erred in its parenting time determinations; that she was improperly required to pay additional costs for a new reunification therapist; that the one-day evidentiary hearing was insufficient; and that the district court was biased against her.

The Court of Appeals held that the district court retained ultimate decision making authority. The court found no evidence of bias by either the parenting coordinator or the reunification specialist. The parenting time decisions were supported by substantial evidence. The cost allocation was within the court’s discretion. The scheduling was not arbitrary or prejudicial. Probst failed to show judicial bias.

In Nevada, custody and parenting time decisions are reviewed for abuse of discretion and must be supported by substantial evidence. Courts may appoint professionals to assist but must retain final authority. Judicial bias must be proven with specific facts, not dissatisfaction with rulings.

The Court of Appeals Affirmed. The district court’s custody and parenting time determinations were upheld.

 

5.    Norman v. Stamper, No. 88904-COA, Order of Affirmance (Unpublished Disposition, June 26, 2025)

Norman and Stamper were married in 2014 and had three minor children. Stamper filed for divorce in 2023, seeking primary physical custody. Norman counterclaimed, also seeking primary custody. After Norman’s attorney withdrew, the parties engaged in settlement discussions. They agreed to joint legal and physical custody, $550/month child support from Norman, and division of medical costs and retirement benefits. Stamper sent Norman her updated financial disclosure form (FDF) before the settlement conference, showing her new employment and income. At the settlement conference, both parties affirmed the agreement and waived trial. The court entered the stipulated decree of divorce, which included updated income figures.

A day short of six months later, Norman moved to set aside the decree under NRCP 60(b)(3), alleging fraud and misrepresentation. The district court (Thomas Gregory) denied Norman’s motion.

Norman appealed, arguing that the district court abused its discretion by denying his NRCP 60(b)(3) motion to set aside the divorce decree; and that he was entitled to relief based on alleged misrepresentation or misconduct by Stamper.

Relief under NRCP 60(b)(3) requires timely filing and a showing of fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct. Courts have broad discretion in denying such motions, especially when the moving party had prior knowledge of the facts.

The Court of Appeals held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Norman’s motion for relief under NRCP 60(b)(3) because Norman had full knowledge of the facts, whether or not Stamper filed her FDF, and upheld the lower court’s findings that Norman’s motion was untimely, lacking good faith, and did not demonstrate fraud upon the court or justify setting aside the decree.

Marshal S. Willick
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