1.    Rendon v. Garcia F/K/A Rendon, No. 89514-COA, Order of Affirmance (Unpublished Disposition, November 20, 2025)

Arturo Rendon and Lea Garcia were married in 2012.  They share one child together.  They divorced in 2021 pursuant to a joint petition granting joint legal and physical custody of their child.  In 2023, Lea accepted a promotion with the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) in Boise, Idaho, and requested Arturo’s consent to relocate with the child. Arturo refused.  Lea filed a motion to relocate and requested primary physical custody, citing: increased income, career advancement opportunities, better schools, and access to family in Boise.  Arturo opposed, arguing that; the income increase was minimal, educational and medical opportunities were similar in Elko, and relocation would disrupt the child’s social life and cultural ties.  The District Court (Kriston Hill) held an evidentiary hearing and granted Lea’s motion, awarding her primary physical custody.

Arturo appealed, arguing that: Lea violated NRS 125C.0065 by partially relocating before court approval; the District Court erred in finding “actual advantage” under NRS 125C.007(1)(c); and Lea’s motives were dishonorable under NRS 125C.007(2)(b).

In Nevada, under NRS 125C.0065, a parent with joint custody must seek consent or a court order before relocating. A court must apply the Threshold Test under NRS 125C.007 (good faith, best interest, actual advantage), and the six relocation factors when determining a relocation request. A party requesting a custody modification must show that a substantial change in circumstances occurred, and that the relocation is in the best interest of child (NRS 125C.0035(4)).

The Court of Appeals AFFIRMED.

The court found that Arturo forfeited his argument about partial relocation (not raised below), that substantial evidence supported the District Court’s findings, and that the District Court properly applied the NRS 125C.007 factors and best interest analysis.

 

2.    Peralta v. Talley, No. 89288-COA, Order of Reversal and Remand (Unpublished Disposition, November 20, 2025)

Lyka Peralta and Chyron Talley married in 2021 and separated in October 2023 while Peralta was pregnant. In November 2023, Talley filed for divorce.  The parties mediated custody and agreed that Peralta would have sole physical custody of the child.  In July 2024, the District Court (Mari Parlade) calculated Talley’s gross income at $3,066 (base pay) and excluded his military Basic Allowance for Housing (BAH) of $2,407.25/month.  Child support was set at $490/month based on the reduced income.

Peralta appealed, arguing that the court erred by excluding the BAH from Talley’s gross income in violation of Nevada law, and that therefore the child support award was under-calculated.

In Nevada, under NAC 425.025(1)(I), gross income includes military allowances and veterans’ benefits without limitation.  Under NAC 425.120, a court must consider all financial information relevant to obligor’s earning capacity.

The Court of Appeals Reversed and Remanded the child support award, finding that the District Court erred by excluding the BAH from Talley’s gross income. The Balance of Decree (custody and other issues) were affirmed by the court.  The court declined to rule on arrearages, leaving the issue for the District Court to determine after recalculation.

 

3.    Sabo v. Malandra, No. 89948-COA, Order of Affirmance (Unpublished Disposition, November 26, 2025)

Justin Sabo and Nieve Malandra are the parents of a minor child born in 2017. They were never married.  Initially, the parties stipulated that Malandra would have primary physical custody and that Sabo would pay $1,000 per month in child support.  In 2023, Sabo moved to modify custody and child support.  After an evidentiary hearing, the District Court (Mari Parlade) denied the custody modification, but addressed child support.  Sabo testified that he earned about $2,000 per month as a delivery driver, and denied receiving recent income from real estate or loans, despite having monthly expenses of nearly $9,000. Malandra testified that Sabo fraudulently obtained $162,000 in Employee Retention Credit (ERC) funds using her business, Stardust Entertainment, and provided a 1099 form reflecting that amount. Malandra’s expert, Richard Prinzi, a CPA and her romantic partner, testified that Sabo transferred $162,000 from Stardust’s account to his own, and that his LLC received $309,516.83 in ERC funds.  Prinzi’s report suggested that Sabo’s income exceeded $800,000, but the court rejected that figure.  The District Court found that Sabo was underemployed to avoid child support and imputed his income in the amount of $496,000 annually, resulting in a monthly obligation of $2,533.33.

Sabo appealed the District Court’s order modifying his child support obligation. He argued that the court abused its discretion by relying on the allegedly fraudulent 1099 form to impute $162,000 in income, by admitting Prinzi’s testimony despite his bias, and by basing its findings on evidence Sabo claimed was unreliable.  He also challenged the court’s inclination to award attorney fees, though no final fee award had been entered.

In Nevada, child support orders are reviewed for abuse of discretion (Wallace v. Wallace, 112 Nev. 1015, 922 P.2d 541 (1996)).  A District Court abuses its discretion when its findings lack substantial evidence, defined as evidence a reasonable person may accept as adequate (Miller v. Miller, 134 Nev. 120, 412 P.3d 1081 (2018); Ellis v. Carucci, 123 Nev. 145, 161 P.3d 239 (2007)).  Appellate Courts do not reweigh evidence or reassess credibility (Quintero v. McDonald, 116 Nev. 1181, 14 P.3d 522 (2000)).  Expert testimony is admissible if the witness meets the qualifications under NRS 50.275 and the Hallmark v. Eldridge test: (1) qualified in specialized knowledge; (2) assists the trier of fact; and (3) testimony is limited to that scope (124 Nev. 492, 189 P.3d 646 (2008)). Bias affects credibility, not admissibility (Capanna v. Orth, 134 Nev. 888, 432 P.3d 726 (2018)). Income for child support may be imputed under NAC 425.125 when a parent is underemployed to avoid obligations.

The Court of Appeals held that the District Court did not abuse its discretion. Substantial evidence supported the finding that Sabo received ERC funds and was underemployed to avoid child support. The Court AFFIRMED the child support modification and DISMISSED Sabo’s challenge to attorney fees as premature.

 

4.    Goldstein v. Goldstein, No. 88541-COA, Order of Affirmance (Unpublished Disposition, December 2, 2025)

Adam Goldstein and Sandy Goldstein married in 2011 and divorced in 2019. Their case involved bifurcated trials: custody issues were tried in May 2021, and financial issues in September 2021.  In May 2022, the District Court (Bridget Robb) awarded Sandy primary physical custody and permitted her to relocate with the children to Colorado, finding that Adam opposed relocation in bad faith and made unsubstantiated claims, including allegations of alcoholism and educational neglect.  The court also found that Adam withheld parenting time and improperly influenced a child’s testimony.  Later, Sandy requested attorney fees under NRS 18.010(2), citing Adam’s bad faith litigation tactics.  Adam opposed, arguing that his positions were not frivolous, and that he prevailed on financial issues.  The District Court granted Sandy’s request, awarding $124,627.12 in attorney fees after reducing her initial request of $194,861.25 based on Brunzell factors.

Adam appealed the District Court’s award of attorney fees to Sandy.  He argued that the court abused its discretion by treating attorney fees as a community obligation and unequally dividing them based on alleged misconduct.  He also contended that improper litigation tactics were not a compelling reason for an unequal division, that the amount awarded was unreasonable, and that the court failed to consider income disparity.

In Nevada, attorney fee awards are reviewed for abuse of discretion (Logan v. Abe, 131 Nev. 260, 350 P.3d 1139 (2015)).  Courts generally cannot award fees absent statutory, rule-based, or contractual authority (Liu v. Christopher Homes, 130 Nev. 147, 321 P.3d 875 (2014)).  Under NRS 18.010(2)(b), fees may be awarded to a prevailing party when the opposing party’s claims were brought or maintained without reasonable grounds or to harass, and the statute is liberally construed to deter frivolous claims.  A claim is frivolous if no credible evidence supports it (Rodriguez v. Primadonna Co., 125 Nev. 578, 216 P.3d 793 (2009)).  Courts also consider income disparity (Wright v. Osburn, 114 Nev. 1367, 970 P.2d 1071 (1998)) and apply the Brunzell factors to assess reasonableness of fees.  While community debts generally exclude post-separation legal expenses not benefiting the community (Barry v. Lindner, 119 Nev. 661, 81 P.3d 537 (2003)), fees may be awarded based on bad faith litigation tactics under NRS 18.010(2)(b).

The Court of Appeals held that the District Court did not abuse its discretion. Although attorney fees could not be treated as a community obligation, the award was proper under NRS 18.010(2)(b) because Adam pursued frivolous and bad faith claims, including opposing relocation without reasonable grounds, making false allegations, and influencing testimony. The court found substantial evidence supported these findings, and noted that Sandy was the prevailing party. The district court also considered income disparity and applied the Brunzell factors, reducing the requested amount. Therefore, the award of $124,627.12 was AFFIRMED.

 

5.    Lopez, Jr. v. Lopez, No. 89245-COA, Order of Affirmance (Unpublished Disposition, December 9, 2025)

Raul Lopez Jr. and Rosalba Lopez married in May 2014 and share two children. Rosalba filed for divorce in September 2022.  The parties agreed to joint legal and physical custody, with Rosalba paying Raul child support.  The remaining issues were Raul’s request for alimony and attorney fees.  At the September 2023 evidentiary hearing, Rosalba testified that she works full-time as an operations supervisor earning approximately $5,984 monthly after taxes, has expenses of $5,477, including costs for her household, medical treatments for breast cancer, and support for their adult child, J.L. Raul testified that he has not worked since 2018, receives $1,856 monthly in Social Security Disability benefits, and seeks alimony to move out of his parents’ home.  The District Court (Dedree Butler) found Rosalba’s testimony credible, noted her necessary expenses, and determined Raul’s expenses were limited and that he had managed without Rosalba’s financial support for a year. Both parties were to receive equal proceeds from the sale of the marital home.  The court denied Raul’s alimony request and indicated that Rosalba would be awarded attorney fees in a separate order.

Raul appealed, arguing that the district court erred in denying alimony. He claimed that Rosalba’s expenses were inflated, that her payments for J.L. should not have been considered because J.L. was 18, and that Rosalba had the ability to pay alimony.  He also challenged the court’s factual findings, asserting that they were erroneous.

In Nevada, a district court may award alimony as appears just and equitable under NRS 125.150(1)(a).  The court must consider the eleven factors listed in NRS 125.150(9), including the financial condition of each spouse, earning capacity, and the duration of the marriage.  Alimony is based on the receiving spouse’s need and the paying spouse’s ability to pay (Kogod v. Cioffi-Kogod, 135 Nev. 64, 439 P.3d 397 (2019)). Courts have broad discretion, and factual findings must be supported by substantial evidence (Eivazi v. Eivazi, 139 Nev. 408, 537 P.3d 476 (Ct. App. 2023)).  Appellate Courts do not reweigh evidence or reassess credibility (Grosjean v. Imperial Palace, 125 Nev. 349, 212 P.3d 1068 (2009)).

The Court of Appeals held that the District Court did not abuse its discretion. The record showed that the court properly considered the statutory factors, and that substantial evidence supported its findings. Accordingly, the denial of alimony was AFFIRMED.

Marshal S. Willick