- Rumley v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct., No. 89875-COA (Nev. Ct. App. Jan. 2, 2025) (Unpublished)
The Court of Appeals denied Alisha Rumley’s emergency writ petition challenging the denial of her motion to quash service in a custody case. The Court ruled it could not review the matter because Rumley failed to provide a written, file-stamped order as required, but only a Minute Order (issued by Hon. Nadin Cutter), which is not effective for any purpose. Additionally, she did not demonstrate entitlement to extraordinary relief, and her jurisdictional challenge was already preserved for appeal. Rumley may refile if she later obtains a proper written order. This decision highlights the need for strict compliance with procedural rules in appellate review.
- Gilmore v. Fears (In re Custody of A.A.L.R.), No. 88396-COA (Nev. Ct. App. Jan. 15, 2025) (Unpublished)
Gilmore filed a petition for guardianship of her three-year-old granddaughter, A.A.L.R., alleging that the child’s mother, Fears, was unfit due to homelessness, lack of transportation, and substance abuse. Gilmore claimed the child had been living with her since May 2022. Fears opposed the petition, asserting she was employed, had stable housing, and did not have substance abuse issues. The district court (Dawn Throne) granted temporary guardianship to Gilmore pending an evidentiary hearing.
At the hearing, both parties testified. Fears stated she had been the child’s primary caregiver and that Gilmore had only babysat during her night shifts. The court found that Gilmore failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that guardianship was necessary and ordered the child returned to Fears.
Gilmore appealed arguing that the district court abuse its discretion in denying Gilmore’s petition for guardianship of the minor child.
In Nevada, a petitioner must prove by clear and convincing evidence that guardianship is necessary (NRS 159A.055(1)). A rebuttable presumption of parental unfitness arises if the child has been out of the parent’s custody for six months (NRS 159A.061(4)(c)). The court must act in the best interest of the child (NRS 159A.061(9)). The best interest of the child is usually served by awarding custody to a fit parent.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s denial of the guardianship petition. Additionally, the Court rejected Gilmore’s claims of judicial bias, finding no extrajudicial favoritism. Fears retains custody, and the guardianship petition was properly denied.
- Pais v. Corral, No. 88484-COA (Nev. Ct. App. Jan. 15, 2025) (Unpublished)
Pais and Corral, who were never married, share one minor child. Pais filed a complaint seeking joint legal and physical custody; Corral counterclaimed for sole custody. The district court temporarily ordered joint custody. After an evidentiary hearing in November 2023, the court (Stacy Rocheleau) awarded joint legal custody but granted Corral primary physical custody. Pais was also ordered to pay $394 per month in child support.
Pais filed a timely NRCP 59 motion to alter or amend the judgment or for a new trial, arguing that the district court failed to make required factual findings, particularly under the best interest factors in NRS 125C.0035(4). The district court denied the motion, asserting that it had made oral findings at the hearing.
Pais appealed arguing that the district court abused its discretion by failing to include written findings regarding the child’s best interest under NRS 125C.0035(4) in the custody decree.
In Nevada, the best interest of the child is the sole consideration in custody determinations (NRS 125C.0035(1); Ellis v. Carucci, 123 Nev. 145 (2007)). The district court must consider all twelve statutory best interest factors and include specific written findings in the custody.
The Court of Appeals held that the district court abused its discretion by failing to include written findings regarding the best interest factors in the custody decree, and remanded for that purpose.
- Morales v. Mayfield, No. 87503-COA (Nev. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 2025) (Unpublished)
In 2019, Morales signed a consent order acknowledging paternity and agreeing to pay child support to Mayfield for their minor child. The order set monthly payments at $389, including arrears. Morales complied with the order for over three years.
In June 2023, Morales filed a motion to vacate the consent order, arguing lack of subject matter and personal jurisdiction, duress, fraud, and constitutional violations. The hearing master denied the motion, finding jurisdiction proper, no evidence of duress, and that Morales reaffirmed the order by making payments. The district court (Regina McConnell) adopted the master’s recommendation.
Morales appealed arguing that the district court abuse its discretion in denying Morales’ motion to vacate the child support consent order under NRCP 60(b).
In Nevada, a motion to set aside a judgment under NRCP 60(b) is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Subject matter jurisdiction is the court’s authority to hear a type of case. Objections to personal jurisdiction must be timely raised or are waived. NRCP 60(c)(1) requires motions based on fraud or misrepresentation to be filed within six months of notice of entry.
The Court of Appeals held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Morales’ motion to vacate the consent order.
- Reed v. Reed, No. 87580-COA (Nev. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 2025) (Unpublished)
Samarn and Dorothy were married for 29 years and divorced in April 2022. Under the stipulated divorce decree, Samarn was to pay $1,250/month in alimony until child support ended in May 2023, after which alimony would increase to $2,500/month for 10 years. Samarn, a USPS executive earning over $200,000/year, was demoted to a $110,000/year position after an internal investigation found he violated USPS ethics policies by promoting and favoring a romantic partner.
Samarn moved to terminate or reduce alimony, citing a 45% income reduction and Dorothy’s allegedly improved financial condition. The district court (Gregory Gordon) restructured, but did not terminate or substantially reduce, alimony: $2,000/month until January 2025, then $2,500/month, with a 3-month extension of the term.
Samarn appealed arguing that the district court err in applying Rosenbaum v. Rosenbaum, 86 Nev. 550, 471 P.2d 254 (1970), to deny termination or substantial modification of alimony; and that the district court was required to apply the factors under NRS 125.150(9) in deciding the motion to modify alimony.
In Nevada, alimony may be modified upon a showing of changed circumstances (NRS 125.150(8)). A 20% or more reduction in income triggers mandatory review (NRS 125.150(12)). The Courts may consider whether the paying spouse is financially unable to meet the obligation and any other relevant factors. Under Rosenbaum, courts may consider whether a reduction in income was in good faith or due resulted “from circumstances beyond his control.”
In evaluating a motion to modify alimony, the district court generally is not required to consider all the factors set forth in NRS 125.150(9), but instead, must consider “whether the income of the spouse who is ordered to pay alimony . . . has been reduced to such a level that the spouse is financially unable to pay the amount of alimony the spouse has been ordered to pay,” and the court may consider “any other factors [it] considers relevant.” NRS 125.150(8).
The district court found that the court also found that, despite his demotion and reduction in income, Samarn continued to spend money on trips for himself and his family, heavily utilized credit cards, and otherwise engaged in spending that suggested his margins were not as tight as he argued.
The Court held the district court properly applied Rosenbaum and found Samarn’s demotion was due to willful misconduct, not circumstances beyond his control and the district court was not required to apply NRS 125.150(9) factors, but it did consider relevant financial circumstances consistent with its discretion under NRS 125.150(8), and affirmed.
- Stojack v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct., No. 89815-COA (Nev. Ct. App. Feb. 14, 2025) (Unpublished)
Stojack filed a petition for a writ of mandamus challenging the district court’s denial of his motion to obtain disclosure of his minor child’s therapy records. The underlying case involved child welfare proceedings, and the therapy records were presumably related to the child’s care and custody.
Stojack argued that the district court (Robert Teuton) abused its discretion or acted arbitrarily or capriciously in denying Stojack’s motion to compel disclosure of his child’s therapy records.
In Nevada, a writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy used to compel a public officer to perform a duty required by law or to control an arbitrary or capricious exercise of discretion (NRS 34.160). Mandamus is only appropriate where the petitioner demonstrates a clear legal right to the relief requested and the lower court has manifestly abused its discretion. Nevada courts generally disfavor writ petitions challenging discovery rulings.
The Court of Appeals denied the petition for writ of mandamus.
- Banker v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct., No. 89766-COA (Nev. Ct. App. Feb. 18, 2025) (Unpublished)
Banker filed a writ petition challenging the jurisdiction of the family court (Amy Mastin) to enforce a property settlement agreement. The family court had not yet made a final ruling on jurisdiction but had scheduled an evidentiary hearing to determine the parties’ intent regarding the agreement, merger issues, and its enforcement. Banker sought extraordinary relief to prevent the court from proceeding.
Banker argued that the family court exceed its jurisdiction in proceeding to enforce a property settlement agreement, thereby justifying writ relief, but he did not provide the agreement at issue in his record and at this point the family court has not made a final decision, but only set an evidentiary hearing to consider relevant evidence.
In Nevada, a writ of mandamus compels a public officer to perform a legal duty or correct an abuse of discretion (NRS 34.160). A writ of prohibition arrests judicial proceedings that exceed jurisdiction (NRS 34.320). Writ relief is extraordinary and only granted when there is no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at law.
The Court of Appeals denied the petition for writ of mandamus or prohibition.
- Mezzano v. Townley, No. 87863-COA (Nev. Ct. App. Feb. 19, 2025) (Unpublished)
Mezzano and Townley signed a prenuptial agreement before marriage, which stated that property acquired during marriage would be separate unless explicitly designated as community property. Townley filed for divorce in 2019 and obtained a default decree, which was later vacated by the Nevada Supreme Court due to improper service. On remand, Mezzano filed counterclaims and a crossclaim, including claims for divorce, conversion, breach of fiduciary duty, and others. Mezzano failed to comply with discovery obligations, including not appearing for her deposition or responding to discovery requests.
The district court (Bridget Robb) imposed sanctions, precluding Mezzano from introducing evidence in support of her claims, and granted summary judgment on five of her six counterclaims. The court also sua sponte granted summary judgment on parts of her divorce claim and ultimately ordered her to pay Townley over $740,000 as an equalization payment, treating certain real property (the “Yellowstone properties”) as community property.
Mezzano appealed arguing that the district court erred by failing to apply the prenuptial agreement when determining the character of the Yellowstone properties; abused its discretion by imposing discovery sanctions; and erred in sua sponte granting summary judgment on part of Mezzano’s divorce claim.
In Nevada, property acquired during marriage is presumed community property unless proven otherwise by clear and convincing evidence (Draskovich v. Draskovich, 2024). Valid prenuptial agreements are enforceable and may override community property presumptions (NRS 123A.050). Courts may impose discovery sanctions, including evidence preclusion, for failure to comply with NRCP 16.1 and 16.2. Summary judgment may be granted sua sponte if no genuine issue of material fact exists and the non-moving party is not prejudiced.
The district court abused its discretion by failing to consider the prenuptial agreement when determining the character of the Yellowstone properties. The discovery sanctions, however, were appropriate given Mezzano’s failure to comply with discovery obligations. Mezzano was not prejudiced by the sua sponte summary judgment due to the discovery sanctions that precluded her from presenting evidence. The case was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
- Lee v. Burden, No. 88009-COA (Nev. Ct. App. Feb. 19, 2025) (Unpublished)
Lee (n.k.a “Khalifa”) and Burden share one minor child but were never married. The parties initially shared joint legal and physical custody. In 2015, Khalifa was awarded primary physical custody, but in 2019, custody was modified to joint physical custody. In 2020, the family court (Dawn Throne) reaffirmed joint custody and selected Burden’s preferred school for the child. In 2022, Burden filed a motion to modify custody, alleging Khalifa emotionally abused the child and interfered with her education and therapy. The district court granted Burden temporary primary custody pending an evidentiary hearing and later awarded her primary physical custody, joint legal custody with final decision-making authority over education and mental health, and child support.
Khalifa appealed arguing that the district court abused its discretion in: modifying physical custody; granting Burden final decision-making authority over the child’s mental health treatment; and granting the school choice request; and that the Chief Judge erred in denying Khalifa’s motion to disqualify the trial judge.
In Nevada, custody modifications require a showing of (1) a substantial change in circumstances and (2) that modification is in the child’s best interest. Legal custody decisions, including decision-making authority, are reviewed for abuse of discretion. School selection is governed by the best interest standard and the Arcella factors. Judicial disqualification requires a showing of actual bias or improper conduct.
The Court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in modifying custody based on substantial evidence of emotional abuse and interference with the child’s education and therapy. The court properly granted Burden final decision-making authority over mental health treatment due to Khalifa’s refusal to support therapy. The court’s school selection decision was supported by the Arcella factors and substantial evidence. The Chief Judge did not abuse discretion in denying the motion to disqualify the trial judge.
- Deponte v. Oomrigar, No. 87487-COA (Nev. Ct. App. Mar. 3, 2025) (Unpublished)
Donna and Jonathan were married in 2010. Donna filed for divorce in 2021. On the eve of trial in 2022, the parties’ attorneys negotiated a settlement agreement via email, which was confirmed in court the next day without the parties present. Donna drafted a stipulated divorce decree based on the settlement, but Jonathan later refused to sign it, claiming that he never agreed to with its terms and that it was an unequal distribution of property. The court enforced the settlement and entered the decree without Jonathan’s signature. Nearly six months later, Jonathan moved to set aside the decree under NRCP 60(b), citing a forensic analysis that revealed unequal property distribution. Donna opposed, arguing claim preclusion and that no fraud or mistake had been proven.
The district court (Mari Parlade) set aside the stipulated decree and set the matter for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the decree complied with the requirements of NRS 125.150 for an equal division of community property.
Donna appealed arguing that the district court abused its discretion by partially setting aside the divorce decree under NRCP 60(b) despite the existence of a prior settlement agreement.
Under NRCP 60(b), a court may relieve a party from a final judgment for reasons including mistake, fraud, or “any other reason that justifies relief” (catchall provision under NRCP 60(b)(6)). Relief is granted in extraordinary circumstances to prevent injustice.
The Court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting partial relief under NRCP 60(b)(6), setting aside the decree, and setting the matter for an evidentiary hearing.
