New Cases Added to MLAW: 1 SCT Unpublished: Vidrine; 4 COA Unpublished: Minhas, In the Matter of the Guardianship of E.I.C. (Minor), Clements, DeNoto, and Toung 

by | Aug 31, 2026 | Nevada Family Law Appeals | 0 comments

1.    Vidrine v. Mulliner, No. 91919, Order Dismissing Appeal and Cross-Appeal (Unpublished Disposition, June 3, 2026)

Timothy Vidrine and Anistasia Mulliner were parties to a child custody dispute. On December 1, 2025, the Seventh Judicial District Court (White Pine County; Robert Estes) entered an order granting a motion to modify custody of their minor child and directing each party to bear their own fees and costs. Vidrine appealed, and Mulliner cross-appealed. Vidrine’s notice of appeal was served on Mulliner’s counsel on December 30, 2025. Mulliner did not file her notice of cross-appeal in the District Court until January 23, 2026.

The Supreme Court raised a jurisdictional defect on its own and ordered Mulliner to show cause why her cross-appeal was not untimely. Mulliner argued that the 14-day window to cross-appeal did not begin until January 9, 2026, when Vidrine’s notice of appeal was docketed in the Supreme Court, and that she had been advised by the clerk’s office that the clock ran from that point.

In Nevada, under NRAP 4(a)(3), once one party timely files a notice of appeal, any other party must file its own notice no later than 14 days after the first notice was served (or within the time otherwise allowed under Rule 4(a), whichever is later). The deadline to file a notice of appeal is mandatory and jurisdictional, and under NRAP 26(b)(1)(A) the court may not extend it except as provided in Rule 4(c). An appeal may also be dismissed as abandoned where the appellant fails to comply with court orders to retain counsel or proceed pro se.

The Nevada Supreme Court dismissed both the appeal and the cross-appeal. It held that Mulliner’s cross-appeal was untimely because the 14-day period ran from the December 30, 2025, service of Vidrine’s notice of appeal—giving her until January 13, 2026—not from the January 9 docketing date, so her January 23 filing was ten days late; and that even if she had been misadvised, the deadline is mandatory and the court could not extend it, leaving it without jurisdiction over the cross-appeal. It separately dismissed Vidrine’s appeal as abandoned because, after his counsel was permitted to withdraw, he failed to retain new counsel, or notify the court he would proceed pro se, or otherwise communicate with the court despite repeated orders and warnings.

 

2.    Minhas v. Gill, No. 89267-COA, Order of Reversal and Remand (Unpublished Disposition, June 2, 2026)

Sandeep Minhas and Monika Gill married in 2008 and divorced by joint decree in 2020. The settlement agreement incorporated in the decree awarded Gill real property in San Jose, California, and the net proceeds from the sale of a Fremont, California condominium. But those properties were owned by the SMG Trust, which Minhas had created in 2017, and which was never mentioned or joined in the divorce. The appeal centered on two conflicting copies of the trust, both dated October 8, 2017; one declaring it revocable under California law, and the other irrevocable with spendthrift protections under Nevada law. Minhas later moved to set aside the decree, arguing that he could not have conveyed the properties because the trust held title. After the parties agreed to bring the trust into the case, he filed a third-party complaint against it and, shortly before the hearing, produced the irrevocable version and argued that the decree was void under NRCP 60(b)(4) for distributing a third party’s assets. The District Court (Bill Henderson) deemed the trust revocable, found the irrevocable version unreliable, struck the third-party complaint, found the trust revoked as to the two properties, and upheld Gill’s benefits under the decree—all without joining the trust.

Minhas appealed, arguing that the District Court abused its discretion by determining that the SMG Trust was not a necessary party, and by denying his motion to set aside the divorce decree.

In Nevada, an order denying a motion to set aside a judgment is reviewed for abuse of discretion, and appellate courts may address the joinder of necessary parties on their own initiative. Under NRCP 19, a person whose joinder will not defeat jurisdiction must be joined where the court cannot accord complete relief without them, or where their absence would impair their interest or expose an existing party to inconsistent obligations. If a required party is not joined, the court should not enter a final order. Where a third party—including a trust—holds legal title to property at issue, failure to join that party is fatal to a judgment regarding that property because distributing another’s property without joinder risks taking property without a hearing, and forcing re-litigation.

The Court of Appeals Reversed and Remanded. It held that the SMG Trust, whether revocable or irrevocable, indisputably owned the properties or their sale proceeds, making it a necessary party whose interest the District Court’s order potentially impaired. The court distinguished cases excusing joinder where the spouses were the sole co-settlors, co-trustees, and co-beneficiaries, noting that here the trustee and other named beneficiaries were not parties. Because the District Court interpreted the trust, declared it revocable, and distributed its assets without joining it, the resulting order was void. The court Reversed, directed that the trust be joined, and instructed the District Court to reconsider the NRCP 60(b) arguments once joinder was accomplished.

 

3.    In the Matter of the Guardianship of E.I.C. (Minor), Clements v. Reed, No. 91844-COA, Order of Affirmance (Unpublished Disposition, June 15, 2026)

In April 2017, the District Court (Michelle Rocheleau) granted Joelle Reed and Carolyn Louise Reed guardianship over two minor children, E.I.C. and E.M.D., after the guardians alleged the parents could not care for them. In the following years, Richard Dominic Clements, E.I.C.’s father, repeatedly tried and failed to terminate the guardianship. In September 2025, he filed an emergency motion to vacate it, asserting that the original order was void for lack of service, that he was entitled to relief under NRCP 60(b)(4), and further suggested that the court’s prior rulings reflected judicial corruption. The District Court denied the motion on two grounds: 1) It found the motion void because Richard had not properly served the appropriate parties; 2) Reaching the merits, it found that his service claims had already been raised and rejected in prior proceedings, making the issue res judicata, and that he failed to allege facts showing termination was in E.I.C.’s best interest. This appeal followed.

Richard’s appeal argued that the District Court erred in denying his motion because the original guardianship order was void for lack of proper service under NRS 159A.034(1). He pointed to prior orders he said acknowledged the missing proof of service, contended that the court wrongly relied on res judicata given his repeated challenges, and asserted that because the order was entered without jurisdiction it was void, entitling him to NRCP 60(b)(4) relief.

In Nevada, guardianship decisions and rulings on NRCP 60(b) motions to set aside a judgment are reviewed for abuse of discretion, as is dismissal for failure to serve process. Ineffective service can render a judgment void, and the policy favoring resolution on the merits is heightened in domestic-relations matters. But where a district court rests its decision on multiple independent grounds, an appellant who fails to challenge each one forfeits the appeal as to that ruling. Under the law-of-the-case doctrine, a legal decision made at one stage of a proceeding generally governs throughout. And, under the termination statute applicable to pre-July 2017 guardianships, the parent seeking termination bears the burden of showing by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the ward’s best interest.

The Court of Appeals held that Richard was not entitled to relief and Affirmed.

 

4.    DeNoto v. Hilton, No. 91325-COA, Order of Affirmance (Unpublished Disposition, June 16, 2026)

Ricky DeNoto and Alisha Hilton, who were never married, share one minor child (T.D., born 2017) and exercised equal week-on/week-off parenting time after both moved to Nevada, with Hilton generally handling T.D.’s medical, insurance, and school matters. In early 2024, Hilton took a temporary work assignment in Hawaii, and the self-represented parties signed a written “Permission to Travel” agreement allowing T.D. to remain there for a set window in summer 2024. As the return date approached, Hilton became evasive, stopped communicating, never returned T.D. to Nevada, and enrolled him in a Hawaii school without DeNoto’s consent. T.D. later suffered serious injuries in a vehicle accident in Hawaii requiring extensive ongoing medical care. DeNoto filed a paternity action, and after trial, the District Court (Adriana White) found that Nevada had jurisdiction, entered joint legal custody, and awarded Hilton primary physical custody in Hawaii based on the best-interest factors.

DeNoto appealed the physical-custody determination (but not the child-support or other financial provisions), arguing that the District Court abused its discretion by misapplying several best-interest factors, by minimizing Hilton’s non-return of T.D. and her unilateral school enrollment, by failing to make necessary credibility findings, and by entering findings unsupported by substantial evidence. His primary challenge was to the court’s treatment of the factor addressing which parent would foster the child’s relationship with the other parent as “neutral,” despite Hilton’s conduct.

In Nevada, child-custody determinations are reviewed for abuse of discretion, which occurs when the decision is not supported by substantial evidence or is clearly erroneous; substantial evidence is evidence a reasonable person may accept as adequate to sustain a judgment. The sole consideration is the best interest of the child, assessed through the statutory best-interest factors, and no single factor is given controlling weight. The reviewing court does not reweigh evidence or reassess witness credibility, and an error warrants reversal only if it affected the appellant’s substantial rights.

The Court of Appeals held that the District Court did not abuse its discretion and Affirmed.

 

5.    Toung v. Solis, No. 91453-COA, Order of Affirmance (Unpublished Disposition, June 16, 2026)

Danial Toung and Sauri Reachi Solis, who were never married, share three children (A.T., born 2016; N.T., born 2020; and H.R.S., born 2024). A 2021 custody decree gave the parties joint legal custody and Sauri primary physical custody of A.T. and N.T., with parenting time to Danial. After H.R.S. was born, Sauri moved to modify custody based on changed circumstances, alleging that Danial had disengaged from the family, stopped contacting the children, and been arrested for domestic violence. Danial disputed this, and petitioned to change H.R.S.’s name. Following trial, the District Court (Frank Sullivan) found that joint physical custody was not in the children’s best interest given Danial’s only “sporadic” contact since 2023, awarded Sauri primary physical custody of all three children and sole legal custody, and ordered Danial’s parenting time supervised.

Danial appealed only the physical-custody decision, raising four arguments: 1) The District Court misapplied the best-interest factors by relying on hearsay and unsubstantiated claims; 2) Procedural irregularities denied him a fair trial, including untimely scheduling, and that the second judge’s alleged repetition of prior testimony; 3) The chief judge improperly denied his motion to disqualify the first judge for bias; 4) The District Court improperly refused to admit key evidence and excluded witnesses. He also challenged the denial of his request to change H.R.S.’s name to reflect only his surname.

In Nevada, child-custody decisions (including parenting-time determinations) are reviewed for abuse of discretion, which occurs only when no reasonable judge could reach a similar conclusion under the same circumstances, and factual findings are affirmed if supported by substantial evidence, which the reviewing court will not reweigh. Physical custody may be modified only on a showing of a substantial change in circumstances affecting the child’s welfare and that modification serves the child’s best interest, with the best interest being the sole consideration and the statutory factors non-exhaustive. A judge is presumed unbiased, and disqualification generally requires a showing of deep-seated favoritism or antagonism, ordinarily from an extrajudicial source. Appellate courts need not consider arguments that are not cogently argued.

The Court of Appeals held that Danial failed to demonstrate any abuse of discretion and Affirmed the judgement in full.

Marshal S. Willick
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