1. Maxwell v. Simpson, No. 92163-COA, Order Affirming in Part and Dismissing in Part (Unpublished Disposition, September 30, 2026)
Krysten Maxwell and Gregory Simpson, Jr., who were never married, share one minor child, N.S. A 2022 custody decree awarded joint legal custody, gave Simpson primary physical custody, and gave Maxwell unsupervised parenting time. A central pre-decree dispute was whether Maxwell was abusing methamphetamine. The court ordered her into the Options patch-testing program, she repeatedly tested positive and failed to complete it, and she attributed the results to innocent environmental exposure, fraud, or contaminated samples. The court credited expert testimony that the patch program was reliable and that her results were not caused by exposure, and it entered the decree based on that and other findings. Maxwell’s appeal of the decree was later dismissed by stipulation. She then filed three successive motions to modify custody, in September 2023, February 2025, and August 2025, each alleging conflict with Simpson, N.S.’s academic struggles, and a deteriorating relationship, while continuing to test positive or refuse testing. The District Court (Nadin Cutter) denied each, conditioning any reconsideration of her parenting time on her producing twelve clean patch tests, and on reconsideration, allowed her to undergo hair and urine testing at her own expense in addition to the patches.
Maxwell appealed, arguing that the District Court abused its discretion by denying her 2025 modification motions without an evidentiary hearing, and by requiring twelve clean patch tests before it would consider modifying parenting time. She further argued that the court should have held a hearing on the reliability of the patch results and whether her positive tests resulted from fraud by Options, and that it erred in declining to modify child support. Her notice of appeal and brief also challenged various orders predating the initial decree and findings within the decree itself. Simpson responded that she had failed to allege changed circumstances, had not completed the Options program, and that her reliability challenge was untimely.
In Nevada, the denial of a motion to modify physical custody without an evidentiary hearing is reviewed for an abuse of discretion, found only where no reasonable judge could reach the same conclusion. A hearing is required only if the movant shows adequate cause, a prima facie case for modification, by demonstrating a substantial change in circumstances affecting the child’s welfare that generally arose since the last custody determination (to prevent repetitive, serial motions) and that modification serves the child’s best interest. The court accepts the movant’s allegations as true, but need not ignore evidence conclusively establishing they are false, nor credit vague or general allegations. Modifying child support likewise requires a change in circumstances since the prior order and the child’s best interest, and the trial court retains continuing jurisdiction over support. An untimely notice of appeal does not invoke appellate jurisdiction, and the law-of-the-case doctrine bars relitigating an issue already decided.
The Court of Appeals held that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying the modification motions without a hearing because Maxwell failed to allege changed circumstances; the conflict and academic struggles had been litigated in the initial proceedings; her allegations blaming Simpson were too vague; and she either refused court-ordered testing or tested positive, so her filings were repetitive, serial motions and the court need not blind itself to the evidence of her drug use. It rejected her challenge to the patch-test reliability under the law-of-the-case doctrine because that issue had been decided at the initial evidentiary hearing and she had abandoned her appeal of it, and it rejected her “Catch-22” contention. It AFFIRMED the denial of child support modification, holding that it had jurisdiction despite separate support proceedings, and that she alleged no changed circumstances. The portions of the appeal challenging the pre-decree orders and the initial decree were dismissed as untimely. In a footnote, the court clarified that completing the patch program is not a strict pre-condition to filing, and that a future motion adequately alleging changed circumstances and best interest would obligate the court to consider it. The order was AFFIRMED in PART and the appeal DISMISSED in PART.
2. Schoenwald v. Tarantelli, No. 91757-COA, Order of Affirmance (Unpublished Disposition, October 2, 2026)
Alexander Schoenwald and Krista Tarantelli never married but share one child, born in December 2022. In August 2024, Tarantelli filed for sole legal and primary physical custody, and Schoenwald counterclaimed for sole legal and physical custody. Citing an alleged domestic violence incident, Schoenwald withheld in-person contact between the child and Tarantelli for roughly six months even though no court order barred her parenting time. After extensive motion practice, the District Court (Amy Mastin) ordered temporary joint physical custody, and the matter proceeded to an evidentiary hearing at which both parties testified. The court analyzed the best-interest factors, awarded Tarantelli sole legal and primary physical custody, and ordered Schoenwald to pay $320 per month in child support based on his most recent financial disclosure. Eleven days after entry of the decree, Schoenwald moved to modify child support claiming that his income had dropped more than twenty percent, and the District Court denied the motion.
Schoenwald appealed the custody decree and the denial of his modification motion. He argued that the District Court failed to properly analyze the best interest factors, particularly the domestic violence factor, and disregarded his evidence; that the child support award rested on an inaccurate gross monthly income and should have been offset for his caregiving history and prior contributions to the child’s expenses; that the court erred in denying modification despite his claimed income decrease; that it denied him due process by disregarding his evidence, limiting his opportunity to be heard, and “chilling” his speech; and that the judge was biased against him.
In Nevada, custody and child support decisions are reviewed for an abuse of discretion, with factual findings upheld if supported by substantial evidence, and credibility determinations and the weighing of evidence left to the trier of fact rather than reweighed on appeal. The child’s best interest is the sole consideration in custody, and a written decree must make findings on all twelve statutory best interest factors and tie them to the custody determination; joint physical custody must be considered first, with findings required when another arrangement is imposed, and domestic violence as a best interest factor is evaluated by a preponderance of the evidence. Child support follows the administrative formula — a set percentage of the obligor’s gross monthly income, with adjustments available on request — and a court must review a support order upon a twenty-percent change in the obligor’s income, while modification also requires a change in circumstances and consideration of the child’s best interest. Constitutional claims are reviewed de novo; due process requires notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard, and district courts have broad discretion over the form of evidentiary hearings. Claims of judicial bias generally must stem from an extrajudicial source, and adverse rulings alone are not disqualifying.
The Court of Appeals held that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in awarding Tarantelli sole legal and primary physical custody because it made specific best interest findings supported by substantial evidence, reasonably weighing Schoenwald’s months-long withholding of the child, his controlling behavior, his lack of credibility, and permissibly found domestic violence unproven by a preponderance of the evidence; his contentions amounted to requests to reweigh the evidence and revisit credibility, which the court would not do. It AFFIRMED the $320 child support award as consistent with the statutory formula and with Schoenwald’s own disclosure, which he had testified was accurate, and AFFIRMED the denial of his modification motion because he offered no best interest reason, did not explain his voluntary reduction to one workday per week, and submitted unverifiable pay stubs. It REJECTED his due process claim because he received notice, equal time, and full participation, and REJECTED his bias claim for lack of any extrajudicial source or deep-seated antagonism. The judgment was AFFIRMED.
3. In Re: Marriage of Carney and Probst, No. 91350-COA, Order of Affirmance (Unpublished Disposition, October 7, 2026)
Kristina Probst and Casey Carney divorced in 2011 and share two minor children. Under their prior arrangement, the parties had joint legal custody, with Carney holding primary physical custody and Probst exercising parenting time. After concerns arose over sexual contact between Probst’s stepson and the parties’ younger child, the District Court (Sandra Unsworth) moved Probst to supervised parenting time, and the parties agreed to a safety plan and reunification therapy, for which the court appointed a therapist and a parenting coordinator. The court later restored unsupervised parenting time on the therapist’s recommendation, but disputes developed between Probst and the parenting coordinator. In January 2024, Probst moved to remove the therapist and coordinator for alleged bias, and claimed that Carney had withheld her parenting time. After an evidentiary hearing, the District Court denied the motion, finding that safety issues had occurred in Probst’s home, that the professionals were not biased but could no longer work with her, that Carney should retain primary physical custody, and that Probst’s parenting time could occur only in the Reno/Sparks area rather than at her California home. The Court of Appeals affirmed that order in a prior appeal. Carney then moved for attorney fees under NRS 18.010(2)(b) and NRS 125C.250, and the District Court granted fees of $18,300 under the former statute while evaluating reasonableness under the Brunzell factors and the parties’ income disparity.
Probst appealed the fee award. She first renewed her challenges to the District Court’s underlying January 2024 rulings and to the prior order affirming them. As to fees, she argued that she, not Carney, was the prevailing party, that the District Court made no findings that her motion was frivolous or brought to harass, and that it failed to consider the Brunzell factors and the disparity in the parties’ income.
In Nevada, an award of attorney fees is reviewed for an abuse of discretion, and an order that reaches the correct result will be affirmed even if based on the wrong reason. Fees require authorization by statute, rule, or contract. Under NRS 18.010(2)(b), a court may award fees to a prevailing party only on findings that the opposing party’s claim was brought or maintained without reasonable ground or to harass, and merely losing a motion is not enough; a party prevails by succeeding on any significant issue that achieves some of the benefit sought. Separately, NRS 125C.250 gives the court broad discretion in a custody action to award reasonable fees, requiring adequate findings of reasonableness under the Brunzell factors together with the parties’ income disparity. Under the law-of-the-case doctrine, a legal decision made at one stage of the litigation binds throughout and cannot be avoided by a more detailed or precisely focused argument made later.
The Court of Appeals held that Probst’s challenges to the prior January 2024 rulings and the earlier affirmance were barred by the law-of-the-case doctrine, with no exception shown. It held that Carney was properly deemed the prevailing party because he succeeded on significant issues raised by Probst’s motion. It agreed with Probst that the District Court’s stated basis for fees under NRS 18.010(2)(b) was unsupported because the court made no finding that her motion was brought or maintained without reasonable ground or to harass, focusing instead only on the prior suspension of her parenting time. Nevertheless, the court AFFIRMED the award under NRS 125C.250, which Carney had invoked and the District Court had recognized, because the District Court made specific Brunzell findings and considered the parties’ income disparity, all supported by substantial evidence, so the award stood on that proper alternative ground. The judgment was AFFIRMED.
4. Pinto v. Pinto-Guardado, No. 90603-COA, Order Affirming in Part, Reversing in Part and Remanding (Unpublished Disposition, October 16, 2026)
Vanessa Pinto and Francis Pinto-Guardado divorced in 2022 and share two children, A.P. and J.P., with joint legal and physical custody. In July 2024, Vanessa moved to modify to primary physical custody. Francis opposed and counter-moved, asserting that she was not complying with joint legal custody and had enrolled A.P. in a school other than the one A.P. was zoned for — Silvestri. After a September 2024 hearing, the District Court (David Gibson) denied Vanessa’s motion for lack of changed circumstances, ordered A.P. enrolled at Silvestri, and awarded Francis attorney fees. Vanessa sought reconsideration as to fees, and Francis countered that she still refused to enroll A.P. at Silvestri, sought to have her held in contempt and declared a vexatious litigant, and requested orders about the children’s health insurance. Following a January 2025 hearing, the court denied reconsideration, set the health insurance split, and indicated that it would issue an order to show cause. After a March 2025 show-cause hearing, the court declared Vanessa a vexatious litigant, found her in contempt, assessed daily fines and the prospect of jail for failing to enroll A.P. at Silvestri, and awarded Francis sole legal custody. Vanessa appealed.
Vanessa challenged the order declaring her a vexatious litigant, arguing that her pleadings were not frivolous, and the contempt determination, arguing that she could not comply with the directive to enroll A.P. at Silvestri because the same order had awarded Francis sole legal custody. She did not challenge the sole legal custody award in her opening brief, and her attempts to contest the health insurance obligation and the school enrollment decision were tied to earlier orders.
In Nevada, an order declaring a person a vexatious litigant and restricting court access is reviewed for an abuse of discretion, and because it limits the right of access to the courts, the court must apply a four-factor analysis: reasonable notice and an opportunity to oppose; an adequate record explaining the order; a finding that the filings were frivolous or harassing rather than merely litigious; and an order narrowly drawn to the specific problem. Contempt orders are also reviewed for an abuse of discretion, and, while not independently appealable, may be reviewed within an otherwise appealable order; disobedience of a lawful order is contempt, imposable on notice and an opportunity to be heard, but no deference is owed to legal error. Sole legal custody vests basic legal decision making for the child, including education, in one parent. Issues omitted from the opening brief are forfeited, new arguments cannot be raised in reply, and a challenge to an earlier appealable order or a special order after final judgment must be brought in a timely appeal from that order.
The Court of Appeals held that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in declaring Vanessa a vexatious litigant because it conducted the required four-factor analysis; (1) providing notice and an opportunity to oppose, that she did not use, (2) making an adequate record of her repetitive custody and reconsideration filings and her noncompliance, (3) finding her filings harassing and frivolous, and (4) narrowly tailoring the order by allowing filings subject to a merit review. It REVERSED the contempt determination, however, because the same order awarded Francis sole legal custody, vesting all educational decisions in him, so the court could not simultaneously hold Vanessa in contempt—with daily fines and the threat of jail—for failing to take a step that she had no legal power to take. It could restrain her from interfering with the enrollment, but not compel her to enroll the child, and holding otherwise was legal error. The court declined to reach the unchallenged sole legal custody award, the health-insurance obligation, and the school choice argument as not properly before it, and it would not consider post-order developments outside of the record. The order was AFFIRMED in PART, REVERSED in PART, and REMANDED.
5. Trout v. Trout, No. 91342-COA, Order of Affirmance (Unpublished Disposition, October 16, 2026)
Brandon and Annastacia Trout, during their divorce proceedings, stipulated in 2021 to joint legal and physical custody of their two children, and to a $1,700 monthly child support obligation for Brandon, with a review to occur in May 2024. In September 2024, Annastacia moved to modify child support, arguing that Brandon’s income had increased, and requested attorney fees under the child support statute. Brandon opposed, and sought his own fees under NRS 18.010. After a June 2025 evidentiary hearing, the District Court (Michele Mercer) found that Brandon’s income had increased by more than twenty percent, modified his obligation to $1,981 per month retroactive to September 2024, and ordered the parties to calculate arrears. It denied Brandon’s fee request and allowed Annastacia, as the prevailing party, to submit a fee memorandum, after which it awarded her $13,689 in attorney fees under NRS 125B.140 and $10.50 in costs.
Brandon appealed the award, arguing that Annastacia was not entitled to attorney fees under NRS 18.010(2)(b) because he had been forced to litigate the matter, that the amount of fees was unreasonable and unsupported by evidence of the claimed hourly rates, and that Annastacia had not shown that her costs were actually incurred, offering only non-descript billing statements.
In Nevada, an award of attorney fees or costs is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. In setting a reasonable fee, the court must consider the Brunzell factors. Express findings are preferred, but not required where the record shows that the factors were considered and that the award is supported by substantial evidence. And, in a family law case, the court must also consider the disparity in the parties’ income. Arguments not raised on appeal are forfeited. An appellant bears the burden of providing an adequate appellate record, and where necessary documents are omitted, the reviewing court presumes that the missing portions support the district court’s decision.
The Court of Appeals held that the District Court did not abuse its discretion. Because the fees were awarded under NRS 125B.140 rather than NRS 18.010(2)(b), and Brandon offered no argument on the propriety of fees under the statute that the court actually applied, his challenge was forfeited and not considered. The court’s order otherwise showed that it considered the Brunzell factors, made sufficient findings, and weighed the parties’ income disparity, finding Brandon better positioned to pay. And, because Brandon failed to include Annastacia’s fee memorandum, the billing statements, or his own opposition in the appellate record, the court presumed that the missing materials supported both the fee and cost awards. The judgment was AFFIRMED.
- New Cases Added to MLAW: 5 COA Unpublished: Maxwell, Schoenwald, In Re: Marriage of Carney and Probst, Pinto, and Trout. - November 1, 2026
- New Cases Added to MLAW: 5 COA Unpublished: Gray, Hoodenpyle, Newcomb, Hall, and Martin - October 28, 2026
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