1. Gray v. Gray, No. 91341-COA, Order of Affirmance (Unpublished Disposition, September 10, 2026)
Myisha and Ester Gray, previously married, share one child born in 2017. During Myisha’s divorce action, Ester sought primary physical custody based on a 2021 “gun incident” in which she alleged Myisha restrained and threatened her with a gun. The court instead ordered temporary joint custody and referred the parties to mediation. The 2022 divorce decree adopted the parties’ agreement for joint legal and physical custody, and included an undefined “event” provision letting Myisha take the child to weekend events on notice, subject to Ester’s existing plans. Ester later filed two modification motions. The first, based on a recorded “phone call incident” involving Myisha’s girlfriend, was denied for lack of good cause. The second, based on a September 2024 “soccer game incident” in which Myisha was arrested for domestic violence against Ester in the child’s presence and on Myisha’s repeated misuse of the “event” provision. After an evidentiary hearing, the District Court (Nadin Cutter) found a substantial change in circumstances, found by clear and convincing evidence that Myisha committed domestic violence, deemed her testimony not credible, awarded Ester primary physical custody, terminated the “event” provision, and later awarded Ester $20,000 in attorney fees (reduced from about $47,000 for income disparity).
Myisha appealed the modification and the fee award. She argued that the court improperly relied on previously known domestic violence incidents, barred by res judicata, to find a substantial change in circumstances; that it erred in admitting the recorded phone call as hearsay lacking foundation; that it acted arbitrarily by reinterpreting a recording it had earlier found showed cooperation; that grabbing the child’s arm was not domestic violence; that it failed to consider her evidence rebutting the domestic violence presumption; and that the fee award was unwarranted and excessive given the parties’ income disparity.
In Nevada, custody decisions and attorney fee awards are reviewed for an abuse of discretion, and factual findings and credibility determinations supported by substantial evidence are not reweighed on appeal. The child’s best interest the sole consideration in determining custody. To modify custody, the movant must show a substantial change in circumstances affecting the child’s welfare, and that modification serves the child’s best interest, weighing the statutory best-interest factors. Domestic violence known when the prior order was entered cannot itself establish a substantial change, but may inform the best-interest analysis. A court must hear all information about domestic violence. A finding by clear and convincing evidence that a parent committed domestic violence creates a rebuttable presumption against that parent’s custody. Arguments not raised previously, or raised on a different theory, are forfeited and reviewed at most for plain error, which is rarely granted in civil cases. Attorney fees may be awarded where a party maintains a position without reasonable ground to harass, or unreasonably and vexatiously multiply the proceedings, considering the Brunzell factors and any income disparity.
The Court of Appeals held that the District Court did not abuse its discretion. It did not use the earlier gun or phone-call incidents to find a substantial change in circumstances, resting that finding on the new soccer game incident and the misuse of the “event” provision, and permissibly weighed the older incidents only in the best-interest analysis. Myisha forfeited her hearsay and foundation challenge to the recording by objecting solely on lack-of-consent grounds, showed no plain error, and the court’s reassessment of that recording was a permissible credibility and weight determination. Any error in finding domestic violence against the child was harmless because Myisha did not dispute the domestic violence finding as to Ester, which independently supported the modification, and substantial evidence supported the unrebutted domestic violence presumption. Finally, the fee award was within the court’s discretion, supported by findings of unnecessary delay, intent to harass, and by consideration of the Brunzell factors and the income disparity. The judgment was AFFIRMED.
2. Hoodenpyle v. Hoodenpyle, No. 90081-COA, Order of Affirmance (Unpublished Disposition, September 10, 2026)
Dana and Manuela Hoodenpyle traveled to Las Vegas in 2004 for a short vacation to marry, then returned to Virginia, where they lived. Dana filed for divorce in Nevada in 2024 and obtained a clerk’s entry of default, which Manuela moved to set aside for lack of jurisdiction because neither party resided in Nevada. After the District Court (T. Arthur Ritchie, Jr.) set aside the default, Manuela answered and moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, asserting that she had never lived in or done business in Nevada. Dana opposed, contending that Manuela had submitted to jurisdiction through her motion, practice, and had minimum contacts through a family company, MMP-USA LLC, a Virginia entity that sold parts nationwide, and he attached various business records. The District Court found it lacked personal jurisdiction over Manuela, granted a status divorce based on Dana’s own presence in Nevada, and held that property issues would have to be litigated in a court with jurisdiction over the parties. It later denied Dana’s motion for reconsideration.
Dana appealed the personal jurisdiction ruling, arguing that Manuela had sufficient minimum contacts with Nevada, and that, regardless of her residency, other connections established jurisdiction, including the parties’ marriage in Nevada, the divorce action itself, and his own vehicle registration and business activity in the state. He also argued that the court erred by deciding the issue without an evidentiary hearing. Manuela responded that her only connection was a one week wedding trip two decades earlier, that the exhibits showed no purposeful contact with Nevada, and that she had no role in MMP-USA, so Dana failed to make a prima facie case.
In Nevada, a determination of personal jurisdiction is reviewed de novo, and the long-arm statute extends jurisdiction to the limits of due process. Specific personal jurisdiction over a nonresident requires minimum contacts, purposeful availment of the forum, a claim arising from those contacts, and consistency with fair play and substantial justice, while general jurisdiction requires contacts so continuous and systematic that the defendant is essentially at home in the forum. The minimum-contacts inquiry focuses on the defendant’s own suit-related conduct creating a substantial connection with the forum, not on contacts with people who reside there, and the plaintiff cannot be the sole link. A marriage in the state without residence, and the unilateral activity of others or a contract standing alone, do not establish the required contacts. A district court may resolve a fully briefed personal jurisdiction motion without holding an evidentiary hearing.
The Court of Appeals held that the District Court did not err in concluding that it lacked personal jurisdiction over Manuela. Although the parties married in Nevada in 2004, she never resided there, the family business was formed in Virginia, and the records Dana submitted showed no personal, purposeful Nevada activity by Manuela, and no continuous and systematic contacts. It further held that the court permissibly decided the fully briefed jurisdictional motion without an evidentiary hearing. In footnotes, the court also rejected Dana’s argument that Manuela had waived the defense, finding that she adequately preserved it, and noted that the Supreme Court had already denied her motion to dismiss the appeal. The judgment was AFFIRMED.
3. Newcomb v. Newcomb, No. 89874-COA, Order Affirming in Part, Reversing in Part and Remanding (Unpublished Disposition, September 10, 2026)
Norma and Raymond Newcomb married in 1993 and divorced by stipulated decree in 2020, having no children. The decree deemed the Henderson marital residence community property, awarded Norma lump-sum alimony, plus $15,000 “off the top” of the home sale proceeds, and directed that the remaining net proceeds be split evenly. An “exclusive possession” provision gave Raymond exclusive possession after his payment of $35,000, and required Norma to list the property herself, with Raymond to use best efforts to cooperate. Raymond changed the locks about two weeks later. Norma contended that this locked her out, and that Raymond refused to cooperate with her efforts to sell. Raymond contended that Norma moved out of state and never tried to comply with the decree. The home did not sell until 2023, and the sale price was roughly $575,000. Raymond moved for an order to show cause, arguing that Norma’s delay had cost him mortgage principal payments that should be offset against her share. Norma countered that Raymond should bear those payments because he had exclusive possession. After a two-day evidentiary hearing, the District Court (Nadin Cutter) found that it had been impossible for Norma to list the home because she was locked out, observed that the delayed sale had benefitted the community by about $180,000, yet nonetheless ordered, without explanation or legal authority, that the roughly $26,929 in mortgage principal be deducted from Norma’s share of the proceeds.
Norma appealed, arguing that the District Court abused its discretion in deducting the mortgage principal payments from her community-property share of the sale proceeds, and that the order lacked adequate findings of fact and legal conclusions to permit meaningful appellate review.
In Nevada, a district court’s division of property is reviewed for an abuse of discretion, but no deference is owed to legal error or to findings so conclusory that they may mask legal error. The court must reach its conclusions for appropriate reasons, and where an order contains no facts or legal analysis explaining how the court arrived at its result, the reviewing court cannot assess whether the ruling was proper and may reverse. Issues not raised on appeal are forfeited.
The Court of Appeals held that the District Court abused its discretion by requiring Norma to pay the entire mortgage principal out of her community-property share, and the order contained no findings of fact or legal basis for that ruling, particularly troubling given the court’s own finding that any delay in the sale had been an impossibility caused by Raymond’s conduct in locking Norma out. It reversed that portion of the order and remanded for the District Court to supply the legal basis and analysis for its ruling on the mortgage principal, while affirming all other, unchallenged aspects of the order. In a footnote, the court rejected Raymond’s separate-property reimbursement theory as both unpreserved and inapplicable since the residence was community property rather than his separate property or held in joint tenancy.
4. Hall v. Loftis, No. 90386-COA, Order of Affirmance (Unpublished Disposition, September 11, 2026)
Burke Hall and Vanessa Loftis were previously married and had three minor children. After their youngest child died in a tragic accident, they divorced, and the decree awarded Loftis sole legal and primary physical custody of the two remaining children, with Hall receiving supervised parenting time that later expanded by consent. In January 2024, Hall moved for joint legal and physical custody, alleging that Loftis medically neglected the children, and that her husband is a convicted felon. While the motion was pending, two confrontations involving Hall, his wife, and the older child (who is on the autism spectrum) drew police involvement, and the District Court (Gregory Gordon) temporarily reduced Hall’s parenting time with that child. The parties then elected to enter the Informal Family Trial Court program, signing an acknowledgment that waived the rules of evidence and allowed the court to question witnesses without objection. After the informal trial, the District Court found changed circumstances, but denied joint custody based on its best-interest findings, kept Loftis’s sole legal and primary physical custody, set Hall’s parenting time, found Hall’s claim that he could not work not credible, and imputed income for child support. Hall’s motion for reconsideration was denied.
Hall appealed the denial of his modification motion. He argued that the informal trial violated his due process rights by barring objections and by the court’s questioning of witnesses, which he said turned the court into an advocate; that a witness was improperly permitted to testify; that the court failed to meaningfully consider his evidence, improperly relied on the prior custody decree, and made an adverse credibility finding based on his demeanor; that it considered a children’s interview report that was never admitted; and that it imputed income without evidence of voluntary unemployment. He did not brief his challenge to the reconsideration order.
In Nevada, custody determinations and child-support orders are reviewed for an abuse of discretion, and factual findings and credibility determinations supported by substantial evidence are not reweighed on appeal. To modify custody, the moving party must show a substantial change in circumstances affecting the child’s welfare and that modification serves the child’s best interest, and the court must consider all evidence relevant to best interest and may be informed by its prior custody findings. A party who consents to a procedure waives a later objection to it. A court may impute income to an obligor who is unemployed or underemployed without good cause, with the parent’s good faith the key issue. An error is harmless unless, but for it, a different result might reasonably have been reached, and arguments not raised on appeal are forfeited.
The Court of Appeals held that the District Court did not abuse its discretion. Hall waived his challenge to the informal trial’s procedures by voluntarily agreeing to them, and the record showed that the court acted as a neutral fact-finder rather than an advocate, while the challenged witness was properly allowed to testify. Substantial evidence supported the denial of joint custody and the retention of Loftis’s sole legal and primary physical custody. The court permissibly considered its prior findings, and it would not reweigh the evidence or credibility. Any reliance on the unadmitted interview report was harmless. The court also properly imputed income after finding Hall’s claimed inability to work not credible, and that he resigned shortly after his support obligation was increased. Because Hall did not brief his reconsideration challenge, that order was affirmed as forfeited, and the judgment was AFFIRMED in full.
5. Martin v. Martin (n/k/a Palmer), No. 91865-COA, Order of Affirmance (Unpublished Disposition, September 29, 2026)
Michael Martin and Danielle (now Palmer) divorced in 2017 and share three children, one still a minor, and they have litigated post-decree matters repeatedly in the District Court (Heidi Almase) and the Nevada Supreme Court. In April 2025, the Supreme Court affirmed an award of attorney fees to Danielle. The following month, Michael moved for reconsideration of three District Court orders from late 2023 and early 2024, which had denied his opposition to appointing a parenting coordinator and his request for a child support review, denied a stay, and awarded Danielle attorney fees, or, in the alternative, for relief under NRCP 60(b); he also sought modification of child support, return of overpaid support, an order about future legal fees, and revised custody exchange instructions. The District Court denied reconsideration as untimely under the local 14-day rule (the motion came hundreds of days after notice of entry), found it lacked authority to reconsider matters affirmed by the Supreme Court, and, treating the motion as one under NRCP 60, found it both untimely and unsupported under the governing factors; it denied the remaining requests without prejudice for lack of supporting points and authorities.
Michael appealed, arguing that the District Court and the Supreme Court violated his due process rights and used procedural rules to his detriment throughout the custody and support litigation, that errors concerning orders not listed in his notice of appeal (particularly the parenting coordinator appointment) should be addressed, that the court improperly relied on an August 2020 stipulation to impede his parental rights, and that it abused its discretion in denying return of overpaid child support. He further argued that his motion was timely because it was filed shortly after the latest Supreme Court decision and the filing period had been tolled during that appeal, and that the court erred in finding that he acted in bad faith.
In Nevada, the denial of a motion for reconsideration and the denial of a motion for relief from judgment under NRCP 60(b) are each reviewed for an abuse of discretion, with the district court afforded wide discretion and its factual findings, if supported by substantial evidence, not reweighed on appeal. Reconsideration is appropriate only where a party presents substantially different evidence or shows that the prior decision was clearly erroneous, and the local rules require the motion to be filed within 14 days. Relief under NRCP 60(b) for mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect must be sought within six months of the challenged order, and the court weighs the Yochum factors—prompt application, absence of intent to delay, lack of knowledge of procedural requirements, and good faith—alongside Nevada’s policy favoring adjudication on the merits. A district court has no authority to reconsider or grant relief from orders that the Supreme Court has affirmed.
The Court of Appeals held that the District Court did not abuse its discretion. To the extent Michael sought reconsideration, he introduced no substantially different evidence, showed no clear error, and his request for a wholesale review of the record, including of the Supreme Court’s own rulings, was not a proper basis for reconsideration. To the extent that he sought relief under NRCP 60(b), his motion came more than six months after notice of entry of the challenged orders and was therefore barred, and the District Court’s findings on the Yochum factors, that the motion was not promptly filed and not made in good faith, were supported by substantial evidence that the appellate court would not reweigh. The judgment was AFFIRMED.
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